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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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MOSCOW WEEKLY CITES PETER HART POLL OF U.S. SCIENTISTS

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 2, 18-25 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Andrei Avdulov, Cand. Sc. (Technology), USSR State Prize winner]

[Text]

ALL PEOPLE – from politicians to schoolchildren – today are talking about the SDI, expressing different views. But there is a group, more competent in matters related to SDI. These are scientists, and mostly physicists.

What do American physicists think about the SDI? Some of them oppose this programme and have refused to participate in its development. But General James A. Abrahamson, head of the SDI programme, maintained that opposition to the Star Wars in the US scientific community is confined only to a "handful of diehards".

How big is this "handful of people"? The results of the poll recently held among the members of the American Physical Society – a very representative US organization of physicists uniting more than 37,000 scientists – help to answer this question. The poll was carried out by the firm Peter D. Hart Research Associates at the request of the Union of Concerned Scientists. The questionnaire circulated among the society members included six questions.

First question: How well are you informed about the Strategic Defense Initiative and the problems it implies. Versions of replies: "very well", "more or less" and "not much". The results (in percentages) are: 60, 29, and 9. One per cent of those polled could not assess the degree of their knowledge (I don't know exactly).

Scientists are inclined to underestimate their knowledge rather than overestimate it, therefore it can be said that 90 per cent of the polled are well informed about SDI.

Second question: Is the US moving in the right or wrong direction by developing the following types of weapons for its national security: MX missiles, Trident submarines, cruise missiles, arms under the SDI programme, Midgetman missiles and Stealth bombers? Below is the table received by the sponsors of the poll.

Hence it follows that American physicists are by no means pacifists opposing the development of all weapons. Most of the people who gave a definite answer approve of the development of submarines, cruise and Midgetman missiles and new bombers. On the other hand, most American physicists (approximately 2 to 1) resolutely condemn the development of space anti-missile defence and MX missiles. In addition, a number of those polled who held a passive stand regarding the SDI programme was the least: it was condemned by the majority of the polled.

Third question: concerns individual stages of SDI. It proceeds from the fact that work has already started and now it must be decided whether it is to be confined to laboratory research or the threshold of laboratories is to be overstepped and samples be developed and tested, followed by the system's deployment. The overwhelming majority (77 per cent) was in favour of continuing laboratory research and 21 per cent of the polled suggested that it be stopped.

It is not very little but still a minority. This is easy to explain. Physicists value any opportunity to conduct fundamental research. Moreover, in

the current situation when the Reagan administration has sharply cut allocations for peaceful science and almost 75 per cent of funds on "Research and Developments" go to the Pentagon. Hence, it can be assumed that laboratory research was backed not only by those who really approve of SDI but also a considerable number of scientists who wish to utilize this programme as a generous source of funds.

It may not be out of place to recall the statement of David L. Parnas, a computer scientist, former member of one of the scientific consultative groups of the Pentagon Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Last year he applied for retirement, regarding as amoral to do work which, in his opinion, is unrealizable and dangerous for peace. He said that he had met people who had told him that they knew it was impossible to create a programme support for SDI but believed that the programme must be continued because through it funds could be drawn for sound investigations... "Is it fair to hold such a stand?" asks Mr. Parnas.

Let's not go deeper into moral aspects of the problem. It can be emphasized that 62 per cent of physicists opposed the deployment of the SDI system and only 21 per cent spoke in favour of this programme. With a threefold majority scientists reject the turning of research into a real system. It may be recalled that at the talks in Reykjavik the Soviet Union did not insist on stopping laboratory research into the SDI programme. It only suggested that the US should strictly observe for 10 years the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and not overstep the laboratory threshold with SDI developments.

Answers to the 4th and 5th questions of the questionnaire show the reasons for which American physicists oppose the deployment of space weapons.

Fourth question: It concerns the possibility of protecting various US installations by means of SDI. To this question 67 per cent of the polled answered that in that way it is impossible to defend the country. And 52 per cent of scientists believe that SDI cannot defend even separate populated areas.

Fifth question: What percentage of Soviet warheads will break through the best possible SDI version in case of a massed attack? Only one per cent of physicists think that all warheads can be intercepted, 32 per cent are sure that up to 10 per cent will break through, 49 per cent gave bigger figures. Many of them (21 per cent) believe that over 50 per cent of the nuclear charges will reach the targets.

Sixth question: Do you regard as sufficient or insufficient the offensive nuclear potential of the US as an effective deterrent against a Soviet attack? Answers were practically unanimous – 81 per cent said "sufficient", only 8 per cent "insufficient", and 11 per cent abstained.

On all aspects touched upon in the questionnaire most scientists condemn the Star Wars programme. In his statements about a "handful of diehards" General Abrahamson, to put it mildly, sinned against the truth.

Type of weapons	Answers (in percentages)			
	right	wrong	don't care	don't know exactly
MX missiles	18	50	19	13
Trident submarines	63	11	8	18
Cruise missiles	45	26	10	19
SDI programme	29	54	6	11
Midgetman missiles	25	19	8	48
Stealth bombers	39	24	10	27

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CSO: 5200/1242

PRAVDA ON ROBERT MCNAMARA BOOK CRITICAL OF SDI

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 22 Jan 87 pp 1-4

[G. Tsagalov article: "What Robert McNamara Thinks about the Current U.S. Administration's Nuclear Policy"]

[Text] Robert McNamara's book "Blundering into Disaster" came out in the USA recently.

McNamara has no sympathies for socialism. He's a millionnaire, a successful businessman and a statesman. For a long time he worked for Ford, who entrusted to him the management of his auto plants. Then he moved on from the Ford Motor Co. presidentship to a minister's job. He was in charge of the Pentagon under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Directly answering for US military policy, he wasn't reputed to be a "dove." Not for nothing was the Vietnam war called "McNamara's war." Later he heads the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and is on the board of powerful transnational corporations.

Wisened by such a rich practical experience, he does not hide his motives in taking up the pen. Years of reflection have led him to conclude that Washington's nuclear strategy, especially under Reagan, is deeply wrong and has an in-built enormous risk of destroying all mankind. McNamara is exhorting the USA and NATO to abandon this reckless line.

The book reveals the mendacity of the godfathers of star militarism. It notes, in particular, the substitution of a fundamentally new SDI variant for the earlier proclaimed one.

Initially Reagan promised SDI-based protection from nuclear threat to the entire US population (Star Wars-I). However, implementing the project of such an impenetrable space shield proved virtually impossible. Then came the plan of protecting chiefly missile bases, command centres and only "partly" the population (Star Wars-II).

The declared ultimate aim in the first case is to replace offensive weapon systems with defensive. In the second: to preserve the offensive systems while adding defensive to them. But such "pairing" means nothing but an attempt to become able to deal a first unpunished nuclear strike.

Indeed, if Star Wars-II can't repulse a full-scale missile attack, then what aims do they pursue? The answer is simple: they'll come in handy should the USA risk a massive nuclear attack on the USSR. Weakened retaliation forces surviving the first US blow would be easier to cope with. That's the big point.

The recent US abandonment of the SALT-2 Treaty and the hectic construction and deployment of MX and Midgetman strategic missiles, Trident submarines, B-IB heavy bombers and other components of the first-strike triad, along with a "we won't give up SDI under any circumstances" attitude, bear out US intentions to forge both the sword and the shield.

McNamara reasonably warns that the Star Wars policy will not only destroy the important arms control agreements and understandings, but will also make their conclusion in future altogether impossible. He writes that one cannot simultaneously have Star Wars and arms control.

But why does Washington so maniacally cling to Star Wars?

The fact is that some in the USA hope to undercut the USSR economically through the military-technological race and gain a decisive strategic superiority that would permit them to dictate their will to the entire world. But those who are now

thinking so forget the entire period of post-Hiroshima history and underestimate the potential of the Soviet system, notes McNamara, adding that all technical initiatives in the nuclear arms race actually came from the USA, but that the end result of all this was a steady erosion of American security. And nothing suggests that space weapons will be an exception, he points out.

SDI has one more important feature. The programme envisages the development of several types of directed-energy weaponry, of which the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser is believed to be the most promising. This is a new, third generation of nuclear weapons. Unlike work on the atomic and hydrogen bombs, its creation requires not 5 or 6, but from 100 to 200 tests. Thus, the link between the efforts to promote Star Wars and the refusal to halt nuclear explosions and join the Soviet moratorium is more than obvious.

So what value are then the White House assurances that Star Wars will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, that Washington is only thinking of how to break out of the captivity of nuclear terror and wishing to end the dilemma of assured mutual destruction?

Yes, the world has truly come up to the brink of an abyss. There currently are 50,000 nuclear charges on Earth, each of which on average is 30 times more powerful than the one that incinerated Hiroshima. Just one submarine carries a destructive potential exceeding the power of everything that was exploded during World War II. To move away from this dramatic situation, of course, is necessary. But only not to where the Washington leaders indicate, but in a diametrically opposite direction.

Not less topical are McNamara's opinions on NATO's European strategy based on the "expediency" of first use of nuclear weapons against the USSR. This is why the USA and

other NATO states refuse to join the pledge of the Soviet Union never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is why, incidentally, the NATO chiefs and many Western leaders were obviously embarrassed after Reykjavik where the Soviet side came up with a proposal to fully eliminate medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The use of nuclear weapons in Europe would have perilous consequences for all mankind, states McNamara, but this dismal state of things is being deliberately concealed from the general public of the West.

Of all the myths the nuclear ones are the most dangerous, and among them the myth about a "Soviet military threat." McNamara's book cites statistics showing the falsity of the assertions about a US "lag" behind the USSR, about the emergence of "windows of vulnerability" and other variations on the "Soviet menace" theme. McNamara expresses a firm belief that the Soviet Union is sincere in its desire for peace and disarmament.

Why are, then, the fables about a "Soviet threat" so persistent in America? To this the McNamara book gives no answer. But it is clear: the "nuclear myths" serve the military-industrial complex of the USA, helping it to justify the policy of whipping up the arms race that guarantees huge profits from the nuclear-missile, and now also the space business.

There also are some other "omissions" and a number of questionable assessments in the book. But, on the whole, this is a very interesting study, meriting special attention now, after Reykjavik, which has given new impetuses to the struggle for disarmament.

(Pravda, January 22. Abridged.)

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CSO: 5200/1266

USSR: STRATEGIC, HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF SDI

Moscow KOMSMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23, 24, 26 Dec 86

[Article by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer for military questions: "SDI: Folly of the Century"]

[23 Dec 86 p 3]

[Text] The entire world received with understanding the Soviet Government's declaration of the cessation of our country's unilateral moratorium on any nuclear blasts after the first nuclear blast in the United States in the coming year. Extended four times, the almost 18-month moratorium of the USSR played an extremely important role, having put the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race on a practical plane and having demonstrated in practice the possibility of the adoption of measures capable of putting effective obstacles in the path of this race. But the current U.S. administration did not respond positively to the appeal of the USSR to join in its peaceful initiative. It stubbornly continues to carry out nuclear blasts and is openly gambling on obtaining a military advantage over the USSR through the creation [sozdaniye] of fundamentally new forms and types of arms and through the development [razrabotka] of "third generation" nuclear weapons, including for "star wars."

And this is after the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik marked a turning point in the movement toward a nuclear-free planet, when an "eleventh hour" may have arrived for all of humanity. Reykjavik showed that a maximum of positive results is possible in a minimum amount of time and that one can also receive a maximum of disappointments in that minimum amount of time.

Thanks to the persistent striving of the Soviet delegation to achieve positive results and thanks to its major steps in the search for compromises and its promotion of extraordinary and bold decisions, it was possible to come to an agreement on most of the problems presented at the meeting. The latitude, scope, boldness and creativity that characterized the actions of the Soviet representatives in Reykjavik were due to the fact that our country has developed a clear strategy for nuclear disarmament, a detailed and staged plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on earth by the end of this century as proposed in the declaration of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on 15 January of this year. It also makes it possible to

see the longer term and consequently to show tactical flexibility on the way to the achievement of the final goal. Precisely this was noted by foreign mass press organs, which emphasized: "A clear understanding of the goal and a specific philosophy are essential to bring about a change in the current critical situation with nuclear arms. In this stage, it is precisely the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee who has these qualities." In Iceland, the USSR and United States were on the verge of making extremely important historical decisions and, for the first time in many decades, the meeting may have taken them extremely far in the search for a way to nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, the meeting also illuminated difficulties on the way to a nuclear-free world, the most important of which is the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) or, more simply, the "star wars" program. R. Reagan, stated American Congressman E. Markey, "gave the world the signal that he does not want arms control, that he believes in the star dust and moonlight of his own fantasies about "star wars." "One gets the impression that 'star wars' are more important for this administration than arms control," declared Senator G. Hart, who is considered to be a leading presidential candidate for 1988. Senator C. Pell called the failure of negotiations a sad day for humanity.

The hearts of people throughout the world were filled with pain and indignation, for the American delegation wrecked an agreement that seemed to be within reach. But then, as the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "the American hawks and uncompromising conservatives rejoiced, having sighed with relief when Reagan quite simply said "no" and blessed "star wars" because it was such a "difficult barrier to overcome."

The U.S. administration turned the SALT II Treaty into a "scrap of paper" and it is striving to attach the same label to the ABM Treaty. By no means does it want to renounce space strike arms for the sake of treaties and agreements, hoping, with the help of a new cosmic stage in the arms race, to go back to strategic superiority, to create a situation analogous to the one that prevailed when the United States had a nuclear monopoly.

How does the Pentagon present the "space fortress" of the United States, a fortress that must ensure the "great America" the possibility of looking at the entire world imperiously and haughtily? A special group of corporate subcontractors of the U.S. Department of Defense, having examined alternative system variants that include four, five, six and seven echelons for the deployment of space strike arms (they are also called floors, layers and the like in the United States) gave preference to a structure composed of seven echelons.

The first two echelons, corresponding to the active phase of the flight of the missiles, must utilize space battle platforms with so-called "exotic" weapons, or directed-energy weapons (lasers and particle beams), as well as with kinetic weapons (small homing missiles and electromagnetic guns).

Two other layers, again including platforms with "exotic" and kinetic weapons, are intended for the destruction of missiles in the ballistic phase of their

flight. In accordance with the developed project, the four indicated layers will actuate dozens of large-scale space battle platforms with laser and particle beam weapons and thousands of smaller satellites, each of which will be capable of carrying reduced-size homing missiles or projectiles discharged from electromagnetic guns.

A fifth layer can be created for the ballistic phase of the flight of the missiles. It would utilize mirrors in space for guiding the reflected radiation of land-based laser weapons to targets.

The last two echelons will be made up of land-based interceptor missiles of two types that are intended for the destruction of missile warheads immediately before they enter the atmosphere and in the dense layers of the atmosphere.

The Pentagon would like to deploy the seven-layer system in stages as particular types of space strike arms become ready, not waiting, in particular, for the completion of the work in the creation of "exotic" types of weapons. As early as the beginning of the 1990's, according to Gen J. Abrahamson, director of the SDI program, the United States will have the possibility of deploying "first generation space arms" including battle platforms with reduced-size homing missiles.

The Pentagon has already made the appropriate calculations for the initial deployment of the "star wars" system. As a result of the first stage of deployment, according to a statement made in June by an official representative of the United States, the system could include 3,200 space battle platforms capable of carrying small homing missiles and located in 40 different orbits as well as supplemental space stations equipped with various kinds of sensors for the detection of targets, the targeting of weapons, etc.

With this objective, according to Pentagon calculations, it will be necessary to carry out about 600 space launches within a 3-year period, that is, it will be necessary to launch more than one rocket with a dangerous cargo every 2 days. According to the American journal TIME, the United States will have to put into space weapons, sensors and other equipment with a total weight of about 1.2 million kilograms just in the first year of deployment of a "relatively primitive" SDI system. This weight will increase to 2 million kilograms by the year 2000, when they begin to put the latest kinds of weapons into orbit.

Altogether, calculated the NEW YORK TIMES, the "star wars" program would require up to 5,000 space shuttle flights. NASA would have to launch shuttles every 44 hours, notes the newspaper.

In his article in the newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR in May of this year, Senator W. Proxmire wrote that the production of the equipment alone for the "star wars" program will cost no less than $1 trillion. Considering the practice of cost overruns, especially in Pentagon procurements of systems involving new technology, the senator stressed, the sum of $1 trillion for the creation of these arms should be considered too low and significantly so. In his opinion, expenditures will actually be several trillion dollars. But this

is still not all. According to a study carried out by staff members of the American Senate, annual expenditures for technical servicing and system modernization will amount to more than $200 billion.

The apologists of "star wars" are not at all disconcerted by these figures, however. They are more and more insistently calling for the very rapid beginning of the deployment of SDI under the current president to make it more difficult for his successors to renounce this program.

On the eve of the departure of the U.S. President for Iceland, a group of "hawks" and conservatively-minded American politicians sent him a letter demanding that he immediately give the order to begin deployment of a space system in the framework of SDI.

After Reykjavik, the proponents of "star wars" became considerably more active. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT wrote on 26 October that the White House came under strong pressure by conservatives who demanded the dispositioning of an interim version of an ABM shield within the scope of the "star wars" program even before it is perfected. The President already needs to make a decision on the deployment of SDI in a "two-level version," declared Z. Brzezinski, who proposed a specific scheme--one level in space and the other based on land.

Why are the "star warriors" in such a hurry? Why are they clinging to SDI in such a way? Above all because the "star wars" program is a concentrated expression of the policy of militaristic circles, of a policy incompatible with nuclear disarmament and security, and a policy in which the main emphasis is being put on force and the law of the fist. For them, international law is becoming burdensome.

[24 Dec 86 p 3]

"U.S. imperialism has not renounced the dream of an 'American age,'" stated Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, at the party's national congress held 25-27 June 1986. "But in today's world, even dreams must consider reality. Therefore, when the dreams of Reagan and Weinberger have even momentary contact with the world of real socialism, they turn into somber nightmares. There is no way that they can establish the desired 'American age' while ignoring relations with the Soviet Union. It is precisely the socialist world that stands in the way of their world domination. We do not know what is happening on other planets but our world, as it revolved, has turned to socialism."

The establishment of military strategic parity between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism was an achievement of fundamental historical importance. A factor of primary importance was above all the Soviet Union's achievement of parity with the United States in strategic nuclear missiles, which they were forced to acknowledge in America in the late 1960's. "The technological revolution changed the nature of the military balance of forces...," stated the foreign policy message of U.S. President R. Nixon to Congress on 18 February 1970, "and the Soviet Union and the United States attained the ability to inflict irreparable damage to each other regardless of

who strikes first." This thought was also repeated in subsequent messages of President Nixon to Congress, where it was stated directly that "the indisputable advantage of the United States in strategic power" gave way to a "strategic balance in which the nuclear forces of the United States and USSR are comparable."

At the same time, the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the United States was a serious blow for militaristic circles in the United States, a unique "strategic nightmare." And they began a feverish search for a way out of this "nightmare." In striving to make maximum use of the latest achievements of science and technology for military purposes and in making "thrusts" in the arms race, these circles hoped that quantitative increases in arms and a "technological breakthrough" will ensure them strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and over the socialist community. In fact, however, each new step by the United States in the quantitative proliferation and qualitative improvement of arms gave them only a temporary advantage. In all cases, the USSR immediately answered the "thrust" of the United States with adequate measures and equilibrium was restored.

The main thing is that nuclear war can no longer serve as a means to achieve political objectives, because, as they acknowledge in the West, "whoever strikes first dies second." It was precisely in this connection that they put forward the "star wars" program with the goal of creating a "superweapon" that would permit the United States to violate equilibrium to its advantage. So that SDI is above all an attempt to wage nuclear war and to be victorious in it, despite all of the solemn declarations of the current master of the White House that he does not consider either to be possible.

In Washington, of course, they say nothing about those official documents and declarations where all of this is set forth quite candidly. Let us take, for example, the "Defense Guide for the Years 1984-1988," which no one has yet countermanded. This basic Pentagon document for military construction provides for "the development of space-based systems," including systems for destroying Soviet satellites, and the forced creation of ABM systems for U.S. territory. And one of the goals of such measures is proclaimed clearly: "It is necessary to direct the military rivalry with the USSR into new areas and thus make all previous Soviet defense expenditures meaningless and Soviet arms obsolete." On 22 May 1984, that is, a year after he proclaimed SDI, the President of the United States himself confirmed these intentions, declaring: "They (the Russians--V. Ch.) will not be able to keep up with us and will not stand up to the competition in the area of the proliferation of arms." And in February of this year, speaking on national television, R. Reagan said right out: "We must materialize our advantage at the laboratory level into an advantage in specific arms." Pentagon chief C. Weinberger expressed the "dreams" of the military-industrial complex in the following way: "If we can obtain a system that will be effective and that will make the arms of the Soviet Union ineffective, then we will return to the situation when we were the only country to have nuclear weapons."

The main tasks in the strategy for "direct antagonism" between the United States and the USSR announced by Weinberger in June 1981 are: the achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union and the guarantee of U.S.

readiness to wage war for the purpose of "forcing the USSR in a short time to stop military actions under the conditions of the United States." And, as is detailed in the above-mentioned guide, the Pentagon is ordered to be prepared "to wage war effectively" through the use of space systems.

In adding a "space shield" to its "nuclear sword," the United States is dreaming of establishing a situation under which it would be possible to deal a first nuclear blow with impunity, defending itself against the counterstrike with the help of this "shield." In this way, it is supposed that SDI will strengthen the strategic offensive potential of the United States and will give it the capability of striking first. But this is only one function of the "star wars" program.

SDI is itself an offensive system. In the first place, the arms foreseen in the SDI program are strike weapons with which the United States hopes to "blind" the other side and make it deaf and dumb, having destroyed the satellites that warn of a nuclear missile attack as well as the satellites for communications, command and control, etc. One of the tasks of space strike arms is to surprise the other side and deprive it of the possibility of countering the nuclear attack. In the second place, having a range of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, these weapons can hit targets not only in space but also on the ground and on the seas. The possible stationing of the systems actuated in an ABM system directly over the enemy's territory, the utilization of powerful sources of energy that can be transmitted over an unlimited distance practically instantly, etc. will indeed create broad possibilities for an attack against air, ground and sea targets.

SDI can become one of the most deadly offensive weapon systems ever created by man. If a laser can destroy a missile at a distance of several thousand kilometers, then what can it do to a target on earth that is directly under it, when the intensity of the emission will be many times greater than what is needed to destroy a missile! There is certainly enough time to burn up oil storage tanks, farms, ships and plants.

When he was French minister of defense, C. Hernu spoke out very graphically on the American plans for the militarization of space. Recalling that "the only thing that the Gauls feared in their day was that the sky might fall on their heads," he expressed the fear that "when space is full of such weapons, then our grandchildren, just as the Gauls in their time, will be afraid that the sky might fall on their heads."

But despite all of the propaganda slogans put forward by the U.S. administration, SDI will not strengthen the security of the United States itself. The idea of the creation of an "impenetrable shield" is an illusion that is not feasible from a technical point of view. "Many active and retired military people are convinced that the "star wars" program will undermine the national security of the United States," stressed R. Bowman, an American specialist on military space developments. "If the United States could create an ABM system that is 95 percent effective," warns Senator E. Kennedy, "and the other side effects a counterstrike against the United States

in which 5,000 missile warheads are launched, then 250 warheads will penetrate our defense, will reach our population and will easily destroy the entire nation."

Hopes for an "absolute ABM defense" are erroneous from a scientific-technical point of view, declared quite plainly the members of the the USSR Academy of Sciences in their appeal to all scientists of the world. And their opinion agrees with the authoritative declaration of the representatives of 36 academies of sciences of different countries.

In their article published in the magazine ATLANTIC MONTHLY, former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara and Nobel Prize winner H. Bethe, an esteemed professor of physics at Cornell University, wrote: "Literally all governments now recognize that a defense system with 100 percent reliability will not be created in the coming decades and possibly it never will be.... But a partially effective defense will multiply many times over any suspicions about our striving to achieve a first-strike potential. Why? Because an umbrella full of holes is no protection against a downpour put is quite suitable in a drizzle. In other words, such a system will fall apart in a total first strike but could cope adequately well with the depleted forces of an enemy experiencing a first strike."

This once again completely refutes the position of the U.S. administration on the defensive nature of SDI.

The meeting in Reykjavik revealed even more completely the groundlessness of the official American position in defense of the SDI program put to shame there. Even after the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, reiterated the head of the White House in Iceland, SDI will continue to be essential for the United States, inasmuch as the ABM "shield" will supposedly be a "guarantee" that the Soviet Union will fulfill the agreements. Such a declaration appears, at the least, frivolous.

To ensure complete confidence in the fulfillment of assumed commitments, absolute clarity with respect to verification is indeed essential. This is logical. And the Soviet leader declared firmly in Reykjavik that, in connection with the willingness to make profound reductions in nuclear arms and to enter into a specific stage in the elimination of nuclear weapons, verification must be made more rigorous. The USSR confirmed its readiness for any forms of verification that would ensure the complete confidence of each side that it will not end up in a trap. It is simply ludicrous to propose the piling up of mountains of weapons in space and then to present this as a unique "system of verification."

And with no nuclear weapons in the world, asserted the U.S. delegation, SDI will be a kind of "insurance policy" for the United States, for it will protect it if some "lunatic" gets hold of a missile with a nuclear warhead and resolves to "subdue" the nonnuclear United States. It is like a Hollywood scenario! To be serious, Washington hardly had in mind some "mythical person" in harboring its plans for the creation of a "star wars" system. By the way,

SDI can be used only against ballistic missiles. It is impotent against a cruise missile or an airplane and all the more so against a saboteur with a nuclear bomb in a suitcase.

"The striving of the President of the United States to create an ABM defense system in space instead of adhering to the ABM Treaty," stressed W. Colby, former director of the CIA, and D. Riley, head of the American public organization National Campaign for Saving the ABM Treaty, in their article in the NEW YORK TIMES, "is a reckless path. Nuclear weapons are too destructive and there are too many of them for it to be possible to defend against them successfully. The only way to defend our country against nuclear war is to prevent it."

The behavior of the U.S. administration after Reykjavik is quite representative. During the Soviet-American summit meeting, as everyone knows, the question of eliminating strategic offensive arms within 10 years, and even of the complete elimination of nuclear arms, was discussed. After the meeting, Washington began to reexamine the results of Reykjavik. They first announced that Reagan "may have been misunderstood" and that "the President never agreed to the elimination of nuclear arms." He then retracted his assent to the destruction of all strategic offensive arms, declaring that the subject of the talks was only ballistic missiles and that bombers and all cruise missiles must remain untouched. They are now already retreating from the thesis invented by Washington itself on the elimination of ballistic missiles only. The U.S. administration now declares more or less "realistic" the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent and in such a way that the Soviet Union would have to reduce substantially its own ICBM's that are the basis of its strategic forces. As if neither the Pentagon nor the entire military-industrial complex of the United States objects to such an "interpretation." One asks: For what purpose did the United States "reexamine" its position?

American specialists themselves answer this question. "Although SDI would not be effective against the existing Soviet arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons," declared, for example, the former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT II talks P. Warnke, "it would nonetheless be more valuable if the Soviet Union reduced their number by 50 percent.... This could give the United States a nuclear advantage that would permit it to 'blackmail' the Soviet Union."

In this way, despite all attempts to mask its true objectives, the adminstration is demonstrating in practice its striving to continue to increase the nuclear threat, to diversify nuclear arsenals, and to make not only the entire planet but also space and the universe the arena for confrontation. When they prefer SDI to nuclear disarmament, only one conclusion is possible--with the help of this military program, they are trying to refute the axiom of international relations in our nuclear and space era that consists in the simple and clear words under which the highest representatives of the USSR and United States put their signatures in Geneva in November 1985: nuclear war must not be waged, there can be no victor in it.

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In the scope of the broad propaganda campaign in favor of "star wars," the thesis has been introduced to the effect that the Russians, as they say, have a great fear of SDI, that precisely it [SDI] brought the USSR to negotiations in Geneva and later to Reykjavik and that precisely it "forced the Russians to make concessions." One need apply just a little more "pressure" and the USSR will accept all American conditions.

Nothing can be further from the truth. In Reykjavik, M.S. Gorbachev frankly told the U.S. President that SDI does not worry the USSR in a military sense. If in the end America decides to deploy the "star wars" system, the Soviet response to it will be balanced and effective. The Reykjavik meeting confirmed once again that SDI is by no means a "trump" in negotiations but, on the contrary, is a mine that destroys agreement.

Official Washington is trying to present as some kind of contradiction the fact that the Soviet Union declares that it supposedly does not fear SDI and at the same time comes out against this program and against the militarization of space. But there can be no contradiction here. It is far-fetched and is intended for the uninitiated who are far removed from military and military policy questions.

The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that the goals set by "star" adventurists--the achievement of strategic superiority and the guaranteeing for the United States of the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war with impunity from behind a space "shield"--are unrealistic and unattainable. This is the sense in which SDI does not worry us.

But the American program for putting strike arms into space around the earth carries equal dangers for all countries and peoples, including the United States and Soviet Union. This is a threat to all human civilization and this is why the Soviet Union is fundamentally against the militarization of space.

The declarations of the leadership of the USSR specify the basic principles in accordance with which our country is developing and will apply countermeasures and means for counteracting space strike weapons if the United States proceeds to deploy SDI: in the first place, these measures can be in the areas of defensive as well as offensive arms; the measures chosen will not be those to which Washington would like to push the Soviet Union but those that best correspond to the interests of our security and defense capability, the most economical and effective measures; in the second place, the Soviet Union will not permit the United States to become a monopolist in space; thirdly, it not only will not reduce its strategic offensive potential but, on the contrary, to restore equilibrium, it will be forced to increase the efficiency, accuracy and power of its arms to neutralize, if necessary, the American "star wars" machine.

The future will show exactly which measures the Soviet Union will choose. Nevertheless, many people in the world are already interested in what fundamental possibilities there are for counteracting the "star wars" system. A detailed investigation of this question was carried out, in particular, by

the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. The conclusions of Soviet scientists largely coincide with the conclusions of American specialists.

Countermeasures must fulfill two main functions, those of parrying the danger of the unilateral violation of the military strategic equilibrium as a consequence of the deployment of SDI and of ensuring the preservation under any version of a nuclear attack of the capability of inflicting a retaliatory counterstrike inacceptable for the aggressor.

The hypothetical measures in the nature of a response could include above all an increase in the potential of strategic nuclear arms intended for a counterstrike. This could be done through an increase in the number of ICBM's and in the number of warheads on the missiles. Inasmuch as the deployment by the United States of a large-scale ABM system would mean a renunciation of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union would face the necessity of considering itself relieved of the observance of the Interim Agreement (1972) on several measures limiting strategic offensive arms and the Salt II Treaty (1979) limiting the number of ICBM's and the construction of additional launchers for them. An increase in the number of missiles would lead to a sharp reduction in the efficiency of the American space-based ABM system. The result would be an increase in the number of missiles "penetrating" the "shield" and a sufficiently potent counterstrike against the aggressor. An increase in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles would lead to an analogous result.

For the purpose of supporting the necessary counterstrike power, the side that is trying to compensate the violation of military strategic equilibrium could also increase those arms for which the side deploying the ABM system still has no corresponding systems for their interception. Arms of this kind include, for example, SLBM's launched in low-angle trajectories as well as cruise missiles based in various ways.

The side striving to reestablish the balance of forces could also undertake other measures, in particular the improvement of the capability of ballistic missiles to "penetrate" the "shield" through the use of means to defend against the effect of laser radiation, the use of maneuverable warheads, etc.

To create obstacles to the ABM system and to disorient it, the side that is striving to ensure for itself the possiblity of carrying out an effective retaliatory counterstrike could utilize a large number of special means to mask missile launches and the flight of warheads in their trajectory (decoys, clouds of metallic objects, aerosol clouds, etc.) as well as devices to interfere electronically with the apparatus of the ABM system for the detection and tracking of targets.

And finally, systems could be devised for the direct destruction and neutralization of the ABM system and its elements. The system of space battle platforms that the SDI program proposes to build will be extremely vulnerable to different kinds of weapons. To destroy platforms, one could use small missles based in different ways, laser weapons, and space "mines"--satellites put into orbits close to the orbits of operational space platforms and

equipped with a sufficiently powerful explosive charge that can be detonated from earth.

Soviet scientists have drawn some very important conclusions with respect to the relationship between the cost of a multilayered ABM system in space and countermeasures. It turns out that the cost of a comprehensive system of countermeasures and means may be only a few percent of the cost of a large-scale ABM system with space-based levels.

All of this indicates specifically that Washington's ideas that the military strategic parity is a temporary phenomenon and that it will be possible for the United States to return to earlier times through the implementation of a "star wars" program are nothing other than an illusion and an obvious miscalculation. The United States will not be able to achieve superiority through space.

At the same time, SDI is a tremendous danger for all humanity. What is the nature of this danger?

In the first place, it is seen in the transfer of the arms race to a new sphere and in the possibility of going into completely new types of weapons through work in the area of SDI.

In the second place, the very threat of putting arms into orbit would lead to a clear lack of certainty in the strategic balance and strategic planning, which would serve to increase mutual mistrust.

Thirdly, in such circumstances, it would hardly be possible at all to imagine any reductions or even limitations in strategic offensive arms. To go this way would mean increasing the effectiveness of the first-strike potential established in the form of an "ABM shield," that is, actually help those who intended to "by-pass" you through the use of space arms, the next "superweapons."

Fourthly, the SDI program greatly increases the threat of war and can make it probable at a certain stage. This danger arises by virtue of a number of factors. Let us examine this matter in greater detail.

War can be the result of the premeditated decision of the leadership of the side that acquired an "ABM shield." The unrealistic notion of one's own invulnerability and that it is possible to be the first to deliver a nuclear strike from under a "shield" and to prevent or at least attenuate a counterstrike to an acceptable level would be the reasons for such a reckless decision fatal for all.

War can start accidentally as a consequence of a mistake or a technical breakdown of extremely complex computer systems. Each of them must react so rapidly and so "decisively" that there will be no time left for human interference: to "awaken the President," for example, or especially to convene the National Security Council before the United States starts a war. The result of the deployment of space strike arms would be the creation of a situation under which fundamentally important decisions with irreversible

consequences would be made by computers without the participation of human reason and political will and without considering ethical and moral criteria. In such a situation, humanity would become the hostage of machines and therefore of technical malfunctions and breakdowns.

The disaster of the American space shuttle "Challenger" was an example of this situation. But this was a reliable, well-tested and verified system. SDI will be many times more complex and the cost of a technical error in it will be the loss of a huge ship--the planet earth--whose crew is all of humanity. Besides errors by the computers themselves, war can start through solar activity blinding the sensors or through false effects stimulated by the northern lights.

It is finally time for official Washington and all those advocating SDI to realize that they are dealing with a weapon that can blow up the whole world and that cannot be controlled, even if the greatest "care" is taken. As H. Brown, former assistant secretary of defense [sic] of the United States , put it, the striving to "hang" space strike arms over the globe will lead to a "nightmare that we will pass on to our children in the 21st century." And humanity must enter that century not only without space weapons but without nuclear weapons, indeed without any weapons of mass destruction.

This is why the Soviet Union is against SDI and why it considers that SDI actually does not strengthen anyone's security but, in beginning a new stage in the arms race, destabilizes the military political situation and thus diminishes overall security, including the security of the United States itself. This is why SDI is blocking the way to stopping the arms race and to freeing the world from nuclear weapons and is the main obstacle on the path to a nuclear-free world.

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SOVIET JOURNAL ON ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SDI PROGRAM

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 86 (signed to press 16 Oct 86) pp 110-115

[Article by A. Kireyev: "Economic Aspects of the American Plans for the Militarization of Space"]

[Text] I

The United States' endeavor to put the latest achievements of the S&T revolution at the service of its imperial pretensions is manifested most clearly in the ambitious program for the creation of a broad-based antimissile defense system with space-based components within the framework of the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI).

The scale of the American plans for the militarization of space is beyond all comparison with the programs for the modernization of the armed forces or the creation of new types of arms which have been implemented in the United States hitherto. It is sufficient to say that the Manhattan Project was realized over 3 years and cost (in current prices) $10 billion, the Apollo Project, 9 years and $100 billion respectively. Implementation of the SDI, it is estimated, will take 30 years, and the cost of the fully deployed system could amount to $1 trillion* and, according to some forecasts, several trillion dollars.

In the 1985 fiscal year expenditure on SDI constituted $1.4 billion.** In the 1986 fiscal year it is planned allocating the "star wars" plans $2.8 billion, and for the following year the Pentagon has requested $5.4 billion, and in the 1991 fiscal year it is planned increasing these appropriations to $8.9 billion. Currently SDI expenditure constitutes approximately 8 percent of deductions for the U.S. Defense Department's R&D, and by the 1990 fiscal year this proportion could have been increased to 20 percent. In addition,

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* See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9 December 1985, pp 49-50.

** TIME, 9 December 1985, p 23.

it is contemplated allocating for "star wars" weapons in the 1987 fiscal year $603 million along Energy Department lines, which is over twice as much as in the current fiscal year. According to estimated figures, the total cost of the first stage of realization of SDI, which will last, American strategists calculate, until the start of the 1990's, will amount to $69 billion (in 1985 prices).

Having a presentiment of colossal profits, approximately 240-260 American industrial corporations and research organizations responded to the proposals of the SDI Organization concerning specific areas of R&D. They included practically all the biggest arms manufacturers.

The already limited circle of the Pentagon's main contractors narrowed even further with the U.S. Administration's embarkation on the path of militarization of outer space. Contracts are being entrusted to a small number of the firms closest to the military department inasmuch as the technology of the manufacture of weapons for "star wars" must be kept strictly secret not only from the United States' potential enemies but also from its allies. For this purpose the American Defense Preparedness Association, a leading group of military industry, has formed a special section of SDI contractors.

Therefore despite the existence of a relatively wide range of claimants, 87.4 percent of orders has gone to only the 10 most "reliable" (see Table 1), and six of the main SDI contractors, furthermore, figured on the list of the 12 biggest American arms manufacturers.

Table 1. Participation of the United States' Biggest Military-Industrial Corporations in Realization of SDI

	Position among 12 biggest weapons manufacturers	Sum total of orders (1983-84, $, millions)	Proportional participation in SDI (%)
Boeing	5	364.3	22.4
Lockheed	4	240.2	14.7
McDonnell-Douglas	1	236.8	14.5
LTW	-	211.0	12.9
Teledyne	-	115.4	7.1
Rockwell International	2	88.7	5.4
TRW	-	76.3	4.7
Hughes	7	34.8	2.1
Avco	-	30.6	1.8
Litton	10	25.3	1.5

It is by no means fortuitous that the main nuclear arms manufacturers in the United States are about to create a space "shield" allegedly guarding against nuclear damage. The main reason is the tremendous profits. In 1984 the average profit on the capital of the Pentagon's 10 biggest contractors constituted 25 percent, whereas for other industrial mining and commercial corporations, 12.8 percent.

The "star wars" contractors are availing themselves of the extremely favorable tax conditions which were introduced in 1981. Whereas 275 military-industrial monopolies reduced their payments to the treasury approximately threefold, the biggest space-based weapons manufacturers frequently paid no taxes at all. The average tax refund for eight military-industrial corporations constituted 5.7 percent of their volume. A poll of approximately 50 major American companies, whose profits in the period 1981-1984 amounted to $56 billion, showed that they not only did not pay a single dollar in taxes but received from the treasury approximately $2.4 billion, taking advantage of the loopholes in tax legislation and also manipulating depreciation deductions and investment credit.

However, even these financial privileges for the big wheels of big weapons business under contract for the development of space-based arms seem insufficient. Price machinations, bribery, concealment of the actual amounts of profit and so forth are practiced extensively.

The militarization of outer space is increasing the differentiation among the United States' biggest military-industrial corporations. A privileged group of companies which have obtained the main SDI contracts has been distinguished, which is fraught with an exacerbation of contradictions between them and the majority of the rest of the firms of the military sector of the economy involved in the fulfillment of orders merely as subcontractors. On the basis of the further union of the military-industrial corporations and the upper stratum of the American top brass and civil service the formation within the framework of the American military-industrial complex of an isolated grouping undertaking economic and S&T support for the SDI program is possible.

II

Theoretical evaluation of the basic principles of space-based arms within the SDI framework began long before it was structured conceptually. Big appropriations for the creation of the prototype of such weapons were made back in the first postwar years. At the height of the cold war former Hitler general U. Dornberger, who became vice president of the American Bell Aviation military-industrial corporation, was in charge of research into the creation of satellites carrying nuclear weapons which could upon command have "landed" at any point on the earth. The Argos Project of the end of the 1950's provided for a series of nuclear explosions in near-Earth orbit as a "rehearsal" for putting a potential enemy's communications out of action. In 1959 the United States tested a system which could be considered a prototype of the current ASAT antisatellite system.

Hoping for profitable contracts, private companies were investing resources in the creation of various components of space-based weapons even prior to the official proclamation of the "star wars" doctrine. As result many ABM systems proved very similar in design and engineering properties to antisatellite weapons. It was this which enabled the American Voight to rapidly develop and test the ASAT system and be among the first to announce its

readiness to participate in the SDI. The major firms spend annually from internal sources up to $30 million to develop individual systems pertaining to the "star wars" program.

Thus a large part of the appropriations for the creation of antimissile defense weapons may be seen simultaneously also as investments in the development of antisatellite systems. Expenditure on total military research in the ABM sphere amounted to approximately $40 billion in the period 1954-1983. Consequently, the first, longest, stage of the creation of space-based weapons began in the United States 2-3 decades ago.*

The prospects of practical realization of the information directions of the SDI program requiring the creation of superpowerful fifth-generation computers can be discerned most clearly at the present time. To speed up this sphere of research the Pentagon has created a special computer programs and hardware development group, and contracts have been obtained by McDonnell-Douglas and IBM, among other corporations.

The United States has succeeded in making big progress in the creation of specific types of arms. Attesting this are the testing in September 1985 of the ASAT antisatellite system contemplating the destruction of satellites with two-stage missiles launched from high-altitude fighters, which it is planned deploying by 1987; the testing the same month of a powerful laser weapon against a real target, as a result of which a section of a Titan rocket in a stationary position was destroyed; the use for military purposes of flights of Shuttle-type spacecraft.

Following the catastrophe of the multiple-use Challenger craft, the U.S. Administration revised its approach to the Space Shuttle program. In accordance with the new schedule, it is proposed making 90 shuttle launches prior to 1992. Some 75 percent of the Shuttle payloads here in the 1987 and 1988 fiscal years will, according to information of the Congressional Budget Office, consist of military cargo, whereas prior to the catastrophe it accounted for 33 percent. And over 1,000 flights of one-time and multiple-use carrier rockets will, it is estimated, be required to put all "star wars" weapons in space.

The theoretical research into key problems of SDI, the spending to this end in past decades, the creation of experimental models of individual types of space-based weapons and their testing and, finally, the large-scale capital investments characteristic of the development of the prototypes necessary for operational testing testify that realization of the SDI program has passed beyond the confines of fundamental research. The present stage of the economic and S&T realization of the "star wars" program may be defined as the preproduction development of its main engineering components with some of them being brought to the stage of the creation of test models which are the direct prototype of space-based weapons for series production.

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* For more detail see MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 11, 1985, pp 17-19.

To speed up the preproduction stage of the creation of space-based weapons the Pentagon is mobilizing large-scale S&T and testing-engineering potential. A minimum of 25-30 percent of scientists is involved in military developments in the United States--including approximately 5,000 persons conducting research directly in respect of the "star wars" program, and it is contemplated that their number will have risen to 18,600 by 1987.

Orders for the performance of R&D are spreading among national nuclear research laboratories, colleges, U.S. armed forces centers and private corporations. Scientific development in the SDI Organization is led by the specially formed agency for state-of-the-art engineering and technology, which has already given out orders among more than 600 colleges and research labs in the United States and West Europe.*

Military-space R&D is being financed from several sources, the main ones of which are the U.S. Defense Department, NASA, which is formally responsible for civilian research, but which in practice, particularly in the building of spacecraft of the Shuttle type, participates actively in military developments also, and also the U.S. Energy Department.

In February 1985 the U.S. President signed a directive on a joint program of research of the first two departments for $12 billion, which is to provide additional resources for the financing of space flights. In accordance with the law on achieving a balanced federal budget, in 1986 alone the $7.6 billion NASA budget is to be reduced by $220 million.** It is not fortuitous, therefore, that NASA is endeavoring to obtain military orders. The Pentagon pays for each Shuttle flight which it uses for its own purposes $55 million. Big sums are being invested in space exploration by the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Agriculture and others also.

The Pentagon is allocating college science considerable resources. In 1985 Pentagon investments in college research amounted to $930 million, having increased almost 90 percent compared with the start of the 1980's.***

The structure of the capital investments in military R&D in the 1980's has come to be characterized by major investments in various spheres of electronics. Some 88 percent of the resources allocated for R&D within the SDI framework is directed to this end, whereas for civil aircraft manufacturing the corresponding indicator is only 33 percent, rocket manufacturing, 45 percent, and satellite building, 60 percent.**** The trend toward increased expenditure on electronic equipment is characteristic of the United States' aerospace industry. In the 1960's computers and their software constituted approximately 2 percent of the cost of the development and production of the

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* See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9 December 1985, p 49.
** See BUSINESS WEEK, 10 February 1986, pp 34, 38.
*** See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9 December 1985, p 50.
**** See "Perception de l'IDS par les entreprises americaines," Brussels, 1985, p 16.

American F-4 fighter. A decade later, with the creation of the F-15 fighter, 26 percent of allocated resources had to be spent to this end, and of the current F-18, some 43 percent.*

Under the conditions of the government's special allocation of orders for military R&D a system of research organizations engaged in the development of "star wars" weapons is taking shape in the United States. The integration of science and production is taking place within the framework of research-manufacturing consortia created under the aegis of the government. Three such consortia were formed in the first half of 1986 alone. One of them, which incorporates the State University of New York, a U.S. Navy research lab and the General Electric Corporation, has been entrusted with the development and production of new semiconductor materials, particle-beam weapons and high-speed electronic equipment. The two other research-manufacturing consortia are engaged in the creation of powerful sources of energy and the state-of-the-art computer equipment for the SDI program.

THE WASHINGTON POST wrote in this connection: "As star wars are designed to protect the United States against enemy warheads, the 'star complex' hopes to protect this new business against any threat, including political attacks, pronouncements of skeptics and so forth."

The main developers and manufacturers of space-based arms are based in a few states which account for approximately 95 percent of the contracts granted by the government: California, Washington, Texas, Alabama and Massachusetts. And this is not surprising: senators from four of these states sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and lobbyists for military-industrial corporations, on the House Appropriations Committee Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Thus the two main authorities on which the allocation of orders depends are under the supervision of those same big wheels of the United States' big weapons business.

The United States is creating primarily a strong national economic and S&T base for realization of the SDI program. This is leading to the increased militarization of all aspects of American life and the intensification of many economic and socioeconomic contradictions.

III

The development of the international functions of the contemporary U.S. military-industrial complex is manifested, inter alia, in its endeavor to associate with work on the SDI program the economic and S&T potential of West European countries and Japan. First, the United States is endeavoring to bring under control the militarist sector of the economy of West European countries and Japan as far as it pertains to the development and manufacturing of equipment which could potentially be used to create an independent

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* See FORTUNE, 25 November 1985, p 78.

antisatellite defense system with space-based components. Second, the American military-industrial complex is interested in gaining access to certain types of the latest technology applicable for military purposes, the monopoly owners of which are some of its NATO allies and Japan.

And, finally, other capitalist countries' participation in the development of space-based weapons would make it possible to create the appearance of broad support for the "star wars" program, which could be used as an "argument" in the ideological struggle against the forces advocating the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

The specifics of United States' military-industrial relations with Japan consist of a considerably facilitated "procedure" for back in November 1983, that is, literally 6 months after the proclamation of the SDI program, an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of military technology was signed between the two countries. The Japanese-American Military Technology Exchange Committee, which was formed in accordance with this agreement, held a special session in September 1985, which discussed the possible spheres of Japan's participation in the American SDI, and an agreement was signed in December even on Japan putting at the Pentagon's disposal the latest surface-to-air missile guidance system. In September 1986 the Japanese Government adopted a decision on participation in the American "star wars" program, and it concerns not only private companies, what is more, but government research enterprises also.

On the European continent the United States is persistently involving companies and research centers of the FRG in realization of the SDI. The "benefits" of such participation heralded by the Pentagon are to consist of West German firms' "association" with the so-called "research" pertaining to the "star wars" program, which will afford them an opportunity to use the results of American developments and also circumvent the restrictions on arms production.

Britain hastened to be the first to confirm support for the "star wars" program in writing, signing in December 1985 a "memorandum of understanding" with the United States. However, the American side did not respond by agreeing to the persistent demand of M. Heseltine, former secretary of defense, concerning an assurance to British companies of a share in the SDI program to the tune of $1.5 billion. Britain's participation was limited to 18 spheres of S&T cooperation, which forced the former secretary to announce: "The British Government cannot guarantee that British businessmen will obtain within the framework of this program contracts of any particular value."

Washington's intensified use of various economic, political and technological levels of pressure on its allies and the attempt to thus strengthen its own dominating position in the capitalist world will undoubtedly lead to increased contradictions both within NATO and between this aggressive bloc and other nonsocialist countries.

IV

How are the American defenders of "star wars" endeavoring to justify the colossal expenditure of material, technological, intellectual and other resources?

First, the defenders of the program of the militarization of space assert that the large-scale investments connected therewith will help revitalize the U.S. economy and alleviate the seriousness of cyclical fluctuations and structural disproportions. By participating in the SDI the narrow circle of the Pentagon's main industrial and S&T contractors hopes to secure for itself guaranteed orders for roughly 30 years. However, does this mean that impetus will be imparted to the United States' economic development?

According to estimates of American economists themselves, only 8-10 percent of the almost 1,000 proposals which had been received pertaining to "star wars" projects by the end of 1985 have a chance of realization.

Economic history reveals a clear inverse dependence between the size of states' military spending and the growth rate of their economy. Japan, which spends on arms less than 1 percent of GNP, has for two decades been characterized by the highest economic growth rate. At the same time, however, the United States, which channels into arms on average 6.8 percent of GNP, is more than two times inferior to Japan in terms of growth rate. And in the 1980's also there is no diminution in American arms spending, while for the European NATO countries it constitutes 3.9 percent of GNP.

Second, the supporters of SDI claim that its realization will lead to an abrupt leap forward in the sphere of the latest technology, which could be applied for civilian and military purposes. However, Western economists themselves acknowledge that military-industrial developments extremely rarely find a civilian application. Of the almost 8,000 inventions patented by the 100 biggest Pentagon contractors in the period 1949-1959, only 7 percent came to be used commercially. Of all the patents which were the result of NASA research programs prior to 1983, only 16 percent were usable for civilian purposes.* In addition, expenditure on military R&D is considerably less efficient. Thus while having financed 75 percent of military research in the sphere of integrated circuits in the period 1950-1965, the U.S. Government obtained only 3 percent of all patents in this field. The remaining 97 percent were obtained thanks to R&D conducted in the civilian sectors of the economy.**

Third, the SDI zealots claim that its realization will lead to the creation of a technically reliable space "shield," which will allegedly be capable of securing mankind from nuclear weapons. This proposition was convincingly

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* See WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 20 September 1985, pp 118, 120.
** See "Perception de l'IDS par les entreprises americaines," p 8.

refuted by the tragedy of the multiple-use Challenger craft, whose creators are the corporations contracted to fulfill SDI orders. The general supplier for the Space Shuttle program is Rockwell International, subsuppliers are the Martin Marietta, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas and other corporations.

Computers were unable to alert either the commander of the spacecraft or the flight control center to the danger. "Imperfect people do not create perfect machines. This explosion reminded us that we have no special relationship with space," G. Pike, assistant director for space research of the Federation of American Scientists, who is actively opposed to the plans for the militarization of space, said.*

The same opinion is held by many realistic American scientists. W. Arkin, director of the Nuclear Arms Research Center attached to Washington's Institute for the Study of Policy, declared: "...We lack the hardware for star wars, and, what is more, star wars are not a game, just like the Shuttle flight was by no means a stroll."** The current space-based arms systems created in the United States cannot be completely insured against accidental wear and technical malfunctions. Such an "error" could cost the lives not of a few cosmonauts but of all mankind.

And, finally, one further argument adduced by the supporters of the program for the militarization of space is that the large-scale capital investments will make it possible to create a large number of new jobs and will thereby contribute to an easing of a chronic problem of present-day America--that of unemployment.

Truly, the military-industrial corporations are big employers. The number of staff employees of Lockheed, for example, is 29,000, and it could, it is estimated, grow to 35,000 in the course of implementation of the SDI.*** Nonetheless, currently even an ordinal increase in defense appropriations will not be capable of guaranteeing an adequate increase in jobs. The point being that at the present stage of the S&T revolution the growth of military production is taking the path of an increase in its technological capacity and, consequently, a corresponding upgrading of the skills level of the workmen servicing it.

American economists estimate that military appropriations, given their present rate of growth, will create in the United States in the period 1984-1987 approximately 1.2 million new jobs. However, the same investments in the civilian sectors would create 25 percent more of them.****

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* THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 February 1986.
** L'ESPRESSO, 9 February 1986, p 12.
*** See AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 18 November 1985, p 21.
**** FORTUNE, 30 April 1984, p 12.

Thus while advocating the enlistment in the manufacture of arms pertaining to the SDI program of an appreciable part of the military-industrial potential of the United States and its allies, the defenders of "star wars" are incapable of substantiating the "positive" economic and S&T consequences of the militarization of space.

Mankind has entered a new critical stage of the space age. The material and intellectual potential of the Soviet Union ensures the possibility of the creation of any weapons, if it is forced into this. However, it is not the arms race which is an ideal of socialism. The USSR offers a specific program of the complete elimination before the end of the current century of all nuclear weapons throughout the world inasmuch as it recognizes the full measure of responsibility to present and future generations. "It is our profound belief," the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of 15 January 1986 says, "that we need to enter the third millenium not with a program of 'star wars' but large-scale plans for the peaceful conquest of space by the forces of all mankind. We propose that such plans be elaborated and implemented in practice. This is a most important way of ensuring progress throughout our planet and the formation of a reliable system of security for all."

8850
CSO: 1816/3

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER ON EAST'S PARTICIPATION IN EUREKA

LD171847 Hamburg DPA in German 1546 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn/Stockholm, 17 Dec (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher does not rule out participation by East bloc states in projects related to the European research cooperation, Eureka. The slogan "We do not want any technological division of Europe" should not apply exclusively to the EC and other democratic states, "but rather we are also seeking technological and economic cooperation with our eastern neighbors," he said on West German radio on Wednesday.

Genscher, who was taking part in the fourth Eureka conference in Stockholm, referred to the modernization policy introduced by the present Soviet leadership, for which a "Western Europe strengthened technologically by Eureka" could provide "a particularly interesting partner." However, careful consideration is required to define the shape such a partnership should assume.

The text of the remarks was made public by the Foreign Ministry.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2475

FRG RESEARCH MINISTER COMMENTS ON EUREKA PROJECTS

Showing 'Dynamism'

DW150845 Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Dec 86 p 9

[Heinz Heck article: "Risenhuber: The Eureka Initiative Shows Considerable Dynamism"]

[Text] Bonn — According to Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber, the Eureka initiative, which was started in 1985 and has 19 participating countries, is showing "considerable dynamism." Immediately before the fourth Eureka conference of research, industry and foreign ministers in Stockholm on Wednesday, Riesenhuber stated in Bonn that research cooperation extends to 72 cooperation projects and that it will be increased by 40 to 50 new projects during the meeting. Another 11 projects will be added to the 20 projects in which the FRG is participating, he said.

After France, the FRG and the UK, it is the first time than an EFTA state, Sweden, will arrange the conference. That underlines the "unique function" that Eureka has in connecting those European countries that are oriented to a market economy. The geographic framework includes all of Western Europe. He said that the Eureka participant list has been completed by integrating Turkey and Iceland, but partners from outside — even from Eastern Europe — are "welcome."

According to Riesenhuber's interim assessment, the 110 to 120 Eureka projects are worth about DM8 billion, which comes from private and public sources. The 31 projects with German participation alone amount to some DM2.2 billion. Of those 31 projects, 23 are scheduled for budget support amounting to DM518 million between 1986 and 1993. He told journalists he intends to reduce the government's share as much as possible.

As evidence of that, he said that his ministry's share in the industrial projects was as much as 57% in their initial phases, but a mere 43% in those industrial projects that are to be decided upon in Stockholm. He said that four projects are financed exclusively by industry. Riesenhuber welcomed the federal laender's increased commitment (Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia), which might ease the government's burden. Finally, private banks have shown more interest in projects that are close to the market.

Riesenhuber was not concerned that the research results might be used by the military sector.

However, "we want projects that are justified by civilian use." In the United States it is often the other way around, he added. Bonn has no government defense research that is financed to as great an extent as the United States has, whether some big companies do as much as 50% of their business in government orders.

At a German Industry and Trade Association Eureka symposium President Wolff von Amerongen demanded that Eureka not create new subsidies. Its success depends upon the degree of private, free-enterprise financing.

Further Report

WA171923 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Dec 86 p 2

[Text] Federal Research Minister Riensenhuber has approved grants totaling DM518 million for the European research and development program Eureka over a period of 8 years. At the Eureka conference in Stockholm, Riensenhuber intends, as he announced on Monday [8 December], to approve German participation in 11 projects. This would make a total of 31 projects in progress in which some 11 universities, 2 research institutions, and 66 West German firms are involved. Some 2.2 billion marks will be made available from both public and private sectors., Riesenhuber estimates that total funding for all Eureka project authorized by the 19 participating nations to be in the range of DM8 billion.

State financial support for the Eureka program within the overall research framework, stated Riensenhuber, would have to be concentrated on joint research for environmental protection and health. The share of state subsidy for industrial projects, he remarked, would be cut back over time. To date, this has amounted to 57%. With the newer projects, it has dropped back to 43%. Riesenhuber regards a broad-scale shift of funding to industry for market-appilicable research and development as necessary for two reasons: the stronger industry's participation is, the more quickly it will achieve market success. From the available funds in the research budget a maximum number of new projects must be stimulated. That can only be achieved if he is tight-fisted in releasing funds for individual projects, asserted Riesenhuber. It is also part of the principles governing Eureka that the program will no longer be assigned its own category in his budget. Projects must be funded from existing programs of the Research Ministry.

Riensenhuber once again encouraged the banks to make funds available for Eureka projects within terms of a cooperative European effort without guarantees from other sources. Efforts are being made among banks to cooperate in using new financing methods; however, negotiations toweard this end have been drawn out.

Riensenhuber regards the Eureka program as a success. Ministerial conferences have generated an impulse toward closer cooper-

ation in research and development which must now pick up even more dynamism through greater iniative from the private sector. Eureka is evolving from the ground up through the efforts of individual firms and research institutions and is thus an important adjunct to the long-term programs of the EC. In responseto the question why he was participating in one project. the "factory of the future," with a primarily entrepreneurial mission, Riesenhuber replied that he feld obliged to support the development of new methods of production to the same degree as that for a different advanced production technology program under the name of "Famos." The "factory of the future" project is being developed with the participation of the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land, togethter with the firms of Daimler-Benz, Zeiss, SEL, Bosch, BBC, small and medium-sized machine tool manufaturerss, the Fraunhofer Institute, and university research institutions.

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CSO: 5200/2475

FRG PAPER ARGUES THAT SDI WILL INITIATE NEW ARMS RACE

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 16 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by Anton Andreas Guha: "The Defense That Makes Attack Possible"]

[Text] When influential politicians such as Wolfgang Schaeuble, state secretary at the Federal German Chancellor's Office, or Britain's Lord Carrington, secretary general of NATO, ask what caused the breakdown of the Reykjavik summit meeting and state they cannot understand why the United States' military space program (SDI) thwarted a (well-nigh agreed-upon) settlement concerning strategic nuclear weapons, since "the former problem has nothing to do with the latter," they reveal a remarkable lack of information.

Presumably, President Reagan truly believes that the "Strategic Defense Initiative," i.e. the program concerning a space-based, multilayer anti-missile system, represents "a purely defensive measure that threatens no one": Surely, no one could object to a shield designed exclusively for defense and unusable for attack. The experts know better. According to the politicians in charge of security policy, peace presently is guaranteed by nuclear deterrence. Deterrence means that while an aggressor launching a large-scale nuclear strike could wipe out the enemy as a nation, he would not be able to destroy all of the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons. The mortally wounded defender still would have enough missiles to destroy the aggressor as well. Since both Washington and the Kremlin realize this, nuclear war is not considered an option. Thus, the reason why so far there has been no nuclear inferno is that neither world power has been able to eliminate its vulnerability.

Assuming this security policy dogma (which does not eliminate the threat of nuclear war resulting from technical breakdowns or erroneous assumptions and interpretations) is correct, one realizes that a well-functioning space-based defense system would endanger the balance of terror and the "stability" resulting from deterrence: Once one is capable of really protecting oneself, one is also capable of launching an attack.

In view of these facts, it is wrong to call SDI a "mere defense measure that threatens no one." Actually, it would enable the United States to wage war on the basis of nuclear strategy. After all, a shield combined with offensive weapons is a weapon as well. Moreover, critics of the SDI program argue that

the attempt to develop a space-based defense system is foolish, if only because it could never be totally fail-safe. They feel that the technical difficulties are insurmountable; and if the defense system can intercept only 95 percent of the Soviet nuclear warheads, it would be insufficient, because the remaining 5 percent would be capable of destroying the United States. This argument is not up to the complexity of the problem, either, for 20 percent of full capacity--in terms of the actual number of Soviet missiles--would be sufficient for SDI to give the United States strategic warfare options and to alarm the Soviet Union.

Even today it would be possible by means of a nuclear first strike to destroy approximately 80 to 85 percent of the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons. But such an attack would presently be irrational, because the defender's remaining 15 to 20 percent would wipe out the aggressor as well. Precisely this is deterrence. But if the United States had at its disposal a space-based defense system whose effectiveness--in terms of the actual number of Soviet missiles--rated no higher than 20 percent, a first strike eliminating 80 percent of the warheads would make this sytem nearly 100-percent effective. Theoretically, the United States could then take into consideration the calculated risk of an attack or it might be tempted to exert political presssure on the Soviets. At any rate, any Soviet government would be in fear of this. What with both present and imminent scientific-technological advances, however, a space-based strategic defense system boasting an effectiveness rate of "only" 20 percent (again, as measured against the actual number of Soviet missiles) appears to be feasible.

The Soviets could of course take a great many countermeasures to diminish--and even reduce to zero--the efficiency of any anti-missile defense system. One countermeasure in particular probably would be indispensable: They would have to increase sharply their own missile arsenal. Whereas the United States would be compelled--for reasons of cost and technical control--to limit the number of laser stations in orbit, the Soviets could deploy any number of missiles. But this would step up the strategic arms race to an absolutely uncontrollable degree, because the United States, too, would "modernize," i.e. improve and expand, their missile arsenal (a step they have already announced).

But SDI stirs up another realistic fear among the Soviets: The technologies to be developed for a defense system against missiles or warheads could be employed--with far greater chances of success--as weapons against Soviet satellites. And for either superpower, satellites are as indispensable within the military framework as are the weapons themselves; they are the eyes, ears, and voice of the military apparatus. Without them, the military would be blind, deaf, and mute and not a single missile could be guided to its target.

Thus, if one of the two superpowers succeeded in developing an anti-satellite system capable of eliminating at one blow all of the enemy's satellites, it would also have obtained warfare options--even if these may not be exercised. On the other hand, one can easily imagine the world power without such a system living in constant fear and nervousness; in a crisis situation that it saw as hopeless, it might possibly consider a preemptive strike the lesser risk.

Both superpowers are trying to develop anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), with the United States being in the lead. With the technologies presently available, however, only satellites flying no higher than 2,000 kilometers can be attacked. To destroy satellites flying higher, futuristic weapons such as laser- or ray-guns--i.e. SDI weapons--are necessary.

Regarding the Reykjavik summit meeting, it still is unclear why President Reagan keeps holding onto SDI, even though he had found himself in agreement with CPSU leader Gorbachev regarding total elimination of strategic nuclear weapons within 10 years. Why develop and build an immensely expensive defense system, if there is nothing to be repulsed? Actually, the Soviets may well sit back and watch the Americans tackle a well-nigh unsolvable problem, spend billions, increase their budgetary deficit and their debts, draw more and more scientists and technicians from the civilian sector and as a result of this fall behind their toughest competitors, Japan and the Federal Republic. SDI would cost $1 trillion, and maintenance of this gigantic system [would cost] at least $100 billion a year (at today's prices)--and what for, if there are no missiles any more?

There probably are several answers and they can only be speculative. 1. The influence of industry, of the "military-industrial complex," is so strong that politicians have to yield to the defense interests and consent to an inherently foolish project. 2. The distrust is insurmountable. Reagan called SDI an "insurance policy" that would be effective--whatever the cost--even without any Soviet missiles to be repulsed. 3. SDI is considered an effective instrument of torture for wresting still more concessions from the Soviets. 4. It is hoped in Washington that SDI will produce revolutionary--as yet unpredictable--results in various defense industry sectors.

For the Soviets, the situation is clearer as to what their decisions must be: Either total elimination of strategic weapons and at least postponement of the SDI testing phase, or initiation of countermeasures, which would result in an explosive acceleration of the arms race. Apparently, Moscow will not consider a compromise (such as a 50-percent reduction of nuclear warheads) because it would thereby be put at a disadvantage: Any reduction would make SDI even more effective.

The French president, Francois Mitterand, described the Soviet situation as follows: For Gorbachev, there is only this alternative. If the United States does not want to give up SDI, even modest arms control agreements are out of the question in the foreseeable future.

8760
CSO: 5200/2466

USSR: 13 JANUARY PRESS CONFERENCE ON REYKJAVIK

PM141624 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "The New Philosophy of Security: Press Conference in Moscow"]

[Excerpts] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 13 January. It was devoted to the anniversary of the 15 January 1986 Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Taking part in the press conference were V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute; and V.P. Karpov, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium and chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration.

V.F. Petrovskiy addressed those present. He said:

We are marking the anniversary of the day when M.S. Gorbachev put forward a package of initiatives aimed at the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century.

Journalists' questions were answered.

Question: The Soviet side has made changes to the composition of the delegation tot he Geneva talks. Is this a change in the Soviet position, the Soviet strategy at the talks? Can we expect corresponding changes in the American side's delegation?

Answer: Our country approaches the next round in the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms with the utmost seriousness and sense of responsibility. Since the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik the Soviet Union has done everything possible to translate as soon as possible into the language of concrete diplomatic accords the agreements which were sketched out in the Icelandic capital. Unfortunately the American side has displayed an unconstructive approach and a desire to depart from the results of Reykjavik and bring the talks back into the old, pre-Reykjavik channel.

Now, by way of preparation for the new round of talks, we are proceeding on the basis of the need to make this round a turning point in the cause of the

resolution of the tasks set and to give additional impetus to the talks. In this connection the Soviet side proposed to the American side that the level of the leadership of the delegations be raised, bringing it up to the level of first deputy foreign ministers. The American side announced yesterday that the head of the U.S. delegation to the talks has been appointed a U.S. State Department counselor, thereby raising the level. The head of the Soviet delegation is Yu. M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister. He is leaving to conduct the talks in Geneva.

Question: There are rumors that the Soviet side will make new proposals on the question of a compromise between SDI and the ABM Treaty. This means that some kind of accord will be reached on the basis of Soviet proposals as regards permitting a certain level of tests in space. How true are these rumors?

Answer: Our proposals on the question of precise compliance with the ABM Treaty were put forward in Reykjavik. These proposals are that an accord be reached between the Soviet and American sides, avoiding possible misunderstandings, concerning the line which separates work which is permitted in the ABM sphere from work which is banned by the treaty. In this regard we came out in favor of banning tests in space of any space-based ABM elements. Such tests of space elements of ABM systems could take place only in the laboratory. This position of ours remains in force. We have no other proposals on this score.

Question: What comment could you make on the recent statement by Kampelman, the leader of the American delegation at the talks, and also Weinberger on the question of the forthcoming round?

Answer: Instead of focusing attention on making the next, seventh round of the talks concrete and businesslike, the leader of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Kampelman, has basically launched a worldwide exchange of views designed to unleash an unhealthy debate over questions of the forthcoming round and help ensure beforehand that this round does not lead to any positive results.

It may be said in all seriousness that the American side's observation that the Soviet Union should respond to the American side's proposals, and that the path to an accord will then be opened up, does not accord with reality. The proposals which were submitted by the American side after Reykjavik do not in any way open up the path to an accord.

Let us make a comparison. In Reykjavik President Reagan was prepared to adopt a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. Some 10 days later Ambassador Kampelman, in Geneva, is saying that the American side cannot make any such unconditional commitment not to withdraw from the treaty, and that it can only discuss with the Soviet side the rules for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

On strategic offensive arms, the President agreed in Reykjavik to eliminate all offensive strategic arms over 10 years. At the talks, the U.S. delegation is only prepared to discuss the question of eliminating ballistic missiles.

On medium-range missiles, a complicating element appears, in the form of insistent demands from the American side that the United States be granted the right to deploy medium-range missiles on its own territory in such a way that they could hit the Soviet Union's territory.

And when we come to nuclear tests, which the Soviet side sees as a necessary condition for the transition to real nuclear arms reductions, in this regard the unconstructive approach of the American side is even more obvious.

So on the whole range of questions being discussed in Geneva, the American position does not offer access to an agreement. Conversely, the Soviet side's proposals of 7 November last year are on the conference table, proposals which, it is our profound conviction, could serve as a good basis for opening up the path to an agreement in all avenues of the talks.

The statements by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger and delegation leader Kampelman provide serious food for thought as to what the American side is working toward at the talks. Of course, Weinberger's and Kampelman's inclination to misrepresent reality is well known. They are once again acting in their customary manner. But something else causes concern: How the head of the American delegation sees the question now. In Kampelman's words, the Soviet side should make concessions, while the American side will be coming to Geneva, he says, in order to obtain such concessions. The conclusion can quite clearly be drawn from this that Kampelman is blatantly whipping up polemics in the press instead of approaching the new, seventh round seriously and in a businesslike fashion.

Question: There was another statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, that he also intends to seek the partial deployment [razvertyvaniye] of SDI. Please comment.

Answer: The answer to this very unpleasant news is unequivocal. It would be a direct violation, even a direct rejection of the existing ABM Treaty.

Other questions from journalists were answered.

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CSO: 5200/1277

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SRF CHIEF ON IMPORT OF SOVIET 'STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 11, 1986 pp 4-5, 8

[Interview taken by Major Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[Text]

Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Yuri Maksimov, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces – Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR talked to Soviet Military Review. Yuri Maksimov was born in 1924. Has served in the Soviet Army since 1942. Completed the Great Patriotic War commanding a machine gun company. After the war occupied a number of tactical and operational posts. In 1950 graduated from the Frunze Military Academy, and in 1965 from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces. Commanded the troops of the Turkestan Military District. In 1985 General of the Army Yuri Maksimov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) – Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR. He is a member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Comrade General of the Army, you were a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress which considered issues of historic importance. Which of them, in your opininon, is the most vital?

War or peace. It is the most outstanding issue of our day and is of the greatest concern to the whole of mankind. To my mind, there is no task more important than stopping thermonuclear catastrophe and preserving peace.

Peace is endangered by imperialism and the policy steered by the most reactionary militarist forces. The danger can be removed only by curbing those forces. The Soviet Union's approach to security matters is universally known. We do not seek military superiority over other countries. Nor will we allow such superiority over ourselves. Our military doctrine is of a purely defensive nature. It is directed against an attack from without. The Soviet Armed Forces and the other Warsaw Treaty armies are a reliable barrier to aggressive sallies by world imperialism.

The 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that owing to the Party's and its Central Committee's unremitting attention the USSR's defensive might is maintained at a level guaranteeing the Soviet people's creative work. The Resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress on the Political Report of the Party Central Committee reads in part: **Today, as before, it is one of the most important tasks of the Party, the state and the people to raise to the maximum the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, to educate the men and officers of the Army and Navy, and all Soviet people, in a spirit of vigilance and constant preparedness to defend the great gains of socialism.**

To us, the military, this is an immutable law.

Back in ancient times the great Russian military leader Aleksandr Nevsky used to say that whoever came to our country with the sword would die of that sword. History has confirmed him. As ever, our people today has a reliable defence — the Soviet Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces occupying a prominent place. What is the country's rocket potential today?

I will say straightforwardly that it is immensely formidable. The Strategic Rocket Forces have most up-to-date weapons and combat equipment. Their operation and use are automated to a maximum degree and feature an exceptionally high combat readiness. Along with missiles, the SRF include a whole complex of most sophisticated equipment and systems to deal a retaliatory blow at any aggressor. The missile weapon is capable of hitting targets in any season and at any time of day, irrespective of weather and distance.

It is noteworthy that our missile power does not threaten anyone. Unlike the USA which dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, we have never used nuclear weapons. Moreover, we have pledged never to be the first to use them. The high combat potential of the Rocket Forces and other component parts of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces is nothing but a deterrent to the aggressive designs of the enemies of peace.

Western propaganda spreads lies about the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, particularly about the SRF, representing them as a destabilising factor and a threat to peace. In so doing, it peddles the version that the Soviet Union is allegedly superior to the USA in nuclear armaments. It is also stated that the USSR, far from reducing them, has set up and is deploying a second new type of ICBMs. What is the real state of affairs?

All talk about a "Soviet military threat" and "superiority" of the USSR over the USA in armaments runs counter to the facts. Even American leaders have referred once and again to military-strategic parity with the Soviet Union. The strategic parity of forces, however, does in no way mean that they are identical in structure. The historical situation and, incidentally, the two countries' geographical position, demanded that the USSR should give priority to land-based strategic missiles, and the USA to submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Naturally, the USSR is not going to break the structure of its strategic forces. Nor can it accept patent reduction in its security.

Now a few figures to illustrate the reduction of armaments. Since the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty the USSR has dismounted 72 ICBM launchers and 21 heavy bombers. In compliance with the interim SALT-1 agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty, the Soviet Union scrapped a total of 540 strategic delivery vehicles, whereas the USA only 168.

The assertion that the USSR has produced and is deploying a second new type of ICBMs is equally groundless. We have tested only one new type of intercontinental ballistic missiles — the SS-22, which is allowed by the SALT-2 Treaty. As to the claim about a second new type of ICBMs being tested in the USSR, this is sheer slander. The reference is to the SS-12M missile, which is a modernised version of the old SS-12 ICBM. The USA has purposely distorted the SALT-2 provision on the composition of the elements included in the missile's "throw weight." Specifically, the weight of certain elements of the old SS-12 missile is omitted, whereas the weight of the equipment used only for testing of the modernised SS-12M missile is included in its "throw weight." The purpose of this trick is quite clear. The USA has already developed a new type of ICBM — the MX missile. In violation of the SALT-2 Treaty it is developing a second new type of ICBM — Midgetman. To justify this, it is putting out all manner of falsehoods. The American Administration needs concoctions on alleged "violations" by the Soviet Union of strategic arms limitation agreements to justify refusal to abide by the accords reached between the USSR and the USA and to divert the attention of the world public from full-scale implementation of the nuclear buildup programme. Along with the deployment of the B-52 and B-1B bombers carrying long-range cruise missiles, the Americans are set on deploying another 50 MX ICBMs and speeding up production of a most up-to-date cruise missile. Work is also apace to develop American space strike weapons under the Star Wars programme.

Regarding the Star Wars programme of Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI). Widely advertising the American "space shield", western papers claim that the Soviet Union sharply criticises SDI because it has nothing to oppose it with. What could you say in this respect?

Such statements are hardly serious. Wishful thinking, no more. Indeed, the USA is out to develop a fabulously expensive ABM system with space-based elements. Its different high-sounding titles conceal the same essence: to try and attain strategic superiority over the USSR. Such attempts are futile.

Space weapons are first-strike weapons and have nothing in common with security and defence. From a military point of view, use of the "space shield" is practicable provided

the side possessing it deals the first strike. However, specialists in the USSR and elsewhere have considered a few dozen countermeasures which would pose serious problems to SDI.

As the scientists see it, for instance, the opposing side could use an ICBM launching technique directed at "exhausting" the space anti-missile defence system by its early activation through a preselected sequence of steps to deal a retaliatory blow. This technique may include combined launchings of ICBMs and "false" missiles, launching ICBMs with a wide range of trajectories and the like. All these steps would result in excessive consumption of energy resources of the ABM defence space echelons, discharge of X-ray lasers and electromagnetic guns, and in other premature losses in the ABM system fire power.

Besides, quantitative buildup of intercontinental ballistic missiles would create a number of additional difficulties for the enemy's detection systems and bring about a sharp drop in the effectiveness of the strike weapons interception and guidance systems. An increase in the number of warheads on the missiles would produce the same effect.

According to specialists, another way of fighting SDI is to develop facilities capable of destroying combat space stations. These could be special small-size missiles with different basing modes and "space mines", i. e. satellites put in orbits close to those of the stations and provided with a sufficiently powerful warhead set off on command from Earth. In other words, the idea of achieving military superiority through SDI is illusory. In any case, the aggressor would be dealt an inevitable and crushing blow.

The Soviet Union is against any weapon being emplaced in outer space. We believe that by the year 2000 the arms race could be stopped and the planet cleared of nuclear weapons. If, contrary to our arguments, the USA should implement the Star Wars programme, the USSR will find the answer. As stated by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, "we shall come up with a prompt answer, and it will not be what the United States expects. But it will be an answer that will depreciate the Star Wars programme."

It's people, not space armaments that are capable of providing security and preserving peace. Could you briefly tell us about the men of the Strategic Rocket Forces — people who shoulder great responsibility for the country's destiny?

Like all Soviet servicemen, missilemen are working for the 27th CPSU Congress measures by constantly maintaining a high combat readiness through selfless military labour.

The SRF are full of servicemen who have mastered their specialities to perfection. The overwhelming majority of missilemen are Communists and YCL members, and 80% of officers have a higher military or specialised education. Take, for instance, the missile unit under Lieutenant-Colonel Mayakov. More than half the officers are experts. Each crew has its top-class experts, and a quarter of the crews fully consist of such experts. Nearly one-third of the personnel are men with excellent results in combat training and political education, and 70% of soldiers and sergeants are high-class specialists. The unit rightfully bears the title of excellent.

We have quite a few advanced military collectives in our forces. The missile subunit commanded by Captain Petrov has been in the lead for several years now. The commander himself is a master of the military trade, exacting and solicitous towards his subordinates. For high results in military work, Captain Petrov has been awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3rd Class.

The history of the Strategic Rocket Forces can be traced to the celebrated units of the cannon artillery and the *Katyusha* Guards rocket launchers. That is why the missilemen and artillerymen have a common holiday. The present generation of missilemen cherishes the memory and is multiplying the combat traditions of the artillerymen who fought the nazis in the stern years of the Great Patriotic War. The names of Heroes of the Soviet Union Captain Khigrin, Senior Lieutenant Kosmodemyansky and Guards Senior Sergeant Krasilnikov, entered forever on the roster of missile units, are called out everyday at the evening roll-call.

Next to wartime decorations, the Colours in many units of the Rocket Forces bear orders awarded in our day for courage, military skill and gallantry displayed by soldiers, sergeants, praporshchiks and officers. Missilemen proficiency reveals itself in full measure during practice launches. The marks are generally excellent. The high results, however, do not leave anyone complacent. We realise full well that the Communist Party and Soviet people have entrusted us with the most formidable weapon and put us at the forefront of the defence of peace and socialism.

/7358
CSO: 1812/40

MOSCOW DAILY INTERVIEWS SCOTTISH PROFESSOR ON SDI, SALT, INF

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jan 87 p 5

[Interview with John Erickson: "'The Task of Building a Nuclear-Free World Is Perfectly Feasible'"]

> [Text] "Practical disarmament accords are not only necessary but possible. Efforts to achieve such must not slacken. The way to this is signposted by the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the year 2000 advanced in the 15 January 1986 statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states for a reduction in conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals."
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> E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, chairman of the GDR State Council.
>
> "The entire process of disarmament is at a pivotal stage. The prospects afforded as a result of the Reykjavik summit show that there are practicable opportunities for a significant reduction in and the elimination even of existing nuclear weapons systems."
>
> M. Koivisto, president of Finland.

Prof John Erickson is an expert in the sphere of military-strategic problems who is well known in the West. He is head of the Department of Defense Studies at Edinburgh University. He has studied Soviet military history and strategy for 20 years. John Erickson is the initiator of the Edinburgh meetings of Soviet, American and British politicians, scholars and experts in the defense sphere. In connection with the anniversary of the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA commentator S. Volovets put several questions to J. Erickson.

[Question] "The statement of 15 January 1986 contains a detailed stage-by-stage plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on our planet before the end of the current century. In the wake of the statement the Soviet

Union submitted a package of the corresponding proposals at the Soviet-American nuclear and space-based arms talks. In Reykjavik the Soviet side displayed a readiness to go its half of the way in the search for a compromise solution of the problems in the way of an agreement. And this is far from all that one year of work for peace has contained. In the light of these and other important events of the past year what do you think are the possibilities of the accomplishment of the goals outlined in the statement?

[Answer] I believe that the task of building a nuclear-free world by the start of the new millennium by the means proposed by M.S. Gorbachev is perfectly feasible. In the past year it has become even more urgent and essential. And this is why. The top-level Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik ascertained one main thing from among many: that the achievement of an agreement is perfectly feasible and that it is even closer than it seemed to many of us a year ago. Had the Americans not hidden themselves in SDI, as if behind a wall, a historic shift in the wish to reality would have been made in nuclear disarmament.

[Question] And how do you see the "star wars" program influencing the prospects of further disarmament negotiations?

[Answer] All that has been happening before our very eyes since Reykjavik confirms the misgivings expressed by many people. I see the immediate threat created by the American strategic initiative in the fact that it is swiftly doing away with two most important treaties locking in parity: SALT II and the ABM Treaty, which was signed by the USSR and the United States in 1972. You are well aware of the recent instances of violations of these agreements. Parity is not the ideal, but until a process of the elimination of nuclear weapons begins, it is clearly better than strategic destabilization. It is equality which has served until now as the basis of the Soviet-American negotiations. This, I repeat, makes even more insistent the need for realization of the 15 January statement. For this, I believe, the participants in impending actions need three basic components in their approach: new policy, strict logic and will to action.

[Question] Professor Erickson, you were one of the first Western scholars to write about the changes in Soviet political thinking in connection with the USSR's new approach to disarmament problems....

[Answer] All the events of the past year reinforce this opinion. This applies, of course, not only to the field of international negotiations but also to the approach to your country's domestic problems. The changes in political thought in your country may now boldly be termed revolutionary. Naturally, this is bringing about fundamental changes in diplomatic practice and security strategy.

[Question] Are any positive changes noticeable in this respect among Western politicians? One sometimes has the impression that not only in the United States but in West Europe also certain statesmen are attempting to "back away," as you say, from the proclaimed goals. We may as an example compare what was said in Britain or the FRG about the intermediate-range missilles a year ago and what is being said today.

[Answer] I wish to be honest with you and for this reason will say that I would term this not signs of new thinking but an acute crisis of thought. The point being that it is precisely the people who have become accustomed over the past 20-30 years to say that they want to be rid of nuclear weapons who, finding themselves for the first time face to face with such a real possibility, are confused. Many of them now have doubts: are they really agreeable to not one nuclear bomb, not one nuclear warhead remaining. Many people today are asking: were they sincere when they proclaimed their belief in the possibility of providing for security without nuclear weapons? This is precisely a profound crisis of thought and logic.

8850
CSO: 5200/1265

FRG'S GENSCHER DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT WITH U.S. ENVOY

LD211124 Hamburg DPA in German 0932 GMT 21 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, 21 Dec (DPA) — West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher once again stressed the Federal Republic's interest in a zero option on intermediate-range missiles. In a talk with U.S. Ambassador Richard Burt, Genscher said the zero solution accorded with the aim of German security policy, as did subsequent negotiations on intermediate-range missiles of a shorter range, the Foreign Ministry said today. Genscher assured the ambassador that Bonn strongly supports the intention of U.S. President Ronald Reagan to reduce drastically nuclear potential. The meeting in Reykjavik between Reagan and Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev was an important and encouraging event.

The year now ending was in Genscher's view a successful one for FRG-U.S. cooperation. In this connection, he also stressed the course of the NATO foreign ministers conference in Brussels. According to the Foreign Ministry, the trade problems discussed between Genscher and Burt included EEC agricultural policy.

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CSO: 5200/2475

FRG'S GENSCHER COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK, ZERO OPTION

DW110837 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2025 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Peter Staisch and Ernst Elitz in the Hamburg ARD studio -- live]

[Excerpts] [Staisch] [Passage omitted] I think 1986 will be the year of Reykjavik. My question to the foreign minister: Was it a summit of hope, or a wholesome shock demonstrating that we have been heading in the wrong direction, as Henry Kissinger said several weeks ago?

[Genscher] If you want to use the term summit, I would say it was a base camp for further moves toward disarmament. This year, 1986, has been one of remarkable progress. For example, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe concluded with good confidence-building results. If we had discussed it a year ago, we would have expressed considerable doubts about the possibility of an understanding with the Soviet Union. Such an understanding has been possible because the new Soviet leadership has taken a new position on the verification issue. I hope we will also see that in other fields.

We have achieved other important results in disarmament. The unilateral removal of tactical nuclear warheads has led to a reduction in their number. That constitutes a substantial relief to us. [passage omitted]

[Staisch] Quite concretely, is the zero option on intermediate-range missiles a blessing for our security and a gain for our strategy of deterrence? Is the vision of not having intercontinental nuclear weapons in the USSR and the United States in 10 years a gain for our security or not? Here in the FRG a very essential controversy has broken out.

[Genscher] Mr Staisch, an entirely new approach was made in Reykjavik. The United States and the Soviet Union realized that they could only ensure the survival of mankind through cooperation and cooperative solutions. That explains why they virtually reached agreement in principle on removing 50% of their strategic nuclear capabilities in the next 5 years. They failed to agree on the moves to be made in the following 5 years -- removal of ballistic missiles, or removal of all nuclear weapons. But the prospect of a 50% reduction in all strategic weapons constitutes

a great gain for all mankind, because the capabilities for nuclear destruction would be substantially reduced, without the strategy of deterrence that has safeguarded peace in Europe for many decades being called into question.

Regarding the longer range intermediate-range missiles that affect us in particular, the Federal Government, concurring with NATO, has always said that we have to counterarm [nachruesten]. However, if the Soviet longer range intermediate-range missiles threatening us are removed, the U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were or would have been deployed would also be removed. We have been strongly criticized for that zero option, especially by our SPD colleagues, who at their party congress were still saying they were ready to accept more than 400 Soviet warheads.

Meanwhile, Reykjavik has shown that both superpowers assess the zero option positively. That is in our interest, even though there will still be 100 warheads on the Soviet Union's Asian territory and 100 warheads in the United States. We view it as a gain for our security. And why should it not be a gain for the Soviet Union to remove 1,100 warheads targeted on us? I would feel better if those 1,100 warheads did not exist anymore. Therefore, I advocate the removal of counterarmament [nachruestung] on our side.

We are aware that it does not fully resolve our security problem. The Soviets are superior in shorter range missiles, which must be negotiated. It is interesting to note that the United States has accepted the Federal Government's suggestion to hold negotiations on those missiles. The Soviet Union also accepted that in Reykjavik.

In addition, it is important for us to deal with the conventional balance of forces, where the Eastern side is also superior. At its spring meeting in Halifax, NATO decided to start negotiations on that issue. We will make a decision in Brussels tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. It must be the unchanging goal of every Western strategy in Europe that war will never again be possible — either nuclear or conventional war. Any war would annihilate our people, and most European peoples.

Therefore, we must make sure that the prospect of nuclear disarmament does not create a new offensive capability. There are proposals that — on the basis of the structure of the armed forces, their deployment, their doctrines, their equipment, and their weapons systems — both sides make sure that neither is capable of attacking or carrying out large-scale operations, but are only able to defend themselves.

Considering the fact that all those issues are being discussed and negotiated between East and West and that Reykjavik contributed to that, I would say the picture is corect. It is a base camp from which work must be continued. I am not among those who view Reykjavik as a black day in history, but on the contrary, a day of hope for mankind.

[Elitz] You just said that there should be negotiations on shorter range intermediate-range missiles, the removal of shorter range missiles should be negotiated? Or do you want to link the two problems and negotiate on them simultaneously, as the CSU has demanded?

[Genscher] Mr Elitz, your question is easy to answer. We should negotiate without linking the two issues. A linkage is always the enemy of solutions. Those who pursue a policy of all or nothing will achieve nothing. By the way, the problem of shorter range intermediate-range missiles is not new. It was there in 1979, when NATO's two-track decision on counterarmament was formulated. At the time, we said that negotiations would first be held on longer range intermediate-range missiles, because they constituted the most complicated problem and the biggest threat to stability in Europe. Once a result is achieved, it should form the basis of further negotiations on the other ranges. That is exactly what we are doing. So we are not adding anything to the counterarmament decision or taking anything away. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2475

FRG PAPER SAYS REYKJAVIK SUMMIT HAS LED TO GREATER NATO UNITY

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 23 Dec 86 p 8

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "NATO in Great and Complete Harmony"]

[Text] Brussels, Dec--The Atlantic Pact approaches the end of the year with a greater certainty about the goals of negotiation between East and West than at the time immediately after President Reagan's meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Although different views about methods were expressed during the conference of NATO ministers this past week as to how to continue the quest for a reduction and curtailment of strategic weapon systems, of intermediate-range ballistic weapons, and, above all, of conventional armaments in Europe, there are no basic differences of opinion with the United States. There was a consensus that the negotiations on the removal of the conventional imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be difficult. Among the three topics of negotiation in Geneva between the two superpowers, the intention of reducing strategic long-range weapons by half within five years has the best chance of success, if the Soviets reopen the "package" they made up in Reykjavik, just as a "zero option" on the long-range intermediate-range missiles (LRINF) seems possible after that. No one in NATO's political leadership believes, however, that this will occur in the foreseeable future. Reykjavik was a very healthy shock since, in view of the far-reaching suggestions on disarmament made by Reagan and Gorbachev, it demonstrated on the other hand the obligation to take into consideration the security interests of all participants, not just those of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

The United States has the support of its partner nations in the goal of reducing the inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles on land, under water and in the air by 5 percent. The Europeans are also largely in agreement on a "zero option" for long-range intermediate-range missiles in Europe and on retention of 100 warheads each in Soviet Asia and in America. On all other questions, however, Washington must come to an agreement with its partners. This applies above all to the coupling of future negotiations on long-range intermediate-range missiles to negotiations on the dismantling of short-range weapons (SRINF). In Brussels, American Secretary of State Schulz received a clear message: "This far and no further." All European partner nations rejected the notion that their security was to be decreased through an agreement of the two superpowers. Schultz agreed and declared that for America the security of NATO retained priority. With respect to long-range intermediate-range missiles, the global "zero option," the original negotiation goal, then as now the most desirable one, remains out of sight, since, in

leaving each side 100 weapon systems, serious problems would arise in verifiability, which, in any case, is the main difficulty in the completion of all agreements on limited disarmament. The Americans share the European notion that the freezing of short-range missiles at their present levels would seal the present status of Soviet superiority and is, therefore, unacceptable. Negotiations on the dismantling of these weapons would have to retain for the West the right of parity. At the same time, a "zero option" would not be desirable, in view of the strategic general situation in Europe. Schulz has repeated that America will not place limitations on its plans for a space defense system (SDI).

In Brussels, the declaration on future negotiations on conventional disarmament will be judged as a proof of the inner cohesion of the alliance "between the Atlantic and the Urals" in spite of persisting differences of opinion with regard to what might be the suitable forum for these. France, to be sure, has made it quite clear that it stringently objects to negotiations from one pact to another, as in the case of the continuing 13-year-old Vienna negotiations on MBFR, from which France has absented itself. Paris has, however, fundamentally agreed to the "clamp" of the CSCE forum as a framework. Meanwhile, France reserves the right to use its veto power if French security interests are at stake. The French are watching to see that an agreement on intermediate-range weapons does not reduce the security of Europe; they believe that Moscow in this instance would only agree to a trade-off involving dismantling of the Pershing II missiles and of the cruise missiles against dismantling of the SS-20 missiles directed at Western Europe, because its own short-range missiles could cover the same targets as its SS-20 missiles. They fear, in addition, that Moscow for its part will demand parallel negotiations on the dismantling of the French "Force de Dissuasion" and of the national British atomic weapons. With this understanding, they see themselves strengthened still more when Gorbachev, responding to the question of a NATO ambassador as to whether he was prepared to open up the "package" of Reykjavik again, indicated that, in this case, the separate French and British systems would have to be included with the Geneva negotiations on LRINF. It is almost certain that the Soviet Union will do this anyway in the second 5-year segment of negotiations on the dismantling of long-range ballistic weapons, in which case it might insist that France should also give up the projected modernization of its nuclear warheads, just as England is permitted no Trident submarines.

France has also prevented NATO General Secretary Lord Carrington, as representative of the alliance, from answering the letter of GDR State Secretary Krolikowski, as chairman of the political committee; a co-worker of the Brussels GDR Ambassador Hunger told him that he might simply "throw the letter into the mailbox" near NATO. High-ranking French diplomats dispute the issue that their country is playing here the burdensome role of "brake," and in particular against the wishes of Bonn, since the Atlantic Alliance remains a pact of sovereign nations. Details of how to begin negotiations with the Warsaw Pact in the case of the Viennese Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) succession conference remain, therefore, uncertain. In Brussels, memories linger of the sluggish development of the MBRF talks: the up-to-now unsuccessful dispute on data is child's play compared to what must be articulated with the expanded zone, since the Soviets alone would then repeat their

assertion (possibly through adding Spanish and Portuguese military forces), that there is essentially no imbalance as maintained by NATO.

Thus the "shock of Reykjavik" has had a positive effect in all areas. It has unveiled the deficient sense of reality of those who chase after Utopias. It has demonstrated to the European NATO partners that they must reason together and collaborate in order to avoid under changed circumstances a weakening of their security. NATO is not in a position to present itself in all questions with the same point of view, because the interests of the 16 independent states differ in great measure. Nevertheless, the alliance, after Rekjavik, in view of its political leadership has shown that the pact remains united on basic questions. This is a good basis for the continuation of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

13195/12859
CSO: 5200/2476

FRG BUNDESTAG REJECTS SPD MOTION TO CENSURE REAGAN

LD101842 Hamburg DPA in German 1731 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, 10 Dec (DPA) — The Bundestag today rejected an SPD opposition motion, by a majority of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition parties, to censure President Ronald Reagan's decision to exceed the ceiling set in SALT II. Coalition speakers said that the SPD initiative, which also attacked the Federal Government, was one-sided and polemical. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) indirectly criticized Reagan's decision.

Genscher said that in the view of the Federal Government and of all the other U.S. allies, the abandonment of existing arrangements will complicate the efforts to agree new disarmament deals. The strict observance of the SALT II agreement by all concerned is essential.

FDP Deputy Helmut Schaefer was more pointed when he said that Reagan's credibility has been impaired by his SALT II decision and that the President's logic is increasingly difficult to understand.

But CDU Deputy Juergen Todenhoefer said that the SALT II agreement failed because Moscow, regrettably, has constantly infringed upon it. The SPD, he added, has virtually made itself an ally of the Soviet arms policy because it has failed to protest against Moscow's treaty violations and has always closed both eyes.

Speaking for the SPD, Karsten Voigt said that the coalition attitude is "sorry and shameful." Anyone who reneges on the SALT II treaty and fails to insist on its observance is incapable of turning a new page in East-West relations. The FDP tends to veil the Federal Government's conservative action with liberal speeches. So the Federal Government's approach to disarmament is two-faced.

Greens Deputy Torsten Lange called on the coalition to admit openly and honestly that it is not interested in disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/2475

FRG PAPER CALLS U.S. ABROGATION OF SALT II UNJUSTIFIED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 5 Dec 86 p 7

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "When the Gooseherd Turns Fox"]

[Text] The news broke not with the bang of a bomb, but with the muffled thud of a wrecker's ball systematically knocking to pieces a building condemned long ago: On 28 November 1986, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber equipped with nuclear cruise missiles landed at Carswell Air-Force Base, Texas, and was placed under the control of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. What had been feared by many and hoped for by some has now become a reality. The United States has irrevocably overstepped the limit imposed by the SALT II Agreement which the two world powers had concluded in 1979 and which by and large had been honored in spite of the fact that it had never been ratified. In the midst of the imbroglio caused by his government's blunders in regard to Iran and Nicaragua, President Reagan took the time to sign the controversial directive. And Moscow's reply was not long in coming: Now the Soviet Union, too, no longer feels bound by the SALT limit.

The Washington wreckers had made known their intentions well in advance: Whether in Moscow or in Europe or in the American Congress--no one could claim to have been taken by surprise. For Ronald Reagan and his team had never concealed the fact that the arms control concept of their predecessors was not to their liking. From the time they took office in 1981, they considered SALT, the agreement concerning limitation of offensive strategic weapons, to be "fundamentally flawed." Richard Perle, Reagan's most influential ally in the Pentagon, had stated flatly: "Nothing in the SALT II Agreement has any relevance in terms of our security."

Nevertheless, for 6 years the Reagan Government had honored the agreement, not because of enthusiasm, but because it did not restrict America's armament plans: After all, the agreement allows each side to deploy up to 1,320 multiple-warhead delivery vehicles--missiles and strategic bombers. Now, however, a single B-52 bomber appeared to be more important than the entire agreement or the support of the European allies--more important even than the spirit of Reykjavik. As early as June, White House Spokesman Larry Speakes had stated that "the SALT Agreement no longer exists." The death sentence has now been carried out.

In defense of this step--a step militarily marginal and politically risky--Washington advanced two arguments, one of which--namely the claim that the Soviet Union violated the treaty terms and that the United States therefore need no longer feel bound by the agreement--is specious, for in spite of a longstanding campaign Reagan's disarmament agency and the Pentagon have not been able to prove their allegations concerning Soviet violations of the SALT II Agreement, even though Washington's list of accusations has by now been reduced to only two treaty violations:

Washington claims the Soviet Union violated the agreement in that it has developed more than one missile type, namely the SS-24, a missile equipped with multiple warheads, and the SS-25, a mobile weapon equipped with only one warhead. Countering this accusation, the Soviet Union argued that the SS-25 was not a newly developed weapon, but that it represented a permissible modernization of an obsolete type of missile, namely the SS-13 introduced in the late 1960's. The agreement contains two provisions in this regard: Up to 5 percent of changes concerning the most important technical specifications--circumference, length, launching weight, throw weight--can be considered modernization; changes exceeding this limit are to be considered new development. Moreover, tests of an existing single-warhead missile type or of a single-warhead missile modernized in accordance with these criteria are permissible only if the weight of the warhead exceeds 50 percent of the missile's total throw weight (the total throw weight comprises all explosive charges and dummies). This provision is intended to prevent secret introduction of multiple warheads.

But even the superpowers' eyes and ears, the observation satellites in space, are not always capable of reliably performing limit control. Moreover, there have been technological changes: Frequently, the data for old missiles, which, after all, are necessary for making comparisons, are based on assumptions deriving from imperfect findings. It will hardly be possible to prove the Soviet Union guilty of treaty violation. At most , they can be accused of fishing in the troubled waters of provisions hard to enforce.

The second accusation: The Americans claim the Soviet Union violated the SALT Agreement by coding the signals that during missile tests are transmitted to the ground stations (and that supply the other side with important information concerning the properties of the weapons tested). This accusation, too, has been rejected by the Soviets, who this time had recourse to even better arguments. For what is unclear in this instance is not only the feasibility of technical verification, but the treaty text itself: While the treaty allows either side to code the test signals, coding is permissible only insofar as it does not prevent verification of treaty observance. In fact, the United States never claimed it could no longer receive any Soviet test signals. Since the agreement failed to specify which data may and which ones may not be put into code, the prohibition is vague--a cause for controversial interpretations, but not a solid basis for the charge of treaty violation.

Thus, the United States' list of accusations is not impressive enough to justify going back on the SALT commitments. Certainly, one should not take lightly even a mere suspicion of Soviet treaty violations. But if Washington were really concerned with upholding the treaty, would it make sense to scrap

the entire treaty just because two (of a great many) provisions (two provisions, at that, that in terms of military issues are of no consequence) were not heeded to the extent America wanted?

Thus, it seems safe to assume that what President Reagan really is interested in is not so much elimination of treaty violations, but elimination of the treaty itself. After all, the Kremlin--complying with the terms of SALT I (the 1972 agreement concerning strategic weapons) and SALT II--scrapped approximately 1,300 older ICBMs. But the Reagan Government is not alarmed by the fact that now the Soviet Union will no longer be obligated to scrap missiles, but will be entitled to pursue unrestricted expansion of its arsenals. Washington feels it is more important to lift restrictions off America than to curb the Soviet Union.

This also applies to the position taken in regard to the other--possibly even more important--agreement on East-West arms control, the ABM Treaty concerning limitation of anti-ballistic missiles which was concluded in 1972. Here, too, Washington--this time advancing stronger arguments--accused the Soviet Union of treaty violation. Near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, approximately 700 kilometers from Mongolia's northern border, the Soviets--in violation of the treaty terms--have set up a large-scale radar station which will be put in operation in the next few years. Centrally-located radar systems of this type, which are highly effective against enemy missile attacks, are prohibited by the ABM Treaty. But again, in making this accusation, Washington appears to be interested not so much in ensuring stricter observance of the ABM Treaty as in obtaining arguments facilitating its own deviation from the treaty--in accordance with the motto: Good thing that the Russians are cheating--now we can get out of the game.

Here, too, Washington is motivated by the wish to pursue its own military programs, above all the SDI project, without any bothersome legal constraints. In the last 2 years of his term, the president wants to prove to his successors that space-based strategic anti-missile defense is not a dream and that it can become a reality. But in Article V, the ABM Treaty prohibits--among other things--development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. Until October 1985, i.e. for as long as 13 years, all U.S. governments had taken this provision to mean that the prohibition was not restricted to technologies known in 1972, i.e. that it included novel technologies such as laser-based processes, particle accelerators, and arms technologies based on kinetic energy.

It is precisely these technologies, however, that are particularly attractive to the SDI managers. And the legal experts in the Pentagon and the State Department were quick to discover a hitherto unnoticed provision in the treaty's appendix, according to which no specific restrictions were to apply to anti-missile systems based "on other physical principles."

Countering the outcry of the Congress (which felt the treaty it had ratified was not identical with the one reinterpreted) and of the allies (who considered the lawyers' interpretation an attempt to kill arms control), the president advanced a Solomonic formula, stating that while the new interpretation allowing unrestricted development and testing of SDI systems

and components was legally correct, the government would for the present go by the old, "narrow" interpretation. The Congress, but also the European allies, more or less accepted that approach; this way, they could keep claiming SDI was "a mere research program."

Taking this view, however, they were fooling themselves; for they did not notice that over the last few months the United States had quickly been sneaking out of the "narrow" interpretation. Even before the Reykjavik meeting, Reagan--addressing the United Nations--had stated that the treaty clearly allowed "research, development, and testing"; at that time, the White House pointed out that Reagan's statement had been based on the "broader" interpretation. After the abortive Iceland meeting, Reagan reconfirmed these positions: "We will further advance SDI research, development, and testing--in conformity with the ABM provisions." And in mid-November, Adelman, the Reagan administration's expert in charge of disarmament matters, followed up with the statement: "We are not going to comply with the Soviet demand to call off half of our SDI tests; if anything, we will step up the number of tests ..., because we are legally entitled to the broad interpretation of the treaty."

Thus, there is something eery about this debate on verification, treaty violations and interpretations. If the Reagan Administration wants its accusations against the Soviet Union to be taken seriously by its allies, it should at least see to it that its own contractual fidelity is beyond all doubt. The way things presently are, however, the criticism leveled against the other world power--even where it is justified--appears to be nothing but a cover for America's withdrawal from prior obligations. One may safely assume that arms control will not withstand the wreckers for long. Even today, SALT II is a heap of rubble. Tomorrow the same thing could happen to the ABM Treaty. America appears to be unconcerned about the fact that with the old structures being demolished, the world is headed for dangerous times. Not that the arms race is going to explode now--neither world power presently has enough money for big ventures. There is another, graver risk that is of crucial importance: Is there any chance of checking the arms race, if the world powers--above all the United States, a country under the rule of law--reinterpret and undermine at will treaties and agreements? This way, the gooseherd turns fox. The big words of Reykjavik now stand revealed as idle talk.

8760
CSO: 5200/2467

UK: ANGLO-FRENCH DETERRENT TERMED BEST ALTERNATIVE TO TRIDENT

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 24 Jan 87 p 14

[Defense correspondent John Keegan examines the case for a genuinely independent Anglo-French deterrent: "An Alternative to Trident"]

[Text]

DID Reykjavik mark the moment when Britain at last had to confront the issue of its own "independent" nuclear deterrent: whether it does have one and, if not, whether is should?

The Reagan-Gorbachev summit called so many of the certainties of the superpower relationship into question that the matter of our own ultimate security was temporarily obscured by apparently larger considerations. It seemed, for example, that the two leaders had come within a whisker of agreeing to rid the developed world of the threat of ballistic missile attack. It was also made to seem, by brilliant Soviet propaganda efforts, that only the American President's commitment to his Strategic Defence Initiative ("Star Wars") had cheated his people and their allies of their due. Beside the dashing of such hopes, the future strategic status of this country appeared a trifling matter.

Not so trifling, however, to those who bear strategic responsibilities. Reykjavik sent the Prime Minister hastening to Washington burdened with anxieties. She had detected that the agreement so nearly made at Reykjavik would have robbed Europe of the protection of American theatre nuclear weapons—Cruise and Pershing II—and forced the United States to abrogate its commitment to supply this country with the Trident D-5 missile for its new fleet of ballistic submarines.

The assurances given by the President to her, and to the German Chancellor, dissolved the fear that the United States was contemplating leaving Europe exposed to Soviet conventional superiority without nuclear protection. His personal guarantee also made it clear that the Trident agreement held good. Mrs Thatcher was thereby enabled to say on her return that Reykjavik had changed nothing.

But there are those—and I am one—who have come to feel that Reykjavik changed a very great deal. It changed expectations. Since the late 1940s, Europe has lived by the expectation that the United States will always identify its national interests with those of Atlantic Alliance. Since the early 1940s, Britain has lived by the expectation that its special relationship with the United States was an American vital interest also. Reykjavik called both expectations into doubt. It revealed that the United States can separate consideration of its own security from that of its allies, and, in doing so, may treat Britain no differently from any of the rest.

It is easy, now that so many of the Reykjavik offers have been taken back, to say that the Summit fright was a storm in a teacup. But the fright has prompted the asking of questions that the old climate of expectation stifled. One is whether Reagan's Trident guarantee binds future U S administrations. The guess is that it does not, but I was recently able to put the question directly to policy makers in the Pentagon. Their answer confirmed that the guess is correct. Should the

superpowers, at a future Summit, find a coincidence of interests that denies the supply of nuclear weapons to allied states, the Trident or any subsequent agreement could be set aside.

Mr Timothy Raison, the junior Foreign Office minister, has this week brought back from the Kremlin word that the Soviet Union, contrary to earlier disvowals, may now see the modernisation of the British deterrent—which is what the Trident programme is—as an impediment to the agreement of a general reduction of nuclear armaments with the United States. The spectre of enforced nuclear disarmament remains one, therefore, with which this and future British governments must live.

No problem there for Mr Kinnock. He promises to anticipate any disarmament measure by unilateral decision. But politicians who live in the real world will perceive very real problems indeed. Remote though the possibility may be of Britain ever being at risk from the Soviet Union without the prop of American nuclear support, it cannot, after Reykjavik, be set aside. Britain in a nuclear-free Europe might not lie under the direct threat of invasion (as would West Germany) in the extreme case of the repatriation of the U S Seventh Army.

But our home waters would then, as those of the neutral Baltic already do, exert the most powerful strategic attraction to the Soviet fleet.

Britain not only lies across what are still the most important sea routes in the world: control of those routes lies with any power that dominates Britain's enormous complex of anchorages and inlets. The by-blow of a superpower disarmament agreement might leave Britain to deny the use of those waters to interlopers by conventional force alone. But the Royal Navy simply lacks the conventional force to do so. Its 90 service warships and attack submarines would be dwarfed by the task. A national deterrent would alone supply such a small conventional force with credibility.

There are other scenarios that supply justification for a national deterrent. But the Soviet maritime menace presents the most convincing. How should Britain act on it?

The time is long gone when Britain might design and develop a ballistic missile of its own. But the acquisition of a deterrent system that would be truly independent, British by right and not by favour, is not beyond the grasp. A weapon of last resort, a short-range attack missile mounted on a Tornado, might be one expedient. Of far greater strategic value would be a cruise missile, a launcher whose design and development lies within British technical capacity. The cost would be high—several times that of the Chevaline programme by which the Ministry of Defence modernised our current Polaris missiles—but nevertheless worth sparing. There would be difficulties in acquiring the data for terrain-matching guidance, and others in re-engineering the submarines currently building to accept cruise instead of Trident. But they could be overcome.

The alternative, and it is a persuasive one, supported by minds as wise as Henry Kissinger's, is that Britain should now seek to combine its deterrent force with the French. Dr David Owen already advocates the harmonisation of British and French ballistic submarine patrol and targeting patterns. It would be possible to go further. The Kremlin has now revealed that the French deterrent attracts its disfavour. France is in the process of an expensive modernisation of its deterrent, represented by the M4 ballistic submarine missile. Further expensive modernisations lie ahead. Were Britain to offer, in exchange for the M4, a fair sharing of costs, our internationally recognised skills in underwater warfare, free use of our enormous complex of submarine hiding places and the addition of our four new boats to the French six, Paris might find the offer irresistible.

An *entente nucleaire* has other attractions for Britain. Nuclear independence unites rather than divides the French people. No party threatens unilateral disarmament. Nor would it be elected if it did. To enmesh the British deterrent with the French would therefore be to confront any future unilateralist government in this country with a diplomatic obstacle to its policy that might defy dismantling. Defenders of our untrammeled national sovereignty would denounce such an entanglement as unconstitutional.

But our sovereignty is already compromised by the Treaty of Rome and our national security ultimately counts for much more than the calculations of economic advantage which underlay our decision to accede to the European Community. The stakes in any case are too high for pussyfooting. Unless we are to forget the spectre that Reykjavik showed us or, with Mr Kinnock, to believe that weak conventional forces deter strong nuclear forces, we must do something.

To work towards the creation of what would be a genuinely independent Anglo-French deterrent would be the best of our available choices.

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CSO: 5240/041

BRIEFS

CHEMICAL EXPORT CONTROLS--The Federal Government has extended measures to prevent chemicals from Australia being used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The foreign minister, Mr Hayden, said an additional 22 chemicals, which could be used in chemical weapons manufacture, had now been placed under export controls. He said Australia was playing a leading role in reducing the risk of chemical warfare and the latest measure reflected the government's abhorrence of the use of chemical weapons. Mr Hayden said he hoped the Australian export controls would serve as a model for chemical exporting nations. [Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 21 Jan 87] /9604

CSO: 5200/4303

USSR: CSCE COMMISSIONS RESUME WORK IN VIENNA

TASS: Sittings Start

LD281310 Moscow TASS in English 1305 GMT 28 Jan 87

[Text] Vienna January 28 TASS -- Today sittings of commissions started at the Vienna meeting of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They are attended by delegates of 33 European countries, as well as by the USA and Canada. They discuss issues of guaranteeing security and progress in disarmament, cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, environmental protection, human rights and development of humanitarian cooperation. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries made on these questions some specific constructive proposals reflecting their desire to do their utmost for the success of this international forum in the interests of all nations.

East, West Exchange Criticism

AU271630 Paris AFP in English 1623 GMT 27 Jan 87

[Didier Fauqueux report]

[Excerpts] Vienna, Jan 27 (AFP) -- U.S. and Soviet delegates exchanged criticism over human rights abuses at the resumption of the third review conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) here Tuesday. [passage omitted]

Soviet delegation leader Yuriy Kashlev, accusing Western nations of coming to the conference "in a spirit of confrontation,"

East and West were also at odds over the next step, with the West insisting on a full report on implementation of earlier decisions before moving on to new proposals by the East block, including a human rights conference in Moscow. There were no new developments on security since Monday, when Mr. Zimmerman in preliminary negotiations said that talks would soon begin in Vienna to work out reductions of conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains.

PRAVDA Cites Kashlev Speech

PM281206 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent B. Dubrovin report: "Constructive Work Is Needed: Vienna Meeting Resumes"

[Text] Vienna, 27 Jan -- The Vienna meeting of states which took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumed in the Hofburg Palace here today, after a break.

In his speech the head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Yu. V. Kashlev, stated, in particular: "The Soviet delegation has returned to Vienna with the firm intention of doing everything possible for the meeting's success." Recalling that the first stage of the Vienna meeting was marked, on the one hand, by major constructive initiatives from the Warsaw Pact states on a wide range of questions of security, economic cooperation, the environment, and also human rights and humanitarian problems, the Soviet spokesman pointed out that at the same time certain NATO countries came to the meeting empty-handed.

The United States and a number of its allies failed to make a single constructive proposal, using the meeting as a platform only for statements in the spirit of "psychological warfare" and for attempts to misrepresent the nature of the socialist countries' policy and grossly distort the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and the concluding document of the Madrid meeting.

To conclude his speech the head of the Soviet delegation expressed the hope that reason, good will, and a common commitment to success will prevail and that the participants in the Vienna meeting, renouncing the tactics of procrastination and confrontation, will go over to constructive work.

IZVESTIYA Views Talks

PM281109 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Own Correspondent N. Novikov report under the "Vienna Meeting" rubric: "Justifying Hopes"]

[Excerpts] Vienna--Once again the national flags of the 35 countries are flying above the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. The Vienna meeting of representatives of the states party to the CSCE states is resuming work 27 January after the recess. The halls of the Hofburg Palace are busy and the press center, where more than 1,000 journalists from 47 countries are accredited, is bustling, so great is the world public's interest in the Vienna forum.

That is understandable. The peoples have a vital interest in ridding the planet of the threat of nuclear conflagration. The preservation of peace on earth depends on many factors bound in a tight knot. Life has shown this knot can only be unraveled by collective efforts guided by a political thinking corresponding to the realities of the nuclear missile age after recognizing the growing interdependence of our contradictory world and the need to create an all-embracing system of international security.

It goes without saying the main problem now facing mankind -- the problem of survival -- is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Africa, America, and Asia. In the situation which has taken shape the role and significance of the all-European process, the strengthening of peace,and the elaboration of disarmament measures in Europe are increasing particularly. The Vienna meeting is expected to make a weighty contribution to the solution of these most important tasks.

Incidentally, the successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe confirmed that the practical implementation of disarmament on the continent is possible. Indeed, it follows from the document adopted in the Swedish capital that "Stockholm I" will lead directly to "Stockholm II" and to the adoption of disarmament measures in Europe. [paragraph continues]

On this question, too, the Vienna meeting should have a substantial say by giving the Stockholm conference the kind of mandate which would make it possible to devote maximum attention to the problems of disarmament in Europe. Especially since there already exists a balanced program of European disarmament formulated by the Warsaw Pact countries. This program, as a number of delegations have stated, is quite suitable for examination at the Stockholm conference.

At the Vienna forum's first stage of work a concrete proposal was submitted by Poland to elaborate the mandate for "Stockholm II" in Vienna. Delegations from Yugoslavia, Sweden, Austria, Malta, and other countries spoke in the same vein. That opinion is supported by the Greek foreign minister, I. Papoulias, and by Finnish Foreign Minister P. Vayrynen who advocated in an interview in the newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET that an accord be reached in Vienna "on a new conference mandate" so that its next stage should discuss confidence and security measures and disarmament measures in parallel.

The NATO countries showed a completely different approach to this most important problem during the first round of the meeting. They came to Vienna without a definite stance on the question of confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe. The NATO countries' representatives avoided a discussion of this topical problem. That was no coincidence if you bear in mind that Washington and its main NATO partners have chosen the path of implementing new militarist programs, the path of wrecking the accords outlined in Reykjavik, and the path leading to the actual buildup of armaments in Europe. The Americans refused to heed the tone of the discussion in the Hofburg Palace. It clearly showed the majority of participants in the Vienna meeting understand it could make a tangible contribution to the consolidation of peace and security in Europe.

Kashlev Bulgarian Interview

AU021014 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 30 Jan 87 p 6

[Interview given by Yuriy Kashlev, "leader of the USSR delegation to the Vienna meeting of the countries which have signed the Helsinki Conference Final Act", to Tsocho Kumanov, SOFIA PRESS correspondent in Vienna, entitled "The Vienna Meeting Reveals New Prospects for the All-European Process." -- date of the interview is not given]

[Excerpts] Today the Vienna meeting of the countries which have signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference resumed its work. Tsocho Kumanov, SOFIA PRESS

correspondent in Vienna, spoke with Yuriy Kashlev, leader of the Soviet delegation, on the work of the meeting hitherto and the prospects of the all-European process. The interview was conducted especially for RABOTNICHESKO DELO.

[Kumanov] What does the Soviet delegation expect from the second stage of the Vienna meeting?

[Kashlev] We came here with hope. The second stage is decisive to a large degree. In the next 2 to 2 and 1/2 months we must determine on what issues we can reach an agreement. The hope now is that, after the socialist countries submitted many important proposals, the Western participating countries will take a stand on them. We know the NATO states are also preparing proposals. After they are published we shall see what the Vienna meeting will produce.

[Kumanov] The USSR position is clear: All issues comprising the Helsinki process can be discussed here. Do you think that during the second stage of the meeting the West will assume a new and more realistic attitude?

[Kashlev] Ostensibly the Western representatives adhere to a balanced approach toward the all-European issue. However, in practice they are not ready to move forward on the basis of the fundamental components of the agreements. The West shows indifference toward issues such as disarmament, economic cooperation, security, and so forth. In general, we have the impression that the United States wants to turn the all-European process which began after Helsinki into a process totally devoted to the human rights issue. In principle they are no longer interested in the other "baskets." However, we shall not allow the issues of disarmament and security to be excluded from the agenda.

Kovalev Praises Process

LD301835 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT 30 Jan 87

[Text] Vienna January 30 TASS -- The CSCE process, started more than ten years ago in Helsinki, has proved its viability and, it can be said, its tenacity, it was stated here today by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Anatoliy Kovalev.

Despite the serious problems created by the policy of confrontation and arms race, including attempts to spread the arms race to outer space, the CSCE process continues to serve the aims of detente, cooperation and security in Europe, and in the whole world for that matter, he said further.

Anatoliy Kovalev spoke at a plenary sessin of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where the general discussion is nearing its close.

Moving to the forefront, he said, is the work to submit and study the proposals of states which was started already before the recess. So there begins an especially responsible phase of the work -- the preparation of weighty accords for the sake of which, after all, the European conference was convened in the first place.

Secondly, Anatoliy Kovalev went on, the CSCE process, the Helsinki Final act and such forums as the Stockholm conference teach the difficult science of how to understand each other better, seriously take into account the national interests of others and find common political denominators acceptable to all the participants in the process. To achieve this it is especially important to better know each other, to treat a partner not necessarily as an adversary, to view him without prejudices and bias.

Such is the approach of the Soviet Union to the participating countries of the Vienna meeting. We would like to count on reciprocity in this respect of our country as well, Anatoliy Kovalev went on.

Mutual respect, a considerate attitude to the concerns, interests and hopes of each member are an imperative condition of the successful cooperation, it could be said co-creativity of our states and peoples in ensuring the survival of humankind. This cooperation, this co-creativity are possible only on an equal basis regardless of the size of a country -- big, medium or small.

Then Anatoliy Kovalev dwelt in detail on the recent plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow. He described it as an event which even according to the strictest standards is of crucial importance for the present and future of the Soviet people.

Relying on the fundamental values of our home and foreign policy, which coincide with the supreme human values, the Soviet representative stressed in conclusion, the Soviet Union will further struggle for a world free from nuclear arms. The concept and the ways of attaining such a world are formulated in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986. The Soviet Union will press for the solution of disarmament problems from the high ground achieved in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1273

USSR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON NATO RESPONSE TO PACT APPEAL

AU242144 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Jan 87 p 2

[Interview given by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vadim Loginov to correspondent Peter Sereny: "Joint Thinking and Cooperation -- NEPSZABADSAG Interview With Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vadim Loginov" -- date and place not given; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Excerpts] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vadim Loginov, who took part in Hungarian-Soviet foreign ministerial talks in Budapest from 19 to 21 January, spent a few days in Hungary. Vadim Loginov and the leading representative of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry reviewed current international issues, the timely tasks of European security, cooperation, and disarmament, and bilateral relations. Vadim Loginov was received by Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi. Also present at the talks was Boris Stukalin, the Soviet Union's ambassador in Budapest. Prior to his departure, Vadim Loganov received our correspondent Peter Sereny and answered NEPSZABADSAG's questions.

[Sereny] In the past 12 months, ever since the Gorbachev declaration of January 1986, the Soviet Union and several other socialist countries have taken many peace initiatives of great significance. The Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact is also one of these initiatives. How do you evaluate the international reception of these initiatives?

[Loginov] The 12 months that passed since Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 have indeed been very important ones. This period started with the Soviet program aimed at eliminating the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in general within 15 years, a program that was widely acclaimed all over the world and primarily in the Warsaw Pact countries, including Hungary. This was followed by a sort of further development and widening of this proposal in other directions, and in this respect, the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact -- an appeal that submitted a program aimeds at radically rreducing the level of military confrontation in Europe -- has a distinguished place. This appeal was received so favorably that even NATO could not say no. Instead, it promised to study the proposal and provide an answer by the end of last year.

Indeed, the answer, which is not entirely constructive, was made public at the NATO meeting in Brussels. It is not constructive that, in its answer, NATO mentions reservations and proconditions: for example, the need -- so to say -- to eliminate the

so-called advantages in armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe and only then sit at the negotiating table, or the fact that, in their opinion, it is necessary to think first about the form and the mandate of the future talks, as if these issues were not mentioned in the Warsaw Pact proposals. However, with respect mainly to the intensive interest generated by the Warsaw Pact proposals in European circles, NATO signaled its willingness to negotiate not only about the armed forces and weapons stationed in central Europe but also those stationed in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

We hope this issue will soon be discussed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO representatives in Vienna. Of course, we are interested in making sure the neutral and the nonaligned countries are not left out of this process because these countries themselves are very much interested in this program and its implementation and also because we think if both sides accepted the proposed disarmament measures -- including their serious verification -- then the neutral and the nonaligned countries could play a particular and positive role as representatives of the countries not directly involved in the confrontation between the Armed Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

[Sereny] In your opinion, what is the role played by certain socialist countries in working out and implementing our community's coordinated foreign policy?

[Loginov] There is no need "to discover" this role because the activity of certain socialist countries in this respect is already accepted practice. For example, the joint GDR-CSSR proposal made in collaboration with the opposition SPD in the FRG on the nuclear-free corridor to be worked our along the borders of the three countries and on a chemical arms free zone in central Europe is a constructive initiative which is in line with our comon guidelines. Similarly important is the initiative put forward by Bulgaria and Romania on a Balkans free of nuclear and chemical weapons, an initiative also supported by other countries. Such actions are organically connected with the joint initiatives of the socialist community, like the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact or the latest initiative submitted to the United Nations on working out a comprehensive system of international security, an initiative coordinated by Hungary.

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USSR GENERAL TATARNIKOV ON NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALK

PM221051 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[Major General V. Tatarnikov article: "Arms Reduction Is an Urgent Task"]

[Text] The disarmament program put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his 15 January 1986 statement is working. It is forging ahead and fostering hopes of removing the intolerable arms burden from the peoples' backs.

In addition to the removal of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear and chemical weapons -- from states' arsenals, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have proposed that conventional arms and armed forces be the subject of agreed reductions. The signal for movement in this direction could be provided by an accord on a comprehensive and deep reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The two world wars, which inflicted cruel suffering on the European peoples, were waged with armaments customarily called conventional. Nowadays many of them are close to means of mass destruction in terms of their destructive effect. A war using them could be fatal for European civilization. The solution of the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe is urgent.

This view is shared by many European countries.

However, not everyone in the West thinks this way. In response to the realistic and balanced program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe proposed by the Warsaw Pact states, the West puts forward a strange argument about NATO's "insufficiency" of them, which, they say, must be made up. As THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reported, E. Rowny, the U.S. President's special advisor, is proposing a "leap forward" in the conventional arms sphere. He puts forward a concept in the form of an ultimatum: either "successful talks" on "equalizing" the levels of both sides' conventional armaments (meaning a unilateral reduction by the Warsaw Pact), or a sharp increase in the combat potential of U.S. and NATO conventional armaments so that they exceed the Warsaw Pact states' potential.

This concept is based on the infamous "Soviet military threat" thesis. However, it is so ramshackle as to cause an ironic smile even in the NATO countries. [paragraph continues]

The USSR and its allies believe the problem of armed forces and conventional arms reduction on a Europe-wide scale should be examined in an all-European context. The Warsaw Pact states are quite flexible regarding the formula of the talks. In their opinion, however, the best forum for these purposes is the second stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. This is logical since disarmament questions are already part of that conference's mandate. Furthermore, all European states have an interest in the relevant process. For instance, it is impossible to ignore or exclude from the talks those neutral and nonaligned countries which have already contributed to reaching accords on confidence- and security-building measures. The exclusion of this group of states from the disarmament talks would mean preventing them from taking part in the all-European process.

At the Vienna meeting of CSCE states the Polish delegation submitted a draft document on supplementing the Stockholm conference's mandate with questions of reducing armed forces and arms in Europe and on the parallel examination of confidence- and security-building measures. The majority of member-states saw this document as a constructive step on the path toward disarmament.

NATO took a long time to reply to this initiative from the socialist countries. When, to promote practical talks, the Warsaw Pact states proposed meetings of NATO and Warsaw Pact working groups, a meeting between Marshal V.G. Kulikov and General B. Rogers, and a meeting between the Warsaw Pact's authorized representative and NATO's secretary general, the response to this was essentially negative.

In December 1986 the question of talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe was examined at a NATO Council session in Brussels. But the "Brussels declaration" which it adopted did not provide an adequate reply to the Budapest appeal. Instead of talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, the NATO countries are actually proposing talks on some imaginary "imbalance" in the sides' military potentials. Leaving aside the unacceptability of the very premise of "imbalance," such an approach may turn into a discussion of figures dragged out for many years. We have already experienced NATO's number-juggling at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, and there is no point in repeating that.

The "Brussels declaration" takes the whole problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments beyond the framework of the all-European process, but the NATO countries do not answer the questions of where, when, and how the corresponding talks are to be held.

The so-called "NATO response" shows the Atlantic bloc's leaders would like to make a vicious circle out of the problems of freeing Europe from nuclear weapons and reducing the level of confrontation in the conventional arms sphere. The elimination of nuclear weapons on the continent is blocked by references to the absence of confidence-building measures in the conventional arms reduction sphere and the path to conventional arms reduction is obstructed by artificial linkages, conditions, and stipulations. That position will not lead to progress on disarmament, which is the aim of the European peoples, who demand a world without palisades of missiles and mountains of weapons.

The Warsaw Pact states have submitted their proposals on this matter. The European peoples now await a constructive move from the United States and the other NATO states.

The practical steps taken by the USSR and other socialist community countries to reduce the level of military confrontation shows they are not setting themselves goals aimed at achieving unilateral advantages which infringe other peoples' security. The Warsaw Pact states' military doctrine is geared toward defense. They will not resort to military actions against other states unless they themselves are the target of aggression

Disinformation about the Warsaw Pact's supposed superiority over NATO in the conventional arms sphere began back in 1948. Then, for the first time, the United States began deploying atomic weapons (more than 90 B-29 strategic bombers) in Europe. Since the USSR did not possess such weapons at the time it was necessary to justify this militarist step in the public's eyes. Thus the propaganda justification -- "the USSR's superiority in the conventional arms sphere" -- was born. Since then this disinformation has been circulated in Europe and is particularly intrusive when NATO is adopting new conventional arms modernization programs.

Of course, well informed people know there is no imbalance. After Reykjavik this fact was publicly acknowledged for the first time by U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and White House Chief of Staff Regan. However, the U.S. propaganda services are continuing to deliberately distort the picture of the correlation of forces. When making comparative calculations they do not take into account NATO's mobilizational and manpower resources, reserve formations, and stockpiles of arms and hardware; they leave out of the calculation on the NATO side the French and Spanish armed forces and the bloc forces under national commands; and they overstate the figures for the Warsaw Pact armed forces and understate their own.

If you assess the correlation of forces objectively rather than for propaganda purposes, you can see that there is an approximate balance of forces between the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces in Europe. And that is recognized not only by the U.S. leadership but also by competent military experts in Europe.

Thus the real basis for major reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe exists.

The Warsaw Pact states' position on this question was clearly set out in their Budapest appeal. It proposes a substantial reduction in all components of the European states' ground forces and tactical strike aircraft as well as in the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces and facilities deployed in Europe. Operational-tactical nuclear armaments with a range (radius of operation) of around 1,000 km would be reduced along with conventional armaments. The proposed reductions would be made throughout Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- while constantly maintaining military equilibrium at lower levels without prejudicing anyone's security.

As a preliminary step it is proposed to carry out over 1-2 years a single [razovyy] mutual reduction of 100,000-150,000 men per side in the number of troops belonging to the states of the opposing military-political alliances. Immediately after that the Warsaw Pact states would be ready in the early nineties for a reduction in the ground forces and tactical strike aviation of the two alliances in Europe of approximately 25 percent in comparison with the present level. Such a reduction would amount to more than 500,000 men from each side. The reduction would amount to more than 500,000 men from each side. The reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments would be carried out under reliable and effective verification [kontrol], including on-site inspections [inspektsiya na mestakh].

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CSO: 5200/1273

SOVIET COLONEL COMPARES PHILOSOPHIES OF WARSAW PACT, NATO

PM281509 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 87 (no edition noted) p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel E. Petrosyan, candidate of historical sciences: "The Vain Attempts of Imperialist Ideologists To Undermine the Unity of the Warsaw Pact Member-States"]

[Text] There is incontrovertible evidence that ideological subversion by certain U.S. circles and their NATO allies against the socialist states has become an integral part of imperialism's militarist preparations. The theoreticians of anticommunism display special zeal in mounting slanderous attacks on the Warsaw Pact. The most bellicose aggressive circles clearly find the collective defense of the gains of socialism unacceptable. They literally leave no stone unturned in their vain attempts to undermine the socialist community, to drive wedges between the fraternal states, and to set them against each other.

Various "theories" called upon to "prove" that the Warsaw Pact Organization is an instrument of "Soviet hegemony in East Europe" have become relatively current in the West in recent years.

The British bourgeois ideologist M. Mackintosh, for instance, claims that the Warsaw Pact is an "instrument of Soviet military and political control over East Europe and also over its allies' armed forces." His colleague R. Johnson alleges in turn that the Soviet Union exercises "hegemony" over the countries of East Europe and uses the Warsaw Pact to maintain "Soviet control" over these countries.

The anti-Soviet bias of this malicious slander is perfectly obvious. [paragraph continues]
The authors of concepts of this kind are trying to prove that the military-political alliance within the framework of the Warsaw Pact allegedly goes against the socialist countries' national interests, impairs their independence, and accords only with the interests of the Soviet Union. It is appropriate to recall here what kind of "independence" the anticommunists are advocating for the socialist countries. T. Stanley, a prominent Western ideologist, expressed himself very frankly on this subject. In his book "NATO in Transition. The Future of the Atlantic Alliance" he wrote: "The best of all possible worlds would be a world in which a united and cohesive West would confront a communist camp split into different groupings."

The very practice of the fraternal socialist countries' cooperation shows that membership in the defensive military-political alliance fully accords with both the

national and state as well as the international interests of all its members on the basis of full equality and respect for their independence. The equitable and fraternal nature of the relations between the member-states of this combat alliance has been expressed in legal terms in the treaty.

Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact a collective discussion of topical international problems takes place, coordinated stances on key foreign policy questions are elaborated, and steps are taken to improve the socialist defensive coalition and strengthen the organizational foundations of the military-political alliance. When the Warsaw Pact was signed, the foundations were laid for a mechanism which provides for the discussion of general political problems affecting all its participants. This role was entrusted to the Political Consultative Committee, which is at the head of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Its activities are aimed at consolidating the political and military foundations of the alliance and strengthening the Warsaw Pact member countries' independence. The Political Consultative Committee does not play the role of a supranational body and therefore the decision and recommendations which it adopts are not and cannot be based on diktat by some countries toward others.

By means of all kinds of pseudoscientific concepts imbued with the spirit of rabid anticommunism and dyed-in-the-wool anti-Sovietism and distortions and lies aout the nature of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the lackeys of imperialism are trying to ascribe to the defensive military-political alliance of the socialist countries the features of strong-arm pressure and political diktat characteristic of imperialist military blocs.

Using these malicious fabrications as a cover, U.S. and NATO militarist circles are further escalating the arms race in the hope of disrupting the existing approximate military-strategic parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and achieving decisive military superiority over the socialist countries. The authors of these calculations have learned little from historical experience. After all, their delirious fantasies did not come true even when the might of imperialism exceeded manyfold the strength of the new system which was just taking shape. How can they hope to "stifle" socialism today when it represents a whole world system and is stronger then ever before?

The attempts of imperialist ideologists to distort the essence of the Warsaw Pact, to ascribe to it a nonexistent contradiction with the principles of international law, and to distort the nature or relations between the socialist states are futile. The Warsaw Pact is entirely in keeping with the aims and principles of the United Nations and with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. It is open to any European state which shares its aimes, and in this it differs fundamentally form imperialist military blocs.

The Warsaw Pact Organization was established 6 years later than NATO as a countermeasure to the increased military threat presented by the imperialist powers. All the activities of the fraternal states' combat alliance serve as a powerful factor for peace and stability in international relations. After all, it is a fact that throughout its existence the Warsaw Pact has not unleashed a single military conflict or caused tension in any part of the world. Over the past 30 years the socialist community countries which make up the alliance have put forward more than 100 initiatives and proposals aimed at strengthening peace. A realistic path toward strengthened European security was outlined in the Warsaw Pact member states' Budapest Appeal. The draft document on complementing the mandate of the Stockholm conference with the reduction of armed forces and arms in Europe and a parallel discussion of confidence-building and security measures which was submitted by the Polish delegation at the Vienna meeting was welcomed as a constructive step toward disarmament by most CSCE particpant states.

At the same time the militarist policy and practice of the imperialist NATO bloc has brought the world more thena once to the brink of a dangerous world nuclear missile war. Suffice it to say that not a single act of aggression of any importance has taken place without NATO's participation or support since 1949, the year when NATO came into existence.

And so, no matter what demogoguery and tricks the lackeys of imperialism resort to, the main source of the danger of war, violence, and international brigandage was and remains NATO -- the militarist block of the imperialist states. Meanwhile, the fraternal socialist countries' defensive military-political alliance, which operates in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, presents itself to the whole world as an instrument for strengthening peace and people's security. In the complex international situation the extension of the Warsaw Pact, in accordance with the unanimous decision of its participants, was of great significance.

The fraternal parties regard the Warsaw Pact as a reliable shield protecting the gains of socialism and they express their invariable determination to continue to strengthen the socialist countries' defensive military-political alliance. The session of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers' Committee in Warsaw reaffirmed the desire to further expand military cooperation between the allied countries and to strengthen the unity of the fraternal armies.

The fraternal states' communist and workers parties are countering the attempts of the ideologists of anticommunism to bring about a split in the fraternal family of socialist states, to undermine world public confidence in the Warsaw Pact, and to weaken its political prestige and military might with a clear program for strengthening the unity of their ranks.

They are unanimous in their belief in the great significance of their defensive military-political alliance both for the joint defense of the gains of socialism and for the successful struggle to forestall a nuclear war.

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CSO: 5200/1273

AFP: DELEGATES DISCUSS GOALS AS VIENNA MBFR TALKS RESUME

AU291659 Paris AFP in English 1621 GMT 29 Jan 87

(Didier Fauquex report)

[Text] Vienna, Jan 29 (AFP) — The East-West negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) resumed here Thursday with both sides working to dispel any impression that the talks will soon be replaced by a forum on Europe-wide disarmament.

The Vienna talks are concerned only with arms and security in central Europe.

The fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is studying the extension of negotiations on conventional disarmament to a wider geographical zone did not mean any Western lessening of interest in MBFR, British delegation chief Robin O'Neill said.

A substantial MBFR agreement, he added, would be the best possible prelude to broader and more ambitious talks.

NATO spokesman Jan van de Mortel of the Netherlands said the Western countries that have been taking part in the talks here for the past 13 years "have received no other instructions than to continue their efforts to try to conclude an agreement at Vienna."

Mr van de Mortel said there was no formal link between MBFR and other negotiations.

His remark was in contradiction to the head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Warren Zimmerman, who said Monday that the MBFR talks would stop if NATO and the Warsaw Pact reached an agreement to negotiate conventional disarmament throughout Europe.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Valeriyan Mikhaylov, meanwhile reiterated that the Warsaw Pact wanted "a positive result" to the talks, thus creating "a better atmosphere for negotiations on conventional weapons and forces in the whole of Europe."

The Soviet spokesman at the MBFR talks, Nikolay Mikhaylov, said that the Soviet Union had proposed several kinds of forums for future negotiations but preferred such talks to be held as part of CSCE, which comprises all European countries except Albania, plus Canada and the United States.

Thursday the Soviet delegation repeated an earlier proposal that a simplified agreement be signed on the withdrawal of 11,500 Soviet and 6,500 U.S. troops from Central Europe. The measure would be fleshed out by mutual political undertakings not to increase troops and weapons on either side.

The main bone of contention between East and West, however, is the matter of verification. NATO rejects the other side's demand that nearly half-a-million Soviet soldiers who are relieved each year in Central Europe as forces are rotated should not be required to pass through the checkpoints that will be set up if an agreement is reached.

The Warsaw Pact, in turn, accuses the West of undermining the MBFR talks by proposing "strongly unrealistic and exaggerated" verification measures. Mr Mikhaylov repeated the charge Thursday.

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CSO: 5240/042

BRIEFS

TASS: 1987 CD SESSION OPENS--Geneva February 3 TASS--The Geneva Conference on Disarmament opened its 1987 session in the Palace of Nations today. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said in a message to the forum that its work was of vital significance to all mankind and that was why the world community would be following it closely in the hope for success in reducing the dangers threatening the world as a result of the arms race. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1147 GMT 3 Feb 87 LD]

USSR MBFR DELEGATION ARRIVES--Vienna January 28 TASS--A Soviet delegation led by Valerian Mikhaylov arrived in Vienna today to take part in the scheduled round of the talks on the mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 18 Jan 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1273

USSR: U.S. TEST BAN STANCE TIED TO SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 1, 12 Jan 87 pp 8-10

[Article by Alexander Pumpyansky]

[Text]

Each new underground nuclear test carried out by the U.S. in Nevada since the beginning of the U.S.S.R.'s moratorium on nuclear tests gets a code name. "Cornucopia"... "Darwin"... "Panamint" (the name of a legendary ghost mining city in California)... "Bodie" (the name of another phantom city)... "Jefferson"... What an odd predilection for phantoms, or chase of phantoms. What grand and sentimental names. I have tried to understand what lies behind this sentimentality: I don't think the great English natural scientist or the author of the Declaration of Independence would feel flattered by the dubious honour of having their names so used. Eventually, I came across a remark of Thomas Jefferson's that gave me a clue: "Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just."

While America is making the earth tremble by its nuclear tests the thought that God is just does not seem to bother it, not yet.

Angel Balevski, President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, offered another argument against Nevada tests. The continuing American nuclear experiments, he said, keep mankind in constant fear. This is terrible for it cripples people's minds and souls. You cannot keep mankind in a state of constant tension. It is a crime, whatever the motives behind it may be.

Far be it for me to divide politics and politicians in terms of absolute good and absolute evil. But the question of nuclear tests is basic and at the same time clear enough to warrant categorical conclusions.

Given the current military-strategic parity and the dangerous oversaturation of our small planet with nuclear weapons, and the fact that Americans have conducted more tests than the Soviet Union by a quarter or one third since the start of the nuclear arms race what can be the White House's reasons for stubbornly refusing to end the tests? Just this—it doesn't want to.

The question of nuclear tests figured in the Reykjavik summit meeting. An impression was formed, probably deceptive, that the issue was somewhat overshadowed by other major nuclear disarmament questions. But it belongs in the same package. It has the enviable distinction of being the easiest and the most ready for solution. It represents the first mile, or kilometre, or li with which, according to President Kennedy's favourite Chinese saying, even the longest road begins. The road to a nuclear-free world could certainly begin with a world without explosions.

The First Mile

A number of important steps have already been made towards ending nuclear explosions:

The 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

stopped shaking and polluting them. The only place left then for this infernal work was underground—the domain of Pluto.

The 1974 Soviet-American treaty limited underground explosions to 150 kilotons.

The 1976 Soviet-American treaty limited the yield of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Regrettably these two treaties, known as "threshold treaties" because they set the permissible thresholds of explosions, have not been ratified by the U.S. Congress.

In 1977 the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain began drafting a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Within three years the text and supplements to the treaty were agreed upon almost in full. But in 1980 the U.S. withdrew from the negotiations.

With the failure of appeals, the U.S.S.R. decided to try the force of example. On August 6, 1985, the Hiroshima Day, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on underground tests in the hope that the United States would join it.

A bilateral moratorium and a treaty on complete cessation of nuclear tests are demanded by the vast majority of countries, the most diverse movements, organizations and initiative groups, from the Socialist International to the Delhi Six. The latter has more than once directly and urgently appealed to the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to heed the voice of peace. An excerpt from a speech made by former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere at the meeting of the Delhi Six in Mexico in August 1986 indicates the extent of the anxiety felt in the Third World and elsewhere:

"In 1984 the U.N. Secretary-General posed this question before the major nuclear powers: by what right do they decide mankind's destiny? To ignore this question means to practise imperialism at a level unprecedented in human history. This is worse, much worse, than colonialism in Africa. That could be eliminated, and, indeed, this has almost been done, though at the cost of great sacrifices. But the disappearance of mankind is a catastrophe no sane person should even think of. This is the last and absolutely unpardonable sin against God, against man and against everything that exists.

"Today we repeat our appeal for ending all nuclear tests. We give due credit to the unilateral moratorium that has been repeatedly extended by the Soviet Union... We call on the United States of America and its allies with redoubled energy to immediately stop all underground nuclear explosions... This minor initial step will not be a manifestation of any weakness but will create a favourable situation for disarmament talks. We appeal to all leaders of states possessing nuclear weapons to have the courage to show at least this degree of good will to those who are seized with fear and thus lessen the grounds for such fear."

The response to this earnest plea was to set off more explosions in the Nevada desert. A spokesman for the test range has given this brief explanation for each one: "It was related to armaments."

Pious Excuses

How is this stubbornness justified? The road to hell here seems to be paved not so much with good intentions as with sanctimonious explanations. These are quite instructive.

One of them has it that the U.S. wants to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty, but feels that the Russians are too secretive. But, as stated in Moscow and later confirmed at Reykjavik, the U.S.S.R. is ready for strict and complete triple verification: by national, joint and international means, including on-site inspections. The Delhi Six has also offered its services as regards verification. Furthermore, scientists have succeeded in dispelling the mystic fog surrounding nuclear tests and have proved that reliable verification is not a technical problem.

The Reagan Administration was in its own way quick to react to this. Instead of reversing its position on the moratorium issue, it changed its arguments.

When the chief vehemently advanced argument collapsed, there came a flurry of lesser arguments.

That the U.S.S.R. is through with its programme of nuclear weapons modernization having gained a lead on the U.S.A. which lags tragically behind. The Swedish Institute of Defence has reported that Americans have carried out 800 explosions, to the Soviet Union's 563.

Another argument goes that tests are needed to be assured of a reliable

deterrent potential. It does not hold water either. Three quarters of nuclear arsenals consist of warheads with a yield of over 150 kilotons, i. e., above the allowed ceiling. And yet both states manage to do very well without "verification explosions." Experts further specify that doubts could arise not over fissionable materials with a half life of tens of years, but over mechanical elements, which can be checked out without explosions. Mechanical tests or even a run through computers would be quite adequate.

Even granted that without tests nuclear weapons become obsolete—on both sides—so what? Isn't it President Reagan who dreams that some day the weapon will be "rendered impotent and obsolete"? This end can well be achieved without "star wars" by simply saying "No" to nuclear tests.

Another argument has it that a comprehensive nuclear test ban would accelerate and not (as is universally thought) prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If many non-nuclear countries come to doubt the validity of the American deterrent they might choose "the nuclear option." And the U.S.A. would then have to increase its arsenals to be on the safe side. A veritable grab bag of arguments.

Choicest Argument

The choicest argument has, in my opinion, come from Kenneth Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Unlike the spokesman for the Nevada test range, he maintains that the Nevada blasts were connected with... disarmament. "Disarmament of kind," he said literally, "an increase in the safety and a reduction in the size of our arsenals—has been taking place of its own accord. We have been moving toward a smaller, safer, more reliable deterrent—and it is largely testing that has made that possible; in the absence of tests to assure reliability, we may find we need more weapons to get the same level of assured deterrence."

This is a beautiful example of the new eloquence being used to justify the U.S.A.'s same old reluctance to end nuclear testing. In August 1945 America possessed an atomic monopoly, and the entire world stock consisted of just two bombs—Little Boy and Fat Man—which were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. Since then test sites in the United States and elsewhere have been rocked with 1,500 explosions. Fifty thousand warheads with an aggregate yield of a million Hiroshimas have been stockpiled in world nuclear arsenals. This process cannot be called "disarmament" "of a kind" or otherwise. Here, perhaps, Mr Adelman has gone too far.

Thanks for Being So Frank

It is worthwhile to hear more from this young ambitious man whose inspired theorizing unwittingly makes him remarkably frank.

According to Adelman, American foreign policy is based on the "arms control tradition," the "disarmament tradition" and the "principle of stability."

According to Adelman, the first two traditions possess drawbacks and internal contradictions, not to mention the fact that they don't mesh well with the principle of deterrence. What then should be done to remain true to three such different goals at once?

A choice has to be made, and the U.S.A. has made it.

"We all want to reduce weapons, but the Reagan Administration is at one, I think, with every other postwar U.S. Administration in placing the imperative of stability ahead of the mandate for disarmament," says Kenneth Adelman. Thanks again for being so frank!

In the meantime his tenor keeps increasing.

He criticizes "the tunnel vision" which, as he sees it, consists in the following:

"Arms control is defined in people's minds as a certain kind of agreement—the kind we signed, say, in 1979 [SALT-2.—Ed.]—and that's that. Stability is equated with having such agreements. But... you can gain stability and mutual restraint without agreements... I would go further: not only is the concept of arms control larger than agreements, but the concept of stability is larger than the concept of arms control. You can help ensure stability through arms control agreements; but at the most basic level you ensure... deterrence with arms themselves."

These words carry special meaning In the lips of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Now everything clicks in place: "with arms themselves"! Arms control and disarmament are only good as catchwords or dreams. It is the weapons alone that are important in actual fact. Make way for the arms race!

This is an old philosophy. It was with such a philosophy, bluntly and straightforwardly expressed, that Reagan began his term of office. With time, the phraseology has become more refined, peaceful declarations and promises have been included into the lexicon, but this has not changed the priorities.

It is on this basis that the old treaties —SALT-2 and the ABM Treaty— are being undermined.

It is impossible to conclude new treaties on such a basis because this kind of a philosophy cancels or internally sabotages negotiations. It is incompatible with reason and pragmatism, and ignores the interests of the other side. Even when the Reagan Administration does undertake to negotiate, it is armed with the same philosophy. So it was with Reykjavik. After Reykjavik this philosophy has turned against it with vehemence.

"Star Wars" Cannonade

Let us now return from the testing of policy to the policy of testing.

As time passes, the explosions become cleaner and arguments dirtier. Now that the U.S. Administration has virtually run out of arguments, whatever they may be, it has adopted a head-on course: as long as nuclear weapons are necessary their tests are also necessary.

Oddly enough, this statement is not complete. What, specifically, are the tests necessary for? The answer is simple and quite concrete.

The MX, Trident and Midgetman are three nuclear missile programmes dependent on underground tests.

It has been written that "star wars" weapons, third-generation nuclear arms, will require hundreds of Nevada explosions, and thus, the test programme is scheduled not for years, but for decades.

All of Washington's loquacity fails to answer this simple question: why can't the Americans rely on their deterrent potential without further testing, while the Russians can? Doesn't it suggest a more fundamental dilemma?

The U.S.S.R. is for banning all nuclear tests, because it really seeks a "reasonable adequacy" of armaments, because it believes that a nuclear-free world is possible and, furthermore, urgently necessary.

The U.S. is for continuing tests, because it finds nuclear disarmament unacceptable, because it can never get rid of the illusion that yet one more new system of wonder weapons will grant it the superiority it so strongly desires. The very concept of "star wars" undermines the idea of ending nuclear tests and the hope that a treaty will be signed in the next few decades on their general and complete prohibition.

The Nevada blasts are not merely a persistent inertia of the past. They are an earnest of the cannonade of "star wars" to come.

Compromise Formula

On the eve of Reykjavik the U.S. Administration, in an attempt to improve its image on this matter, announced that it was ready to begin the process of ratifying the "threshold treaties" and that it favours a certain regulation of further explosions.

Certainly the promise to begin ratification, expressed with strange timidity, was a decade late, but better late than never. Regulation is better than an utter lack of restraint, but it also serves to legalize and give consent to testing.

In Reykjavik I heard George Shultz say that ending tests before reducing nuclear weapons was like putting the cart before the horse. But in fact just the opposite is the case: in order to stop the cart of the arms race, which is gathering speed and rushing forwards, one must stop its motive force—tests. Once this "horse" is reined in, the qualitative race will, for practical purposes, be brought to a halt.

The American side at Höfdi insisted on its principle of reduction of nuclear tests with a reduction of nuclear arsenals. In response, the Soviet side made an important compromise. It agreed to accept the idea provided the U.S.A. agreed to join full-scale bilateral

talks that would lead to a complete ban on nuclear tests. Thus, a formula was found for combining the American proposal, which pursued specific aims, with the comprehensive Soviet proposal. Of course, this is less than an immediate moratorium, but it takes two to tango, as they say; besides, it was a way to preserve the constructive elements of the American position and to remove ambiguities. But even this compromise formula was rejected. Why? Is it not true that every U.S. President prior to Reagan proclaimed the complete banning of tests as their goal? Or was the American proposal merely a ruse for gaining time so that the endless chain of tests could be continued?

And indeed the American tests have continued, giving the lie to the President's rhetoric, for kilotons speak louder than words.

Will Washington Wreck the Soviet Moratorium?

On December 18 the Soviet government issued a clear and stern statement: the Soviet moratorium will continue in the coming year until the first American test. This was the fifth extension of the moratorium in the last 18 months. While it demonstrated the resources of good will on the Soviet side, there was also a bitter taste. For now the question of whether the tests (including Soviet tests) will continue is to be decided in Washington. And there is little sign of change in American policy.

A difficult situation, difficult decisions. It is only fair to say that Moscow has done all it could, even more. But it has run into a blind wall. Moscow, if you like, has declared a bilateral moratorium. Washington can go along with it or wreck it.

In real life, one side may set an example, but one cannot go it alone in bringing about a nuclear-free world. This could only be done together with other nuclear powers.

One great power disarming itself while the other is arming itself is not a viable kind of the international division of labour. Even a noble goal cannot be a privilege of one side in this interdependent and closely-knit world.

Silence in Kazakhstan and continued testing in Nevada... Neither can go on forever.

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CSO: 5200/1253

SOVIET JOURNAL ON TEST BAN, U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11 Nov 86 (signed to press 16 Oct 86) pp 3-18

[Article by A. Arbatov and V. Baranovskiy: "An Examination for Historical Maturity (The Problem of Banning Nuclear Tests)"]

[Text] The unilateral USSR moratorium on nuclear tests expires on 1 January 1987. It came into force nearly a year and a half ago, on 6 August 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. In his 18 August statement, M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, announced another, fourth extension of the moratorium's period of validity. The moratorium could become permanent if the United States joined in it. Such a step would be of decisive importance for stopping the nuclear arms race. (Footnote 1) (The share of the other nuclear powers in all tests carried out from 1945 to 1985 amounted to 13 percent. "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1986." Stockholm, 1986, pp 128-129).

The History of the Issue

In the international community, the problem of banning nuclear tests started being widely discussed more than 30 years ago, when the United States carried out the first experimental explosions of hydrogen bombs in the megaton class. The radioactive fallout caused by the test carried out in the area of Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954 seriously affected the crew of the Japanese ship (Fukuru Maryu). For the world public, this incident has become the symbol of the threat concealed in the tests of nuclear weapons to the lives and health of people.

On 5 August 1963, the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain signed in Moscow a treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons in three milieus--in the atmosphere, under water, and in space. Subsequently, more than 100 states have joined this treaty, which in many respects has made our planet's air purer. (Footnote 2) (According to data published by the Stockholm International Problems Research Institute (SIPRI), nuclear weapons tests carried out before 5 August 1963 totaled 525, including 77 percent in the atmosphere. After signing the Moscow treaty, there were 63 tests in the atmosphere; they were carried out by France (before 1974) and China (before 1980) both of whom did not participate in the treaty. (See "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1986." pp 128-129).

One must keep in mind that underground nuclear tests also threaten places and people with contamination. The leak of radioactive substances following the 1966 test in Nevada, the United States, spread to five American states; as a result of a test carried out there in 1970, the level of radioactivity in the Montreal-Ottawa region, Canada, rose 20 times. In this respect, particularly dangerous are high-power nuclear tests. (Footnote 3) (The most powerful nuclear explosion (5 megaton) was produced by the United States in the Aleutian Islands in 1971 (see P. Craig, J. Jungerman, Nuclear Arms Race. Technology and Society, New York, 1986. p 387).

But unlike the 1950's and early in the 1960's, the continuing practice of nuclear tests has now brought to the foreground different proglems. The point is that these tests make up one of the most important sectors in the nuclear arms race, because without experimental blasts it is practically impossible to improve nuclear weapons [boyezaryady] or to develop new types of them.

The conclusion drawn from this is quite obvious: the cessation of underground tests could bar in a reliable way the qualitative modernization of the existing nuclear potentials, modernization which threatens to upset the military and strategic balance. Two Soviet-American agreements were important for achieving this goal, agreements which fixed the 150-kiloton power ceiling for underground nuclear arms tests (1974) and for underground nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes. The aforesaid restriction has been observed by both sides, although the treaties have been regarded as formally invalid because they have not been ratified by the United States.

At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that the 150-kiloton ceiling leaves very wide possibilities for nuclear tests, particularly in view of the trend toward reducing nuclear weapons in size and in power, and in view of the active practice of test grading [masshtabirovaniye], i.e. testing charges not set at the established full capacity. (Footnote 4) (Out of the 30 types of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, 17 have a capacity of up to 100 kilotons; this includes 5 with a capacity of 5 kilotons. See "Nuclear Weapons Databook," vol. 1, "U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities," Cambridge, Mass., 1984, pp 7-9, 39, 126-127, 182-183, 200-201, 277-278, 279, 308). In essence, the ceiling set in the last decade does not substantially hinder the efforts to increase the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and to develop new types of them.

It is quite obvious that the complete ban of all underground tests would make it possible to a significant degree to reduce the possibilities to renew nuclear arsenals. In 1977, the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain began appropriate talks, and by the end of the last decade they considered that they were very close to the goal set. Only some problems (and relatively marginal at that) concerning control remained to be settled. However, R. Reagan's administration, which came to power, refused to continue the talks, and in 1982 officially stated that the conclusion of a treaty comprehensively banning nuclear arms tests was at present not in the interests of the security of the United States.

Washington's refusal to strive for a complete ban on nuclear tests was clear evidence of a negative turn taken in American policy with regard to the issue under discussion, the sharpest turn in the last quarter of a century. After all, since the late 1950's the United States officially supported the idea of banning tests, and in 1958-1961, along with the Soviet Union, observed a moratorium on nuclear explosions. In the aforesaid 1963 agreement, the United States, along with the other two initial signatories, announced its intention to "attempt the cessation of all experimental blasts of nuclear weapons for ever," as well as its "resolve to continue talks for this purpose." These theses were also repeated in the text of the 1968 agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In other words, the United States as signatory to the treaties took upon itself the international legal obligation to strive for the aforesaid goal. This goal was also posed in connection with the tripartite talks held late in the 1970's. In this way R. Reagan's policy regarding nuclear tests has in essence cancelled the line adhered to by the United States under the six preceding presidents: D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson, R. Nixon, G. Ford, and J. Carter.

This abrupt turn was performed against the background of a significant change in interpreting the very problem of a nuclear tests ban. After all, until recently, this issue, even if it was not withdrawn from the agenda, has hardly been regarded as topical in the spectrum of various problems discussed in the context of arms limitation. The attitude taken toward the idea of giving up tests has been traditionally explained to a certain degree by the same considerations on which the concept of a "guaranteed mutual extermination" was based. If the further build-up of nuclear potentials was becoming pointless (Footnote 5) (The number of nuclear weapons in American arsenals reached its peak of 32,000 units in 1967, and by 1980 it had shrunk to 25,000. In the same period, 8 new types of nuclear weapons were added, and 18 were withdrawn from the effective strength for combat (taking into account modifications in various delivery systems). See "Nuclear Weapons Databook," pp 7-9, 15), the need to continue nuclear tests was also questionable. But since a test ban would not diminish the abundance (and overabundance) of nuclear arsenals, this measure itself was not regarded as something radical and capable of changing in principle the state of affairs in the field of limiting nuclear weapons.

Problems concerning the ban of nuclear tests has now shifted to the center of political struggle and has become an object of great attention.

In this respect, the active policy pursued by the USSR with regard to a test ban, and primarily the moratorium imposed by it on nuclear blasts, have undoubtedly played an important role. It is increasingly clear that what we mean is not some marginal problem, but an issue which is capable of radically effecting the development of some important military-strategic and military-political tendencies. Moreover, precisely a test ban would make it possible at the same time to restrict the development of nuclear systems of various levels--of strategic character, of medium range, and for operational and tactical purposes; the ban would make it possible to do this immediately, without drowning in the enormous number of military-technical, geostrategic, and political disproportions and complications. In this sense a test ban proves, without exaggeration, to be among the most fundamental and really feasible disarmament measures today.

It was precisely the radical character of such a step--a complete ban on nuclear tests--that has produced the "rejection response" on the part of the American Administration. Its official position is that a complete ban--in any case, within the foreseeable future--is impossible for two main reasons.

One--the point has been made that there were no sufficiently reliable verification measures of the appropriate agreement. In particular, it has been pointed out that it was impossible to tell a small-power nuclear blast from many strong and weak earth tremors registered each year with seismographs. References have also been made to various ways it is possible to conceal nuclear tests: by carrying them out against the background of earthquakes, by disguising them as explosions for peaceful purposes, and so forth. The report published in 1986 by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency came to the unambiguous conclusion that "checking the observance of an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests, and particularly any moratorium on tests such as that proposed by the Soviet Union, is highly problematic."

Two--it has been argued that the cessation of tests would undermine the reliability of nuclear deterrence. And since big powers, the Americans argue, will build their military potential on the basis of nuclear weapons for a long time to come, experimental explosions carried out to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons remain the guarantee of the security of states and of maintaining an acceptable global balance of forces a guarantee which is not subject to the statute of limitations. In this context, references have been made to the traditionally alleged Warsaw Pact superiority in armed forces and armaments, superiority which NATO had to "compensate for" by a nuclear threat.

However, an objective analysis shows that the two arguments are refutable by both logic and facts.

The Problem of Verification

The complexity and importance of the problem of verification must not be underestimated. This applies both to arms limitation as a whole, and to the concrete issue of banning nuclear tests. On this occasion M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, "...DISARMAMENT WITHOUT VERIFICATION IS IMPOSSIBLE, AND VERIFICATION WITHOUT DISARMAMENT IS SENSELESS." As in other aspects of disarmament, the following pattern most frequently proves to be valid here: the more radical the measures upon which the sides manage to agree are, the greater the demands made on verification. The observance of the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in the three milieus has been rather easily verified by national technical means.

For example, in 1963 the United States uses (on the highest circular orbits of 115,000 kilometers and with an inclination of 35 degrees) Vela-series artificial satellites with X-ray detectors and photometers to register nuclear blasts in space and in the atmosphere. In the future, these functions will be performed by more sophisticated instruments of the same type on the new American NAVSTAR navigational satellites (Footnote 6) (see A. Krass, "Verification: How Much is Enough?" SIPRI, London, 1985, pp 75-79).

The limitation of underground nuclear tests has raised more complex problems. The power ceiling has placed high demands on geophysical means of observation. They have to be sufficiently sophisticated to verify, by seismic vibrations transmitted thousands of kilometers through various geologic layers, that the power of the explosion did not exceed the ceiling set.

The renunciation of nuclear tests has first of all set the task of detecting prohibited explosions among about 20,000 earthquakes (seismic phenomena) of various intensity which occur each year in various parts of the planet. In the past, science and technology were unable to guarantee such identification with sufficient reliability. For example, one of the reasons the agreement on a full test ban was reached in 1963, was the fact that, as a result of a series of experimental explosions produced at the American nuclear testing grounds in Nevada, there were unexpected seismic waves of a definite type (the so-called "Love"-type waves) which, until then, were considered only characteristic of earthquakes. Subsequently, the reason was found: When a test is being carried out in layers which are in a state of tectonic tension, the subterranean cavity produced by the blast gives this tension an outlet and thus provokes a secondary earthquake which generates "Love"-type waves. If this phenomenon had been discovered earlier, the problem of a full test ban would possibly have been settled before 1963 and the entire development of subsequent events could have taken a different course (Footnote 7) ("Arms Control of the Arms Race. Readings from Scientific American," New York, 1985, pp 141-143).

In the opinion of many respected scientists, science and technology are at present sufficiently reliable to monitor a full cessation of nuclear explosions. This conclusion was confirmed additionally in July 1986, at the Moscow symposium of scientists from the USSR, the United States, West European countries, Japan, and other states. Of course, the problem must be treated in a realistic way, and the criteria of reliability must not be carried to the absurd. As noted, nuclear explosions in space and in the atmosphere can be relatively easily registered with the assistance of special satellites. Hydroacoustic waves produced by an under-water blast differ so markedly from the effects of an earthquake under the sea floor, that there is no problem in detecting a test. More than 90 percent of natural phenomena take place at a depth of more than 30 kilometers or under the ocean floor, and this makes it possible to confidently strike them off the list of possible nuclear explosions. The deepest artificial wells have at present not reached the 12-kilometer mark, and underground nuclear explosions have thus far been carried out a maximum depth of 2 kilometers (Footnote 8) (Ibidem, p 141).

As a result of scientific-technological progress, they have been highly perfected. For example, modern seismometers are capable of registering earth vibrations with an amplitude below a nanometer (i.e. one-millionth of a millimeter), which is comparable to the diameter of an atom. Electronic computers allow one to identify with sufficient accuracy nuclear explosions among earthquakes by comparing the energies (magnitudes) of surface and deep seismic waves and by analyzing the four basic types of these waves which are to a different degree characteristic of explosions and of earthquakes. On the

whole, the authors of most geophysical research works agree that a nuclear explosion, even as small as 1-2 kilotons, is now detectable beyond any doubt (Footnote 9) (A. Krass, Op. cit., pp 67-68, 72).

Taking into account the high resolution capability of technical detection means, is it possible to conceal nuclear explosions? Among all test concealment methods imaginable, the specialists regard the so-called "decoupling", i.e. explosions carried out in big underground cavities, as the most probable. The shock wave caused by such an explosion is to a significant extent absorbed by the soil. People who are excessively demanding on the subject of verification argue that there is no way at all to register explosions below 1 kiloton. They point out that "decoupling" makes it possible to reduce the seismic signal of the test of a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon by a factor of 200, i.e. to make it comparable to the signal of an explosion with a power of 5 tons. And such explosions are being systematically practiced in mining industires, in construction, and in other economic activities performed by states (Footnote 10) (U.S. Congress House of Representatives, "Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing, Hearings." Committee on Foreign Affairs. 99th Congress, 1st Session, February-May 1985, p 323).

However, this circumstance does not pose an insuperable obstacle for verifying a full cessation of tests either. To create cavities is a very labor-consuming process. For example, rocks extracted deep underground to fully "decouple" an 8-kiloton explosion would be equal in volume to the Pyramid of Cheops. It is difficult to conceal an operation of this kind, as it also is to conceal both preparations for and the explosion itself, when they are accompanied by measures characteristic of military tests and are appropriate in appearance. There is always the probability that the ground over the site of the explosion would sink and that radioactivity would leak through the cracks in the soil. These phenomena are detectable by various national means of verification, including those in space, which supplement and reinforce seismic methods.

It must also be borne in mind that, for military programs, the effect of one single low-power test, carried out secretly and at high expenses in secrecy, would be unduly small compared with the risk that the opposite side might detect the infringement. According to reliable sources, to develop most thermonuclear weapons, it is necessary to carry out explosions of at least 5-10 kilotons, which enable tests of the new designs of uranium and plutonium atomic detonators (Footnote 11) (Ibidem, p 323). Tests carried out in series are, from the military point of view, of practical interest, but the probability of their detection increases in geometric progression.

In addition, the latest investigations have shown that the effectiveness of the "decoupling" method could be seriously reduced, in particular, by optimizing sensitive seismometers registering oscillations in the frequency range over 30 herz. On high seismic frequencies, differences between an explosion and an earth tremor contrast particularly strongly, waves spread at significantly longer distances, and the intensity of natural and artificial noises in the background is weaker (Footnote 12) (see A. Krass, Op. cit., p 72).

The reliability of verification of the cessation of nuclear tests can also be fully ensured by some additional measures and agreements. For example, in the opinion of the prominent American seismologists, (L. Sykes and J. Averden), 15 automatic seismic stations located at determined points inside the territory of each big power and as many again located alongside the borders would practically rule out the probability that the agreement would be secretly violated (Footnote 13) ("Arms Control and the Arms Race...," p 147). In their February and April 1986 appeals, the "Delhi Six" offered their cooperation in monitoring a ban on nuclear tests, and in particular they proposed to deploy monitoring instruments in the countries close to the borders of the USSR and the United States. As is known, the Soviet Union has expressed its willingness to accept these proposals and has come out in favor of the most far reaching methods, including on-site inspections and the creation of an international supranational network for monitoring the discontinuation of tests.

The possibility of such steps was made clear by the agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Natural Resources Council to deploy seismic equipment in the areas of nuclear testing grounds near Semipalatinsk and in the state of Nevada in order to check into geological structures. These data make it possible to accurately calibrate seismic equipment and to make it even more effective. The Soviet Union has proposed giving this agreement an official character in order to facilitate verification of the possible treaty.

In this way, there is every ground to assert that technical means of verification (both seismic and other ones) combined with accords on appropriate measures of confidence and cooperation in this matter--and this was stated in M.S. Gorbachev's interview with the chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO--would practically eliminate the problem of verification as an obstacle for an agreement on the full cessation of nuclear tests.

Test and Deterrence

As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, it will be necessary to maintain the reliability of mutual nuclear deterrence. The program for nuclear disarmament, set forth by the Soviet Union in the 15 January 1986 statement, calls for the process of reducing nuclear arsenals at three stages and for their full elimination by the beginning of the next century. But therefore withdrawing these terrible weapons from military arsenals, states possessing nuclear potentials will continue to be interested in maintaining the reliability of these weapons at an adequate level to avert a possible nuclear attack on themselves or on their allies.

The Soviet Union is interested in that not a bit less than the United States--and, as a matter of fact, much more. The American strategic forces confronting the USSR are, in the number of nuclear weapons, superior to the Soviet ones. The USSR sees itself also compelled to reckon with American medium-range and forward-based nuclear weapons deployed in such a way as to keep the USSR within the range of fire. Neither must the nuclear forces of third countries, aimed against the USSR, be disregarded. Last but not least, the Soviet Union is far from indifferent to the circumstance that the military strategy of the

United States and NATO has been openly built on the principle of initiative in applying nuclear weapons at the early stage of an armed conflict, while the Soviet Union has taken upon itself the obligation not to be the first to use them.

Consequently, the question of whether it is necessary to maintain the reliability of nuclear deterrence is not the crucial question, but whether it is necessary to continue tests to ensure this reliability.

Out of about 1,500 nuclear explosions, only a few were carried out to check the reliability of ammunition accepted for service and deployed with troops. The objective of most experimental explosions has been to test the effectiveness of improvements constantly introduced into the design of weapons, including their reduction in size and weight, more thifty use of materials in short supply, more reliability and durability in design, the application of new technologies in production and assembly, and so forth. Tests are even more connected with developing weapons intended for installation on the periodically introduced new generations of carriers and means of delivery, as well as adapted to new operational conditions for their application in accordance with changing strategic doctrines and concepts. Last but not least, certain series of experiments are being carried out to test weapons which are new in principle and radically differing in their working principles and striking effects (in the past, when atomic bombs were replaced by hydrogen bombs, and then by neutron ammunition, and at present, nuclear explosive pumped lasers). This is precisely why, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, "as soon as the tests stop, the race will come to a standstill in the most dangerous field--in the field of developing new kinds of nuclear weapons with all their improvements."

Authoritative specialists, both Soviet and foreign, adhere to the view that there is no need to carry out test explosions to test the reliability of weapons which were tested before and are now in active service. For the production of a series of absolutely identical articles, materials, tools, and technologies have been standardized, and this guarantees their standard effectiveness without additional experiments. Fissionable nuclear materials (uranium or plutonium alloys) applied for the most part as detonators in thermonuclear weapons virtually do not disintegrate because the period of their half-life is very long. Some disintegrating components, such as tritium thermonuclear filling with a half-life of 12 years, or chemical detonating devices can be periodically removed from a weapon to be checked. For such a check there is no need to carry out an experimental explosion, as there is nothing to replace, if need be, the aforesaid components without changing the design of the weapon. Moreover, as the experts note, in the serial production of models which have already been tested it is even possible to make partial changes in design or in the technology of production without additional tests by means of an explosion (Footnote 14) (See "Nuclear Strategy and World Security. Annals of Pugwash, 1984," London, 1985, pp 61-63).

On the other hand, substantial innovations, particularly in developing weapons for new systems of carriers, sometimes require a large series of tests to check and to finish their design. This signifies, that, as far as the need for nuclear tests is concerned, the problem of maintaining the reliability of nuclear

containment is being held up by the following question: Are new systems of weapons necessary for a reliable deterrence, or are those which have already been deployed or are at the stage of deploying sufficient (i.e. they have already passed the stage of testing, including with regard to their weapons)?

This question has been raised repeatedly. It has been widely discussed by politicians and scientists in connection with the idea of "freezing" nuclear arsenals, an idea which in 1981-1983 turned into a slogan for a mass public movement in the United States and other Western countries. This idea has also been supported by the Soviet Union. The cessation of nuclear tests was part and parcel of "freezing." Reagan and his adherents opposing the "Freeze" even then argued that it was "necessary" to build up and improve nuclear means to "strengthen" deterrence. In particular, they alleged that new strategic weapons were necessary to eliminate the so-called window of vulnerability (Footnote 15) (What they had in mind was the theoretical vulnerability of land-based U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, vulnerability that was used by the U.S. leadership to justify several programs for strategic offensive armaments), and that these weapons would ensure a more stable strategic balance because they had a greater survivability, possessed a reliable control and communications system, a guaranteed effectiveness, and so forth.

For their part, the adherents of "freezing" argued that, with the existing enormous thermonuclear potentials, no additional military programs whatsoever were needed for deterrence. Indeed, it is sufficient to recall that in the mid-sixties, R. McNamara, then U.S. secretary of defense, came out with the concept that the loss of 70 percent of industry and 30 percent of the population would be unacceptable even for the most powerful states in the world. He estimated that losses of such proportions could have been inflicted by about 400 nuclear weapons within the megaton range exploded over the main administrative and industrial zones in each belligerent country (Footnote 16) (A. Carter, D. Schwartz. "Ballistic Missile Defense." Washington, 1984, pp 168-169). Only 5-10 percent of strategic nuclear means possessed by one of the two strategic powers would now be sufficient to cause such losses.

The excessiveness of global nuclear potentials is even more obvious when one bears in mind that, in addition to strategic forces, the USSR and the United States also possess medium-range systems and operational tactical means, and there are also third countries with nuclear forces. The number of nuclear weapons has reached a total of 50,000 and their total power, 18,000 megatons. The application of nuclear weapons would result in the destruction of human civilization. In such a war, victory is unthinkable and, as is known, this was confirmed during the Geneva summit meeting held by the USSR and the United States. For deterrence, there are now enormous surpluses of destruction power. There is no need for any additions.

On the contrary, new systems of nuclear weapons upset the stability of the military-strategic situation. The point is that practically all successive generations of nuclear weapons and the systems of their combat control and communications are being adpated to some variety of the concept of a "limited nuclear war" at the global or the regional level. In the paradoxical world of nuclear strategy, the theory of a "limited nuclear war" is tied up not to a limited number of these weapons, but on the contrary, to their enormous surpluses exceeding any rational criterion of sufficiency in destructive power (like, for example, McNamara's "level of losses").

When the number and striking power of nuclear arsenals reach such proportions that operational plans for nuclear attacks exceeds many times over targets of real value for the state (large and medium-sized localities, industrial enterprises, and centers of the economic infrastructure), the further stepping up of nuclear potentials becomes senseless. By the end of the fifties, this situation was called "overkill." Search for a way out from this deadlock has brought the United States in its military-technological development and strategic thinking to the invention of various concepts of a limited application of nuclear weapons. All of them are based on the scholastic premise that when all vitally important values of the opposing states are each other's hostages, the possibility emerges to striking on a wide range of selected military and economic targets. Such an operation would allegedly make it possible to win a substantial strategic advantage or even to "triumph" in the war, without stepping over the extreme line--the total annihilation of the population. This is precisely the line allegedly separating a "thinkable" nuclear war from an "unthinkable" one. This kind of logic was built into the American strategic concepts of "counterforce," "damage limitation," "target designation," "counterrecovery" [kontrovosstanovleniye], "counter-C3" [kontrupravleniye], "limited" and "prolonged" nuclear war, as well as of various concepts of a selective application of nuclear arms in the theater of military operations and of an "escalation domination," all developing since the early sixties.

No matter how dubious and impracticable these ideas are, they contain--from the point of view of the military-industrial complex--an obvious "advantage": they open the path for endless improvements in nuclear arms and in their combat control systems, and for endless competition to increase their survivability and striking power (the optimization of precision and power), varied options for use, flexibility in targeting, and so forth. Moreover, increasingly complex operational plans dictated by new doctrines and concepts make ever higher demands on military equipment. In this strategic context, a deadlock is out of the question; what matters is to keep new weapons systems abreast of increasingly refined military tasks.

Although the concept of a "limited nuclear war" is very far-fetched, the danger of them is fully real. When the nuclear deadlock of "overkill" has been widely realized both by the specialists and the wide world public--at first late in the fifties when the American territory proved to be within the range of thermonuclear weapons, and then late in the sixties when military-strategic parity began to emerge between the USSR and the United States--the development of the theory of a "limited war" reanimated the thermonuclear arms race and turned its curbing by means of agreements into a more complex problem. A serious threat is also concealed in the psychological "submission" to nuclear weapons, in the illusion that their "selective" application is drawing ever closer to the application of conventional armed forces both in combat objectives and in destructive effects. And also in practice nuclear weapons are every more closely interlaced with conventional and chemical weapons both technically (multi-use carriers, deployment and storing), and operationally (striking targets, operational tasks, the stages and sequence of application).

The magnitude of this danger becomes quite obvious when one realizes that various versions of the concept of a "limited nuclear war" are now a long way from the fancy ideas of armchair strategists; they are an objective reality that have materialized literally with "iron-like" tangibility in combat equipment and weapons, a reality programmed in onboard computers on aircraft and missiles, as well as in computers at control centers, a reality approved in operational plans by commanding staffs and headquarters.

Political logic, psychological patterns, as well as many special research work on nuclear weapons, themselves suggest that, if started, the application of these weapons cannot be governed by any rational rules and be restricted in its character. It will lead--and very quickly--to a total and ungovernable thermonuclear slaughter, to the suicide of human civilization. And in this sense it would be pure illusion to expect that the concepts of a "limited nuclear war" could be realized in practice from the beginning to the end. The main danger consists in the fact that these concepts facilitate the first nuclear move, in a critical situation push toward the fateful verge beyond which any control over events would be inevitably lost.

In developing the concept of a "limited nuclear war" in order to adjust nuclear strategy to the principles of traditional warfare, one more "bottleneck," possibly the last one, was overcome when President Reagan's notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" has emerged. SDI has offered truly limitless scope to the confrontation of both offensive and defensive--including nuclear--arms both in space and on earth. Anti-missile space systems threaten to make the strategic situation even in less predictable, and the unleashing of a global conflict much more sudden, quick, and ungovernable than predicted in all hypothetical scenarios.

The problems discussed above are most directly related to a full ban on nuclear tests. Without realizing this relation it is impossible to explain why, late in the fifties when the nuclear deadlock dawned, the idea of reaching an agreement on this issue was shifted to the plane of practical policy. But as preparations for talks on the full ban of tests or talks themselves were going on, it was increasingly obvious that there were obstacles connected not with the technical problems of control, but with the evolution of nuclear strategy. These opposing factors made themselves fully felt in the mid eighties. The firm adherence of the Soviet Union to the idea of a comprehensive test ban, manifested in its 18-month moratorium on nuclear explosions and in its far-reaching proposals concerning verification, has definitely revealed the military-political essence of the issue.

Now it has become quite obvious that a comprehensive nuclear test ban was not a marginal or partial measure on the list of possible ways of disarmament, but an issue directly touching upon the crux of the present strategic situation, to an enormous degree determining the further evolution of the entire global military situation, the ways of developing strategic concepts and military programs, as well as prospects for a dialogue in the field of arms limitation and of disarmament.

Military Programs and Nuclear Tests

The Soviet moratorium and proposals concerning a comprehensive nuclear test ban caught the United States in the midst of another cycle of renewing its nuclear arsenal and of developing a new generation of nuclear weapons. In the eighties and nineties, the United States is planning to put into active service 29,000 nuclear weapons which, taking into account the withdrawal of obsolete systems, will increase the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons (strategic, medium-range, and tactical) from 26,000 to 30,000-odd units. In this way the United States is planning to increase its nuclear arsenal by 20 percent in 15 years, and at the same time to renew approximately 90 percent of it (Footnote 17) (Calculations made in accordance with "Nuclear Weapons Databook," vol. 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, pp 14-15).

The development of new nuclear weapons which need tests is an integral part of this activity. Some 13 types of nuclear weapons are either at the stage of production and deployment in the U.S. armed forces, or will be put on the assembly lines in the very near future. These are thermonuclear warheads for land-based MX ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles for Trident-I submarines, land-, air-, and sea-based long-range cruise missiles, Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons for two types of aviation bombs, two types of anti-submarine missiles, a general-purpose maritime anti-aircraft missile and an anti-ship missile, and two types of artillery projectiles in various calibers. In total, the program calls for the production of about 16,000 nuclear weapons ranging between 1 and 500 kilotons, intended for these systems of strategic, operational-tactical, and medium-range weapons.

The distinctive features of the present generation of weapons are miniaturized component parts, more thrifty use of materials in short supply, an increased reliability and durability, the application of electronic control systems, and, in many cases, switch-regulated explosion power adapted to the improved targeting precision of all carriers.

It must be pointed out that most of the aforesaid types of weapons have already been fully tested, and any further explosions would only be useful for introducing partial improvements in their design.

In the next 5-10 years, nuclear tests will be much more connected with developing weapons for systems which are at the development stage and are to be put into service late in the eighties or in the nineties. These are, for example, two alternative types of warheads for Trident-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles, a light and mobile intercontinental missiles of the Midgetman type, improved systems of long-range cruise missiles, and a new generation of air-to-surface, surface-to-surface and air-to-air operational-tactical nuclear weapons. This program calls for testing 9 types of nuclear weapons and for producing nearly 13,000 units of them (Footnote 18) (see Ibidem, pp 14-16). In case an agreement is concluded on the full discontinuation of nuclear tests, the implementation of the aforesaid plans would be hampered and, in many cases, would be impossible.

In addition to improved nuclear warheads for new carriers for various purposes, the American test program attaches much importance to the development of nuclear weapons that are new in principle, of the so-called third generation (the first being atomic, and the second, hydrogen or thermonuclear). It is planned to develop weapons with selectively increased striking factors, for example, by means of x-rays or neutron radiation of by an electromagnetic impulse. The third generation of nuclear weapons has now been predominantly linked with the Reagan administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative."

SDI calls first of all for developing an x-ray laser with nuclear pumping to intercept ballistic missiles when they emerge from the atmosphere, to destroy satellites and other space objects, as well as to distinguish real warheads from decoys in the middle sector of the ballistic trajectory (Footnote 19) (See "S.D.I.: Progress and Challenges. U.S. Congress Staff Report." Washington 1986, pp 43-45).

In addition, a new generation of neutron weapons is being developed. In particular, they can be used to equip improved Sentry anti-ballistic missiles intended to intercept the adversary's warheads in the final sector of the trajectory, in the last, land layer of the defense. Lastly, nuclear weapons detonating high in the atmosphere and creating a strong electromagnetic impulse are intended to upset electric circuits in the adversary's control and communications systems (Footnote 20) (See "Nuclear Weapons Databook," p 29). It is absolutely impossible to develop the third generation of weapons without continuing tests for the coming 10-15 years.

In this way, Washington's refusal to adhere to the line of discontinuing nuclear tests has been prompted first of all by the aspiration to keep its hands free for implementing extensive military development programs. It is precisely the administration's attitude toward a moratorium that very clearly--and better than other logical and theoretical arguments--refutes the guidelines officially professed by the Americans in their military policy; and primarily it denies the thesis that the United States aspires to "free" mankind from nuclear weapons by changing over from deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deterrence based on a reliable defense. Also the lofty phrases about the intention to create, with the assistance of SDI, a non-nuclear umbrella prove to be groundless. In rejecting the idea of banning experimental nuclear explosions, the American leadership itself has removed propaganda covers from its policy in the field of armaments and has laid bare the true essence of this policy.

Political Struggle Around Moratorium

In light of the facts referring to long-term U.S. plans and programs, it is quite natural to ask: Is it possible in any way to expect a change in the present American attitude toward the issue of banning nuclear tests? The partisans of the arms race resist the ban so strongly, precisely because it would radically freeze, and in a number of spheres completely check, these plans and programs. At the same time it is to be noted that, in the United States and other Western countries, opposition to the arms race has recently been spreading in public circles and among soberly thinking representatives of ruling circles. The SDI program has run into a growing criticism and opposition, and Congress

each year has been cutting ever larger slices from allocations for the "Star Wars" system. Also, programs for offensive nuclear armaments are to some degree an object of internal struggle. But support for the idea of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has won support in the West particularly noticeably recently. The 18-month moratorium in the USSR was a decisive catalyst of this trend.

After all, it is obvious that the unilateral renunciation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union cannot go on indefinitely. Since the United States, during the moratorium, detonated more than 20 devices, demonstratively refusing to adhere to the Soviet initiative, the USSR has got more than sufficient grounds to resume nuclear tests. The American side obviously calculated that, in the issue of nuclear tests, the situation which existed before and fully suited it would be simply restored. The political self-control and the feeling of great responsibility for the destinies of the world, manifested by the Soviet Union, have upset these plans. The White House has again proved to be in the position of a "pleader." It had to repeat again the formula, which has already become a liturgical ritual, that the moratorium "did not meet the interests of the security of the United States, its allies and friends."

But the way this formula is being perceived today differs from that prevailing only a year or a year and a half ago. Public polls show that the Soviet initiative is gaining the support of more and more Americans. And what explains this fact is primarily the fact that the nuclear test ban proposed by the USSR is a measure that is completely unequivocal, intelligible, and at the same time the least vulnerable to both honest and dishonest criticism, which only looks for arguments in favor of the arms race. Also the time factor plays an important role: while at the beginning it was possible to some extent to hush up the Soviet initiative or to present it as a brief propaganda action to fill up the interval between the planned underground tests with a "political offensive," after the third extension of the moratorium (in May) and the fourth one (in August) any attempts to substantiate assertions of this kind appeared to be quite groundless.

Finally, the number of adherents to serious restrictive measures in this field is increasing even among those who accept the arguments in favor of tests carried out to check the reliability of nuclear weapons which are in active service. In particular, proposals have been made to lower the threshold of tests to several kilotons, to reduce their annual quota to a minimum, as well as to put into effect appropriate confidence-building measures facilitating verification (notifications on planned explosions, information about the power of tested weapons, and so forth). At the same time, it has been emphasized that if the power threshold of undergound tests were brought down to one kiloton and the annual quota reduced to one test, the situation would hardly differ from a full ban of nuclear experimental explosions.

At the Reykjavik meeting, the USSR delegation proposed that the U.S. President agree to talks between representatives of the two countries on a ban on nuclear explosions. "Our attitude was flexible," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out at the press conference, "and we stated that we regarded this as a process in the course of which it would be possible at some stage--or maybe even immediately--to examine the issue of both the power "thresholds" and the annual

quota of nuclear explosions, and the fate of the 1974-1976 agreements, and in this way we would progress toward working out a full-scale agreement on the full and definitive ban of nuclear explosions."

But also partisans of a limited settlement of the nuclear tests problem are in favor of prolonging the Soviet moratorium, considering that it is important on the level of providing conditions for reaching an appropriate agreement between the USSR and the United States. It must be borne in mind that moods favorable to reaching such an agreement have also been reflected in Congress, and that these moods were gaining grounds in Congress as the political effect of the Soviet initiative was strengthening. Last year, only a few congressmen in the House of Representatives called on the U.S. Government to declare a moratorium, but last summer their number rose to 150. In August, when the attention of the international public was riveted on Moscow in connection with the expiring annual term of the moratorium, even the Senate, controlled by the Republicans, called on the President to immediately resume talks on a full and general ban of nuclear arms tests. The House of Representatives, by a convincing majority of 234 to 155, spoke out in favor of introducing, as of 1 January 1987, a moratorium on nuclear tests over 1 kiloton (provided that appropriate measuring instruments are placed on the territories of the USSR and the United States, and that tests are carried out in each of the two countries only on one testing ground).

This kind of signal from the Capitol Hill irritates the administration very much (Footnote 21) (Evidence of this are the accusations that Congress was "playing into the hands of the Russians." "The House of Representatives is actually tying the president's hands when it is necessary to strengthen his positions for talks with the Soviet Union" (quoted from a statement made by the White House in connection with drafting a bill on allocations for defense needs). "The Soviet delegation to arms talks should be surprised that the American legislators in Washington conceded what it was unable to get in Geneva" (quoted from R. Reagan's 16 August 1986 radio message). But the chief executive cannot disregard these signals because the financing of any military programs depends precisely on Congress. It is sufficient to recall, for example, that in fiscal year 1986, Congress prohibited the allocation of funds for testing anti-satellite systems against real targets in space, and in this way significantly upset the Pentagon's plans. The government has to think how to neutralize the opposition of the liberal and moderate conservative part of Congress and what concessions must be made to it. The "interest" deliberately manifested by the administration recently in the problem of control over the observance of the restrictions set forth in the 1974 and 1976 agreements can be regarded precisely in this context. Thus, the internal political pressure, which cannot be disregarded even by the partisans of a rigid line in U.S. leadership, is becoming an increasingly serious factor in American policy, including on the issue of banning nuclear tests.

In the Interests of General Security

The political effect of the 18 August 1986 statement goes far beyond the problems of the underground tests of nuclear weapons. The USSR initiative is convincing evidence of the principled and purposeful Soviet line with regard to the issues of war and peace. Our state's patience and persistence in

pursuing the line aimed at the complete discontinuation of the nuclear arms race refute the speculative fabrications alleging that the character of soviet policy is determined by the situation or even by propaganda considerations. The unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests has impressed the world so much that there is every reason to regard it as a model of policy which does not need any advertising or any special propaganda undertakings, because it is primarily its substance that appeals to worldwide public opinion.

The prolongation of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests is also called upon to improve the general climate in Soviet-American relations. Unfortunately, since the Geneva meeting in the fall of 1985 there have been no substantial improvements in these relations. Moreover, the line of invigorating military preparations, initiated by the right-wing, militarist group in the United States, and power policy methods practiced by Washington in various parts of the world are creating new sources of tension in Soviet-American relations. Under such conditions, it is highly important to be guided not by momentary emotions, but by a sober evaluation of the fundamental and lasting interests of guaranteeing both national and international security.

The USSR has manifested its readiness to seek compromise solutions for problems which might bring about contradictions, controversies, and mutual suspicion in Soviet-American relations. This has been attested to, in particular, by the maximally constructive position assumed by our country on the issue of verification. Clear proof of Soviet goodwill is also the fact that the USSR had introduced the moratorium unilaterally without setting any conditions and without making it dependent on an agreement reached previously with the United States in this respect. In this context, it would not be out of place to also refer to the following fact: The aforesaid discussion on a moratorium took place in a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, which examined the draft bill containing the request to the President to suspend for three months, as of 6 August 1985, all tests of nuclear weapons, but only provided the Soviet Union would take an analogous step (Footnote 22) ("Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing," pp 163-166). In other words, the USSR initiative was much bolder in its character.

Most states have favorably responded to the Soviet move. It has been fully in the spirit of many resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on banning nuclear tests, and was highly evaluated at the eighth conference of the heads and governments of nonaligned countries in September 1986. The moratorium on underground tests has also joined in the efforts made in a number of regions all over the world to create zones free from nuclear weapons.

In particular, it is to be noted that the step made by the Soviet Union has contributed toward the consolidation of the system of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. It is known how long and difficult the drafting of the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was. Quite a few states based their reserved attitude toward the very idea of adopting a nonproliferation system on the reluctance to consent to what they considered as the division of all countries into two unequal groups not enjoying equal rights--of those who "managed" in time to provide themselves with nuclear weapons, and of those who did not possess them. For this reason the assent of the latter to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons was compensated for by the appeal set forth

in Article VI of the agreement to take effective steps toward nuclear disarmament. Naturally enough, this appeal was addressed to nuclear powers. At Sweden's proposal, to strive to cease all experimental explosions of nuclear weapons was noted in the preamble.

However, all three conferences on the effects of the agreement--and they are held every 5 years--noted that these precepts had not been complied with. But since all orders of the agreement are not being fully observed, some of its non-nuclear signatories might be tempted to regard themselves as free from the requirements of the agreement! And on the other hand, since some states in possession of nuclear weapons as useful for themselves from the political or military point of view and do not intend to give them up, it would not be strange if some countries, thus far non-nuclear, felt attracted by the same possibility. The more so, since the agreement is to expire in 1995. In other words, to increase the reliability of the nonproliferation system, it is absolutely necessary to embark upon the process of getting rid--at least slowly and gradually--of nuclear weapons, and of curbing their role in diplomacy and military strategy. In this sense, the cessation of nuclear explosions would become an important practical measure hindering the dissemination of nuclear weapons both vertically (in the sense of building up and improving the existing nuclear arsenals) and horizontally (among countries deprived of the technical possibility to produce them).

The decision adopted by the Soviet leadership to prolong the moratorium on nuclear tests has clearly manifested our state's aherence to the imperatives of a genuinely new way of thinking based on the awareness of the realities of the nuclear and space epoch, and on the realization of the fact that guaranteeing security cannot be regarded today as a primarily military or military-technical problem. A basically different attitude is needed, an attitude whose main substance is to seek political solutions for existing problems, solutions guaranteeing security in a more reliable way and at significantly lower financial, material and intellectual costs. The moratorium on nuclear tests convincingly shows that the USSR also considers it necessary to adhere to this attitude toward the problems of limiting arms, to military planning as a whole, and to problems concerning international life in the broadest sense of this term.

What has been said above does not imply any disregard for the security of the Soviet state. Naturally enough, our decision to introduce the unilateral moratorium was complex, very responsible, and even difficult. And the Soviet people are, of course, worried that the nuclear explosions, continued in the United States while the USSR does not carry them out, might prove to be seriously detrimental to our security.

But the difference between Soviet and American policy consists precisely in the fact that the USSR does not reduce its security only, or even first of all, to the opportunity to build up and to improve nuclear arsenals. The USSR treats the security problem more broadly and deeply. It proceeds from the fact that the nuclear arms race with nuclear tests as an integral part of this race does not strengthen, but undermines both national and general security. On the contrary, a full cessation of nuclear explosions could make peace stronger, and the security of all participants in the international community much more reliable.

/9869
CSO: 1816/3

FRG: SPD'S VOGEL URGES NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM

LD211513 Hamburg DPA in German 1108 GMT 21 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, 21 Dec (DPA) — SPD parliamentary group leader Hans-Jochen Vogel has appealed to the United States to declare its readiness for an immediate stop to nuclear tests. In a statement published in Bonn today, Vogel also calls on the Soviet Union to continue its test moratorium beyond 31 December 1986. Vogel further calls on all nuclear powers not to carry out nuclear explosions in the new year.

Vogel says that opponents of disarmament and detente were speculating on the arms race between East and West receiving a new impetus from new nuclear tests on the Eastern side. There is no current military need for nuclear tests. The existing arsenals are adequate for deterrence on both sides. Efforts to develop a new generation of nuclear and space weapons with the help of such tests are dangerous.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2475

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FRG: LUKEWARM RESPONSE TO USSR PLAN FOR KOLA PENINSULA NFZ

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 12 Dec 86 p 3

[Article by Siegfried Loeffler: "Nuclear Free Zone in Northern Europe? A Dubious Soviet Offer"]

[Text] Washington, Dec--Can the advance concessions with regard to disarmament made by the Soviets be taken seriously? Are hopes for a decrease in East-West tensions justified?

These are the critical questions that citizens of Western democracies are asking themselves over and over again. They have grown wary after years of Soviet disinformation, and when the Soviet Union announced recently that it would dismantle missiles in Northern Europe--and especially on the missile-infested Kola Peninsula--Moscow waited in vain for the expected applause.

Western diplomats and military experts labelled as "an interesting basis for further discussion" what Ambassador Kashlev, leader of the Soviet delegation to the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna, and General Tatarnikov, both in the Austrian capital, as well as Politburo member Ligatshov in Helsinki, had to say on this topic.

In Helsinki and in Vienna, the Soviets tried to promote a graduated plan leading to a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. Up to now, the enormous concentration of medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula has stood in the way of such a realization. The Soviets say that the first step in this endeavor has already been taken--all in secret and very quietly, as is customary with military matters. According to the Soviets, launching pads for SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 medium-range missiles have been dismantled. In addition, a major portion of the medium-range missiles stationed around Leningrad and on the Baltic Sea have also been dismantled.

It is only natural for the Soviets now to expect a quid pro quo from the West. The second stage of the Soviet four-stage plan arranges for the withdrawal from the Baltic of those Soviet submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, provided those countries bordering on the Baltic and Norway agree to a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe.

As tempting and desirable as it is to see somebody taking steps toward disarmament and detente, the insight that Foreign Minister Genscher shared on 3 Nov 1983 in a speech delivered to the prestigious Passikivi Society in Helsinki still stands: Nuclear free zones only make sense when they cannot be reached by nuclear weapons.

Under such circumstances it is understandable that the Soviet initiatives of Helsinki and Vienna neither triggered the expected media success nor an outpouring of general enthusiasm. This reaction applies equally to the countries immediately concerned as well as to the United States, the Western superpower, the most important NATO ally, and the guarantor of European security.

It was not surprising then that Gaffney, deputy secretary of the US Department of Defense, refrained from calling the Soviet proposal a breakthrough in effective disarmament initiatives at a television conference in Washington where European journalists from Bonn, The Hague, Geneva, Stockholm, and Oslo participated.

Gaffney surely has a point when he remarked that the SS-20, as part of a mobile system, can easily be redeployed in an emergency. And what is more, the SS-20 can be used to threaten Central Europe anew from entirely different locations.

Furthermore, the Americans seriously doubt that the Soviets are telling the whole truth when they claim that they have removed the threat to Central Europe from the Kola Peninsula. At the same television press conference, the Americans made it quite clear that they are opposed to a test ban because they are determined to keep testing the reliability of their weapons so as to avoid a "technical surprise inflicted through new Soviet weapons."

It does not look too promising for the building of confidence measures which have to precede effective agreements on disarmament. The Soviet information policy has been more or less one of disinformation, and that fact now weighs heavily on the negative side. In spring 1981, when Iljitshov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, was asked about medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula, he denied their existence.

With an eye on the coveted Scandinavian agreement to a nuclear free zone in the North, the Soviets kept quiet about the fact that there were missiles stationed on the Kola Peninsula that could not even reach Central Europe and were intended solely to threaten the Soviet Union's North-European neighbors.

In connection with the alleged missile removal, the Soviets are now mentioning in passing the very missiles whose existence they have denied for years. It is an example like this that explains the American reticence toward Soviet explanations; it also shows how important confidence building measures are as a first step toward disarmament. In accordance with rules agreed to in Stockholm, the Soviets should now invite inspectors from Western and neutral countries to come to the Kola Peninsula for verification.

13196/12851
CSO: 5200/2478

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AGREE TO MONITOR TESTS

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 13 Dec 86 p 4

[Text]

CANBERRA: Australia and New Zealand will co-operate on the monitoring of underground nuclear tests.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Lange, announced yesterday that an inter-governmental agreement will be concluded as soon as possible.

They said the proposed bilateral agreement would facilitate co-operation in monitoring nuclear tests.

They hoped it may also be the forerunner of further agreements providing for a global seismic network to verify compliance with a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The two Ministers affirmed the strong commitment of Australia and New Zealand to the early conclusion of such a treaty, which would ban all nuclear tests forever.

Meanwhile, Mr Lange has apparently failed to gain any support from Mr Hayden on a bid to have Australian Government bounties to manufacturers abolished under the Closer Economic Relationship trade treaty.

This followed another warning by Mr Hayden that New Zealand manufacturers, who had profited greatly from CER, would only aggravate an Australian industry backlash if they continued to complain.

/9274

CANADIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ISSUE

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 16 Jan 87 p C19

[Text]

TORONTO (CP) — Declaring Canada a nuclear-free zone wouldn't guarantee security from unfriendly aggressors or lessen the threat of nuclear war elsewhere, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty said Thursday.

"Such a declaration would not by itself eliminate a single nuclear weapon or reduce the differences which divide East and West," he said. "A nation of nuclear-free zones is not a nuclear-weapons-safe nation."

Addressing a luncheon meeting of the Empire Club, Beatty reaffirmed Canada's commitment to NATO and said a country's security is best ensured when defence is shared with its democratic partners.

Although Canada has no nuclear weapons and no nuclear roles, it relies — along with its allies — on nuclear weapons to deter war, he said.

"Our goal is to demonstrate to a potential opponent that the cost of attack simply outweighs any benefits, to convince any aggressor that it simply isn't worth it."

In his speech, which his office said is one of a series leading up to the government's white paper on defence, Beatty said Canada will maintain its contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

/9317
CSO: 5220/24

USSR: BOOK ON CLIMATIC, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 86 (signed to press 16 Oct 86) pp 141-142

[Review by L. Istyagin under the rubric "On Books and Authors" of "Klimaticheskiye i biologicheskiye posledstviya yadernoy voyny" [Climatic and Biological Consequences of Nuclear War] by Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, editor, Moscow, "Nauka", 1986, 208 pages.]

[Text] However strange this seems, mankind has hitherto adopted quite a frivolous attitude toward what would await it in the event of nuclear war. People just cannot take in the fact, which is natural, in its way, that the survival of the entire population of our planet is by no means guaranteed and could without much ado simply be put in doubt. The imperialist troubadors of militarism who have concocted--and continue now to instill--pseudo-comforting ideas concerning the fact that nuclear war is not that terrible and that it is possible to "limit" and "localize" it and leave it mainly to the enemy to die in it and for oneself to somehow and somewhere bide one's time and sit it out have contributed to a huge extent to the spread of dangerous complacency. It is hard to sternly condemn those who believed this: it is typical of people to succumb to illusions.

It is less understandable why the problem of possible consequences of nuclear war were for a long time overlooked by the majority of scientists: and they also, as Academician Ye.P. Velikhov puts it, have to a considerable extent "overlooked" this phenomenon. Psychologically this is also explicable: no one wants to ponder such depressing events as could be the result of a nuclear cataclysm. Nonetheless, the Soviet scientist believes, this is a big mistake and oversight of science. "If it is important for us to know precisely," he emphasizes, "how the Universe took shape billions of years ago and how in billions of years to come our solar system will perish, we should obviously know all the more precisely how our own planet, the sole one of its kind, might perish tomorrow" (p 13).

However, it may be considered today that the scientists have done their duty in this plane. The book in question summarizes certain findings at which

world science has arrived in an analysis of the problem which they have somewhat belatedly set themselves: what will Planet Earth represent after a nuclear conflict has erupted and raged on it--God forbid that this happen. It is significant that the authors, Soviet scientists, rely not only on their own works and experience but also on studies of their foreign colleagues, American and West European included. It may be recognized that we have before us the concentrated judgment of the highest authorities and figures of science who are the most competent in their fields.

As is permitted real scientists, the authors of the work are extremely cautious in their assessments. The calculations are made for preference on the basis of "most favorable" assumptions, and models are constructed most often by proceeding from "tempered scenarios". The deductions and conclusions which ultimately result are all the more horrifying.

Taking as a basis the works of Ye.I. Chazov, L.N. Ilin and A.I. Guskovskiy and foreign medical men, the well-known specialists in the field of biology and medicine A.A. Bayev, N.P. Bochkov and V.I. Ivanov proceed from altogether "modest" losses in a possible nuclear war. According to minimal estimates, 1.15 billion persons would die from nuclear explosions and their immediate consequences at once and a further 1.095 billion would receive most serious injuries, burns and wounds; altogether, consequently, the number of casualties would be 2.245 billion (p 125). The scientists note that under the conditions of colossal devastation and general chaos medicine would be powerless, and its possibilities of rendering first aid even would be "practically nil" (ibid.). The opinion of a most influential international antiwar organization World Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War is noteworthy. A document of this movement incorporated in the book says: "Studies we have conducted have shown the absolute inadequacy of medical measures in the event of nuclear war erupting" (p 188).

But this is, so to speak, only the beginning and relatively "passable" stage of human suffering. The most dreadful phase begins after the nuclear explosions. It is here that the sphere of secondary consequences into which science has only now been able to peer sufficiently closely is revealed. Not only people but all surviving living organisms in general, it transpires, would have to confront primarily the phenomenon of "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter". The essence of the phenomenon, which is described with exhaustive thoroughness in the articles of Yu.A. Izrael and G.L. Stenchikov, amounts, in brief, to the inevitable large-scale contamination of the biosphere by, besides radioactive products, aerosols and various gaseous substances (methane, ethylene, tropospheric ozone and so forth). The clouding of the entire atmosphere, a darkening of the planet, "nuclear night," would have to result. Inasmuch as the sun's rays would not be able to penetrate the dense shroud of smoke, soot and ash there would be an abrupt cooling of the land of all continents--"nuclear winter".

Different scientists determine differently the levels of possible cooling and its duration. They agree, however, that the "winter" would be prolonged: from several weeks to several months (p 63). This would be sufficient to ruin harvests, cause universal starvation and epidemics and destroy whole ecological zones. Tropical and subtropical forests and savanna, which are

extremely sensitive to changes in temperature, would be condemned to swift and complete destruction. This prospect alone utterly refutes the arguments of those who until recently were asserting that the developing countries would suffer little from nuclear war. These countries would be threatened with death by starvation, even if they escaped death from radiation, of which also there is no real hope.

The "nuclear winter" would be followed immediately, without any smooth "spring" transitions, by "nuclear summer"--an essentially steady rise in temperature, which would last for years, would be accompanied by destruction of the Earth's ozone layer and a strong increase in the stream of harsh ultraviolet radiation (ibid.).

Scientists are not venturing to assert definitely what would happen under such conditions with life on the planet itself. They possess too little information for this. They are attentively studying existing analogies in nature--the eruption of volcanoes, the fall of meteorites and dust storms on Mars--but, of course, they may only partly expand the possibilities for forecasts. The geological catastrophe which hit the planet approximately 65 million years ago--when it clashed, according to scientists' relatively convincing assumptions, with an asteroid or asteroids--is of interest. Then as a result of the suspension of photosynthesis and cooling, evidently, whole species of animals, including giant reptiles, perished (pp 113-117). Does their fate await today's people and animals of the Earth?

It could all be. According to one "measured" scenario, only the "partial destruction of flora and fauna" would occur from "nuclear winter" and its consequences. People and the majority of animals would obviously not remain on Earth. But then, when the temperature rose, there would be an ecological "explosion": many water basins would "blossom" owing to the rapid multiplication of aqueous organisms (p 64). Do today's people need worry if there is hope that "young life will play" on their dead bodies! This life, incidentally, and the indications on this score are clear, would be subjected, in turn, to overwhelming photosynthesis and harsh irradiation with unpredictable consequences. "Counting...," the scientists warn, "on a new spiral of evolution would be naive" (p 138).

People of the Earth should not count on unknown "spirals of evolution," which could present the planet with particularly luxuriant radioactive burdock or some varieties of underwater amoeba and Infusoria. Putting aside all naivete, we need to count on our own efforts aimed at preventing the unthinkable catastrophe.

The book's merit is that in the dry, impeccably objective language of scientific analysis it fervently invites us to follow this path discovered by the new philosophy of the world.

8850
CSO: 1816/3

FRG PARTIES, GENSCHER ON NATO DECISION ON TALKS

LD121319 Hamburg DPA in German 1207 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, 12 Dec (DPA) — The CDU/CSU and SPD today welcomed the NATO foreign ministers' initiative to negotiate with the Warsaw Pact on controlling conventional arms in Europe. Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, said the NATO offer is "realistic and constructive". The nuclear aspect of disarmament is now back on an even keel and a basis now exists for a reduction in the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons. The Federal Government has played a major role in the adoption of the "Brussels Declaration".

SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr heartily welcomed the fact that the NATO foreign ministers have now tackled the conventional area of disarmament in Europe. "In other words" they have formulated what the SPD has described as a "structural incapacity to attack". Speaking on Deutschlandfunk Radio, he added that he is nevertheless sad that the Federal Government has been unable to work out a concept for the reduction of conventional weapons.

Genscher: From the Atlantic to the Urals Now

The problems which for 13 years have prevented a successful outcome to the Vienna troop reduction talks have now, in the words of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, been eliminated. He said in a West German Radio (WDR) interview that only central Europe had been discussed so far in Vienna. Now the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals is included. Moreover, totally new starting points were discussed at the USSR-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, which would benefit the new negotiations in the conventional sphere.

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CSO: 5200/2475

RELATED ISSUES

FRG PRESS COMMENTS ON NATO FALL MEETING

'Hawks' in Charge

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 6 Dec 86 p 3

[Editorial by mac: "Strange"]

[Text] It is really strange: Here we have the defense ministers of NATO discussing the problems of arms control, emphasizing verbally and also in their closing statement that they support the efforts for a reduction of atomic intercontinental missiles—and not a word about SALT II. Merely in passing, the representatives of some smaller NATO countries mentioned the subject to the US delegates at the meeting in order to stress all the more vehemently that they wanted an actual reduction of nuclear weapons in the spirit of the Reykjavik meeting.

Something does not jibe here. Even if there was talk on Thursday about NATO supporting the efforts for a zero-zero option for nuclear medium-range weapons, on Friday not a word appeared on the subject in the closing document which stated all of a sudden that a 50 percent reduction in nuclear intercontinental weapons and medium-range missiles was sought. In plain words: End of the zero-zero option.

Assessing the situation soberly, at the autumn NATO meeting, no progress was achieved toward more arms control; there was, rather, a retrogression. Hope for disarmament was further dampened. How one intends to negotiate successfully in Geneva with such a "handicap" is not clear—if this is the intention at all. At any rate, in Brussels the hawks were in charge.

U.S. 'Disregard' of European Thinking

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 5 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial by hbo: "NATO in a Minor Key"]

[Text] The pre-Christmas autumn sessions of the top committees of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have frequently proven to be routine exercises. Not so this time. There are tensions in the organization

between the protector, USA, and the protected, NATO-Europe. Even though the ministers do not want to admit it, the widely held impression is: that the Europeans' long-standing complaints regarding the inadequate leadership role of the United States have given way to an uneasiness about America's desire to show a discordant, indecisive, provincial Europe "which way the ball bounces."

In late May, President Reagan let it be known that because of Soviet treaty violations, he would no longer honor the unratified SALT II Treaty for the limitation of "strategic" nuclear long-range weapons. Criticism in Europe-("best to have a deficient treaty than none at all until there is a better one") was followed by vague indications that America would not go too far. In addition, Reagan had made the outfitting of a 131-"B 52" atomic bomber with cruise missiles, which goes beyond the upper limit for the number of long-range weapons specified by the two world powers in SALT II, contingent upon Soviet policy with regard to disarmament. After Reykjavik, where even according to American reports certain things "happened", Reagan made his "B 52" decision.

This disregard of European viewpoints is an unofficial subject at the Brussels NATO fall conference. Furthermore, President Reagan--as is now known for certain--stated to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik that he is ready to remove all "strategic" atomic long-range weapons within ten years. Prior to this reversal of Western strategy (which must deter the use of superior Eastern forces with the nuclear threat in almost all other regions) the President had not even consulted the U.S. secretary of defense. This is small consolation for the Europeans, though, as was expressed in no uncertain terms to Caspar Weinberger yesterday at the conference of defense ministers of the NATO military organization.

The USA will have to accept that there cannot be an end to atomic weapons as long as no equilibrium on the lowest level has been achieved in conventional forces and for short-range missiles, where Soviet supremacy in Europe is now in the range of 9:1. The scrapping of strategic weapons by the two powers and the "zero-zero option" aimed at in Reykjavik for the removal of all medium-range missiles, such as the "SS 20", "Pershing 2" or "cruise missiles" from Europe, must be linked to disarmament in all other vital areas. Now comes the punishment for talking before thinking: For seven years, NATO has demanded the zero-zero option for medium-range systems. It has been known for over a year that the East has long since rearmed with short-range weapons. Now that medium-range disarmament could become a reality, the West has to close the gap. Now its credibility is at stake. Therefore, the zero-zero option must be made contingent upon future--not previous or parallel--disarmament agreements. Otherwise (and this was also a subject of yesterday's minister conference) NATO would have to rearm conventionally and with short-range weapons. Not a good prospect.

The one bright spot seems to be that the Soviet government reportedly wants to make headway in spite of Reykjavik and obviously does not want everything to fail because of the U.S. SDI. Soviet statements, like

those of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze as early as 10 Nov, indicate that Moscow could even accept SDI research and tests outside of the lab, but nothing is to take place in space. Will this remove the stumbling block from the path of actual disarmament? In this phase, Europe must speak as one voice--at least that fraction which is willing and able. A subject also for the EC summit in London today.

Some Disarmament Progress Seen

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 13 Dec 86 p 3

[Editorial by Ulrich Mackensen: "NATO Spring Procession"]

[Text] The timing was quite propitious. While the foreign ministers of NATO were conferring in Brussels on problems of arms control, the chief commander of the Warsaw Pact troops, Soviet Marshal Victor Kulikov, let it be known that he would agree to a meeting with his "colleague" Bernard Rogers, the NATO commander-in-chief for Europe. This would also be an occasion to discuss among experts, as it were, the question of weapons reduction.

Moscow has repeatedly made similar advances, a propoganda offensive which started when Michail Gorbachev officially became the CPSU general secretary. The quick succession of proposals and the West's reaction, which until recently was rather slow and hesitant, to the repeated declarations by the Soviet Union that they would agree to arms control and even to disarmament on all levels, has at times gotten in the way of the realities in this country. For example, as early as April, Gorbachev had proposed negotiations on a reduction of non-nuclear armament.

So far, so good, were it not for the fact that since late 1985 there have been concrete proposals from the West on the negotiating table of the Vienna conference on troop and arms limitations in central Europe (MBFR). These proposals are based in turn on previous advances by Moscow. But nothing has stirred. Simply because the West, picking an old Lenin axiom that control is better than trust, did not want to forego on-site inspections. But so far Moscow is rejecting the monitoring of troop and armament reduction right at the site.

Added to this is another point. In the past, the West has rarely been able to speak with one voice. Above all, the Western leading power, the USA, could not be persuaded to make concessions especially in one area which is most unsettling to the Soviet Union: the Star Wars program, SDI. In the meantime, Washington is in a state of acute weakness to act which hardly gives rise to hopes for flexibility.

The foreign ministers of NATO are obviously making an effort to carry the balls tossed to the West by the Warsaw Pact. Their Brussels declaration on a reduction of conventional armaments might--if so desired by the Warsaw Pact--very well be a step forward; Friday's closing statement is also in the same vein, which has at its center the desire for less conventional as well as nuclear armament.

As deserving as this effort is and as much as one has to acknowledge that once again it is the recognizable handwriting of the (on this point) persistent Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the more evident becomes the dilemma of NATO. For when taking a closer look at the closing document, two addressees become evident: the Warsaw Pact for one, and the defense ministers of the Western alliance for another, who had convened in Brussels only a few days ago and who had a different reading after their meal.

The keyword is "zero-zero option." If this word, which means the complete elimination of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe, was nowhere to be found in the case of the defense ministers, it now resurfaces in the official paper of the foreign ministers. In other words, the foreign ministers want to proceed more persistantly, the security politicians are more likely to decelerate, which leaves unanswered the question as to what the potential negotiation partner is supposed to make of this and whom he should credit with more competency.

But this is what is really dismaying about the result of the two fall meetings. Not only was no clear line to be recognized, but broad differences of opinion also came to light on the subject of "arms control" where nuclear weapons were concerned, which should be a poor starting point for some day seriously putting Moscow's verbal willingness for disarmament to the test.

At least the "Brussels declaration" constituted a drive on the area of non-atomic weapons to which Moscow must make a definite comment. And as understandable as the Soviets' reservation against SDI is in combination with the reduction of atomic weapons, it would be unjustified as an argument against the reduction of conventional weapons. Here the Soviets are stronger; they know this and could easily agree to actual reductions. In this respect, the Brussels conference has recovered a tiny margin for the West, in spite of Washington's paralysis.

13011/9190
CSO: 5200/2479

RELATED ISSUES

FRG PRESS COMMENTS ON NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Paper Carries Editorial

DW141731 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 13 Dec 86 p 3

[Ulrich Mackensen editorial: "NATO Spring Procession"]

[Excerpt][Passage omitted] In the past, the West has rarely been able to demonstrate agreement. The leading Western power, the United States, in particular has not been ready to make concessions in a field that troubles the Soviet Union most of all, the Star Wars program, SDI. Meanwhile, Washington's ability to act is acutely handicapped — a fact that hardly allows us to hope for flexibility.

However, the NATO foreign ministers obviously are endeavoring to catch the balls that the Warsaw Pact has thrown to the West. Their Brussels Declaration on the reduction of conventional weapons could really constitute a step forward, if the Warsaw Pact wanted such a reduction. The final communique of Friday whose centerpiece is the desire for fewer conventional and nuclear weapons, also fits into the picture.

No matter how meritorious such aspirations may be, and much as we have to appreciate Foreign Minister Genscher's influence, who is persistent in that respect, the communique clearly demonstrates the dilemma that NATO is in. Taking a close look, the final document addresses two sides: on the one hand, the Warsaw Pact, and on the other, the Western alliance's defense ministers who met in Brussels several days earlier and issued a different statement.

The issue is the "zero option" which means the removal of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Whereas the term was not mentioned by the defense ministers, it now appears in the foreign ministers' official statement. In other words, the foreign ministers want to go ahead more consistently, whereas the security officials tend to put on the brakes. The question as to what the potential negotiation partner is supposed to think about that, and whom he can credit with more competence, remains unanswered.

However, what is really dismaying about the result of the two fall meetings is this: They not only reveal that there is no clear line, but they also show that there are differences over the nuclear "arms control" issue. That is a poor basis for seriously testing Moscow's verbal disarmament readiness.

Nevertheless, with the "Brussels Declaration" a move was made in the field of nonnuclear weapons, on which Moscow will have to comment concretely. No matter how understandable the Soviet objections to SDI may be, which they link to reductions in nuclear weapons, they would not be justified as arguments against reductions in conventional weapons. In that field the Soviets are stronger, and they are aware of it and could easily accept real reductions. In that respect, the Brussels meeting has given the West some very small leeway of action, despite Washington's paralysis.

Press Review

DW121143 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 12 Dec 86

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpts] One of the editorial issues today is the NATO disarmament initiative. [passage omitted] *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger* writes: The question is whether the words will be followed by action. Two sides are always necessaary for disarmament, and Gorbachev's will to release pawns can be tested only at the negotiating table. Moreover, years of a tug-of-war in the own camp seem to be programmed for the future: How many divisions should France send home, how many guns must the Bundeswehr scrap? The pride and happiness of the NATO foreign ministers about the birth of their youngest child before Christmas cannot cover up the concern of the alliance. The lessons of Reykjavik remain disputed. The United States, the main ally, is inactive because of the Iran affair, despite all statements being said to the contrary. 1986, the announced year of disarmament, threatens to ooze away in the swamp of arms deals.

The Duesseldorf *Rheinische Post* notes: The signal from Brussels is asking the Soviet leading power of the Eastern military bloc to put the cards on the table and confess how honestly the so far submitted spectacular disarmament proposals are meant. It was high time for NATO to take Moscow at its word. Gorbachev caused some irritations at the second meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik in October. The Western alliance was directly asked to prove that it was really a defensive and not an aggressive community. It has done so now, and Moscow is asked to follow suit. The *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* asks: What justifies the expectation that a wider circle of participants and a wider field of negotiations — Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals — will offer more chances for success? Arms controllers point out that a wider attempt sometimes makes matters easier. Most of all, the East stated several times this year that it wants to disarm in the conventional field also. If Gorbachev is serious about promoting the economy, he could save costs in expensive conventional armament more than in the field of nuclear misiles. At least with regard to finances the interests of the East and the West are similar. However, euphoria is uncalled for. One basic difference of opinion has not been eliminated so far, a difference that was important in MBFR negotiations. Moscow's chief disarmament negotiator Karpov recently said that the East's superiority in conventional weapons is just a Western tale.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Comments
DW141505 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13-14 Dec 86 p 4

[Dieter Schroeder editorial: "Foreign Policy with Borrowed Weight"]

[Exerpt] [Passage omitted] The Federal Republic is no nuclear power, but it has nuclear weapons on its territory. It cannot start a nuclear conflict, but iit can be dragged into one. Therefore, it is in its interest to contribute to preserving the balance of terror which has proved successful for 4 decades, and to help see to it that this balance does not move to a higher level, but moves gradually down and is consolidated at a lower level. That requires caution and circumspection, good relations with the superpowers and even better ones with its European neighbors. The Europeans must be careful. Even though the Reykjavik summit did not yield any results, relations between Washington and Moscow have started moving. Reagan has been weakened by "Irangate" and urgently needs to divert attention in foreign policy. The alternatives he has are simple: He can resume the struggle against the "evil empire" or try to reach an arms control accord with Gorbachev. In the first case, he would only please his old friends, and in the latter, he would win new supporters.

Therefore, discussion on the consequences of Reykjavik is necessary, as theoretical and confusing as it may seem for the moment. How much the Europeans fear that their interests could be jeopardized by a deal between Washington and Moscow is shown by the discussion that has flared in Paris, London, and Bonn again on basic foreign and security policy matters. The following three issues are in the focus: Can nuclear forces be replaced with conventional forces? Does that mean "separation" from the United States, particularly if Washington were to reduce and withdraw its conventional forces? Should the planned first step — the zero option in intermediate-range weapons in Europe — not be viewed in connection with the Soviet Union's superiority in short range intermediate-range missiles (no more than 1,000 km) and conventional forces? The NATO foreign and defense ministers have clearly established that connection, but they do not demand a linkage. The Europeans could not risk their credibility, because after all they have always demanded the zero solution.

The Europeans are in a dilemma. In the event of a zero solution, a link in the chain of their strategy of flexible response is missing. Raising the "nuclear" threshold by increasing the number of conventional armed forces does not help. It would be a waste of money, as long as the enemy has long-range theater field nuclear weapons. The mere threat to use them would force any conventional army to capitulate. It is therefore in our interest for French Prime Minister Chirac to say that sticking to nuclear deterrence must be the primary European "security principle." Reducing the intermediate-range missiles in Europe to zero would constitute an initial step to a more comprehensive arms reduction. But it would not resolve the European security problems, unless it was followed by further steps. The controversy on the issue will be growing, if the matter is getting serious. In this debate Bonn needs close relations with Washington and Paris, and good relations with Moscow. There is no alternative to disarmament talks on all issues.

DW141844 Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Dec 86 p 2

[Bernt Conrad commentary: "NATO Imperturbed"]

[Text] The Brussels fall meeting of the NATO foreign ministers has shown that despite the present turmoil in Washington the alliance is still functioning and capable of common decisions. Secretary of State Shultz, one of the few U.S. top politicians almost unaffected by the Iran weapons scandal, conveyed the impression that the Reagan administration does not allow its disarmament and security policy to be changed. That has confirmed the allies in their desire clearly to support that policy.

That is the success of Brussels. It is reflected by an offer to the Soviets to negotiate on conventional weapons and by an appeal to Moscow to agree in Geneva on a 50-percent reduction in offensive weapons and to a zero option in intermediate-range weapons in Europe without a linkage to SDI. In accordance with the Federal Government's wishes, the NATO foreign ministers also demanded that any accord on intermediate-range missiles not leave Soviet superiority in shorter range intermediate-range missiles out of account, but contain an obligation to negotiate on them. That must be welcomed, even though a tougher formula tion such as the one used by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti in his opening address would have been more effective.

Following the visions of Reykjavik, the express confirmation that the alliance's strategy of deterrence "on the basis of adequate conventional and nuclear defense" will continue to be valid without reservations, was useful. Reference is made in the final communique to the "continuing intensification of the Soviet Armed Forces" and the necessity to resist attempts of intimidation. It complements the NATO partners' desire for a "broad and constructive dialogue" with the Soviet Union and for "East-West relations aimed at more cooperation," which was particularly welcomed by Federal Foreign Minister Genscher. Only the two factors combined allow a realistic Ostpolitik.

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FRG PAPER SEES FRANCE DRAWING CLOSER TO EUROPEAN NATO STATES

Paris Seeks Alliance 'Europeanization'

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Dec 86 p 4

[Editorial by "kk": "Faint Noises Inside NATO"]

[Text] NATO's political state can best be gauged by the issues which the ministers and generals fail to discuss at the regular meetings of the organization. As far as the winter conference at the political headquarters in Brussels which has just begun is concerned, the list of official non-themes seems to indicate a good deal of controversy behind the scenes. First of all, there are the different assessments of the outcome of the Helsinki summit. The Danes and Norwegians, for example, feel that the American President was not flexible enough. The Paris government, on the other hand, is deeply perturbed about the possibility of a complete withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe. The Germans are torn between two positions: the foreign ministry is pushing the zero option, whereas the defense ministry discreetly distances itself from this point of view, calling attention to Soviet superiority in other areas.

Nor can the Brussels meetings gloss over the unhappiness felt by many of the European NATO countries about the unilateral decision by the United States to no longer observe the limits set by the SALT agreement. On this point, there are unequivocal statements by France as well as by Italy and Canada compared to which Genscher's cautious critique sounds positively restrained. These very distinct differences of opinion within the alliance are well known but, like the SDI dispute, they are discussed bilaterally rather than in the open forum of a NATO meeting.

One noteworthy aspect of this winter session is that France, in demonstrating clear opposition to a number of American positions, seems to be reassuming a role which it occupied prior to withdrawing from the military side of the alliance. At least verbally, the French seem more and more to be in favor of increased Europeanization of NATO. But if this came to pass, they would want to be in charge or at least to play first fiddle. France's reversion to its erstwhile role might well alter the shape of the Western defense alliance yet once more.

Chirac Speaks to WEU

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 4 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial by "J.B.": "Chirac's Principles"]

[Text] In an address to the Bundestag while on a visit to the FRG at the height of the debate about the NATO modernization program, French President Mitterrand voiced strong support for the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This amounted to a clear admission of the fact that France does not feel that its own nuclear weapons and those of Great Britain are sufficient to protect Europe. At the same time, France thereby affirmed its interest in maintaining the alliance with the United States and in the integration of Europe into U.S. deterrent strategy. Germany's social democrats in particular were caught off guard by Mitterrand's statements, since they had believed the French socialist's position to be entirely different.

French Prime Minister Chirac has now presented almost identical views to the WEU assembly. In the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit [he said], the nations of Europe need to be perfectly clear about their security interests--both for themselves and toward the United States. Chirac reiterated that nuclear deterrence is the only way to prevent war in Europe. In a sideswipe at President Reagan's SDI program, he added that new technologies should serve to strengthen nuclear deterrence rather than put it into question. European security, Chirac said, calls for strategic linkage between both sides of the Atlantic, i.e. the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons on the European continent. Just as the threat to European security must be viewed in its entirety, an appropriate balance in conventional and non-conventional weapons must be maintained in any disarmament program.

Like Mitterrand's address [to the Bundestag], the Chirac speech shows just how much French views have changed over the decades. General de Gaulle's assumption was that the United States had no choice but to come to Europe's defense in case of emergency. With the passage of time--and now yet once more in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit--France grew increasingly apprehensive about the fact that the United States, both in its defense policy and its disarmament objectives, might be thinking more of its own security and not so much about the security of the European-American alliance.

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BERLIN PAPER PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 11 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial by "J. B.": "Awaiting the Western Response"]

[Text] Of necessity, the far-reaching proposals for nuclear disarmament discussed at Reykjavik by Reagan and Gorbachev have increased the European NATO members' interest in an assessment of the significance of the so-called Budapest appeal by the WP nations for conventional disarmament "from the Atlantic to the Urals"--for if the nuclear component of defense policy were to become less important (which both sides in Reykjavik held possible), then the primary goal would be to deter the outbreak of war by conventional means. But NATO is unable to do this at the present time because it has never attained the requisite troop strengths. The NATO member nations therefore believe it is necessary to find out by way of disarmament negotiations whether a balanced relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be established in Europe. The NATO foreign ministers will submit a response to this question at their meeting which begins today.

One should not have any illusions about how difficult this job is. In view of the relative strength of East and West, the problem cannot simply be resolved by means of linear disarmament. Instead, the initial goal of negotiations will be to establish balance and strategic stability. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union would have to make the bigger sacrifices. There is no indication that it is willing to do so. But even if it were, lengthy negotiations would have to be conducted in view of the different structures of the armed forces and weapon systems involved. Above all, it would be necessary to draw up a precise inventory of the armed forces potential of East and West and this could not be done without mutual control and verification of the kind which would be required to oversee any disarmament program that was agreed upon.

But this is the very stumbling block which has caused all previous disarmament efforts to fail. Even the most modest troop reduction goal in Europe has been impossible to attain for decades. Initially, years were spent on a "data debate" in the course of which the two sides were unable to agree on the strength of the forces located in the proposed reduction area. Subsequently, once the West abandoned this debate, the Soviet Union refused to agree to effective controls over the proposed minimal reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces. But that happens to be the crux of all disarmament programs.

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PRC LIBERATION ARMY DAILY ANALYZES PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE

HK280320 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Article by Peng Di (1756 6611): "Prospects for World Peace as Viewed From the Present International Strategic Posture"]

[Excerpts] Viewed from the development of recent events, in 1986 alone, dialogues replaced heated interchanges of abuses on many occasions following the first U.S.-Soviet summit in Geneva (in November 1985). But progress in the dialogues was achieved slowly and the path was rugged and rough. On major and substantial issues, there is a great disparity between the views of both sides and the rift can hardly be closed in a brief space of time.

Negotiations, But No Action

The major and substantial issues between the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly divided into two groups: One can be called "negotiations, but no action," and the other "action, but no negotiations."

In saying negotiations but no action, we refer to disarmament. Arms control has all along been a major subject for discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union at the low, middle, and high levels for many years. The two countries have many things in common in their arms expansion. First, most weapons of the two sides are mainly aimed at each other. Second, even after being in the arms race a long time, the military strength of both sides is still nip and tuck. Third, with regard to the kinds and properties of their weapons, they each have their own strong points and it is hard to make a comparison.

According to the latest annual survey report prepared by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies on strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union obviously occupies a dominant position over the U.S. in intercontinental surface-to-surface missiles. (The Soviet Union has approximately 1,400 intercontinental surface-to-surface missiles, which can carry 6,420 nuclear warheads, and the United States has about 1,000 such missiles, which can carry 2,100 nuclear warheads.) However, in warheads carried by submarine-launched nuclear missiles, the United States gains the upper hand by a ratio of one to two. (The United States has 640 such missiles, carrying about 6,600 warheads. The Soviet Union has 900, carrying about 3,200 warheads.) In airborne guided missiles, the United States gains the upper hand by a ratio of one to four. (The United States has 260 bombers, carrying more than 4,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union has 160, carrying more than 1,000 nuclear warheads.)

In medium-range guided missiles, both the United States and the Soviet Union have something to be commended, and the two sides are well-matched. However, with regard to short-range weapons and conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has superiority over the United States.

This means that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can overpower the other on the battlefield and they dare not act rashly. At the disarmament negotiating table, neither is willing to make mutual concessions for fear of being overwhelmed by the other.

Even if a disarmament agreement were reached in principle, no action would be taken after decades of negotiations because their views are far apart on what kinds of weapons should be reduced first and what should not be reduced in view of the strategic situation and the various weapons properties. As a matter of fact, despite endless negotiations, the arms race has never stopped and the production of new weapons has never been delayed. At present, a new round of the arms race is developing in breadth and depth and is moving toward the "high frontier." Both sides have set a deadline for their research plans on advanced weapons at around the year 2000 and are prepared to have a long-term contest of strength.

Under such a situation, the U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit last October nearly broke up in disorder. Both sides earlier had agreed in principle that they would reduce their strategic weapons by 50 percent within 5 years and make further reductions within 10 years. However, differences of opinion arose whenever discussions on concrete measures to be taken were made. The United States advocated destroying "all its ballistic missiles" within 10 years but not destroying its bombers and cruise missiles, which are superior in quality and larger in quantity so as to counteract Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. The Soviet Union, however, did not agree to this. It asked for U.S. suspension of its Strategic Defense Initiative and requested that the United States conduct research and experiments only in the laboratory. The United States said no. Each held to its own position. This shows that their conflicts are notable. So far, the negotiations are virtually in the state of discussion where no action is being taken.

U.S. and Soviet policies in Asia and the Pacific have aroused attention around the world because the strategic position of the region is becoming more and more important. At present, Cambodia and Afghanistan are hot spots in the region. By supporting Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet Union pushed its position in the region forward by several thousand kilometers in one stroke. It also moved its troops about and mounted a large-scale invasion in Afghanistan and pressed on toward Pakistan and Iran, eyeing the Indian Ocean covetously. Consequently, although the Soviet Union has a heavy weight on its back, it has gained a lot in the strategic field. On the one hand, it is reinforcing its Navy and Air Force in Asia in an all-round way, from the Far East and Central Asia to Cam Ranh Bay. It has deployed different types of missiles, aircrafts and other new weapons and increased its aid to Vietnam considerably. On the other hand, it advocates that Asia and the Pacific should be included in the "international security system." All this shows that strategically, the Soviet Union is advancing south toward Asia and it will not retreat from those positions it now occupies.

The United States met with one defeat after another in its aggression and intervention in Asia because it was overanxious for quick results. Now it advances steadily in an effort to realize its long-term plans. To counter Soviet and Vietnamese territorial expansion, the United States has withdrawn to the second line and is fighting indirectly. It makes continuous efforts to readjust and strengthen its relations with Japan and develop military cooperation. At the same time, it also insists on stationing its troops in South Korea and on developing its traditional relations with the ASEAN countries. It does not openly interfere in the political situation in the Philippines in a bid to stabilize the situation. In view of bilateral and overall long-term interests, the United States is improving its relations with China.

In a certain sense, the U.S. plan of staging a comeback in Asia and the Soviet strategy of advancing south toward Asia is blow for blow.

Basically, the United States and the Soviet Union have not changed their policies of strengthening the arms race. Regional contention and "low intensity" regional conflicts are endless. The shadowy threat of a world war still lingers.

Prospects for Peace

However, the bipolar structure, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the center has begun disintegrating. At present they can no longer determine important issues in international relations such as war and peace. Most countries in the world, especially the Third World countries, oppose power politics and military alliances and make sustained efforts to strive for peace and social progress. They are not in a position to stage a world war, but they are in a position to foil and halt it. China, which pursues an independent diplomatic policy of peace, stands side-by-side with them. If Europe and Asia are regarded as two regions that world hegemony must contend for, then China, which resolutely opposes hegemonism, is hard to contend for. By opposing and restricting wars, China can make distinctive contributions.

European countries, including U.S. and Soviet allies, are generally unwilling to become an ignition point for a world war again, and are still less willing to be cannon fodder for a nuclear war. Moreover, hundreds and millions of people in the world bitterly hate war and antiwar mass movements now rise and fall around the world. People of the 1980's will, on no account, let the superpowers lead the world into a war of destruction.

Meanwhile, the development of military science and technology has changed many traditional laws of war and military thinking and has had a great influence on the world strategic structure. It is very likely that a nuclear world war will make belligerent countries perish in common ruin. The stronger a nuclear power is, the less it dares to wage war. Disarmament is not only a common demand of all countries but also the condition which enables the United States and the Soviet Union to coexist as opponents and to keep both sides from suffering losses.

These changes that have occurred are favorable factors that contribute to preventing a world war and safeguarding world peace. From the development of the world situation in the past year, we may also see the effect of these favorable factors.

First, the strategic positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the whole world are still being weakened. Their contention for regions in the world has not gone smoothly. In the Middle and Near East and in Central and South America, as well as in Afghanistan and Cambodia, power politics and military intervention are confronted with resistance and increasing difficulties. Second, U.S-Soviet relations are full of conflicts, but, all in all, the countries have exchanged dialogues again at a high level. No agreement was reached at the Iceland summit, but through discussions both sides, for the first time, reached an understanding on attaining a balance through substantial reductions in strategic weapons and medium-range missiles. In the past they often sought a balance at a higher numerical level. This is certainly an improvement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union believe that the understanding reached at the summit can be taken as a new starting point for further negotiations.

To summarize the above, there is still the danger of a world war, which will not disappear, and regional conflicts of "low intensity" will inevitably occur occasionally. However, in my opinion, a world war is not likely to break out before the end of the century. To all countries working for peace and development this will offer time and opportunities to increase their national strength so that they will be able to resist and frustrate aggressive wars and hegemonic activities from different areas and to mobilize all forces to force the United States and the Soviet Union to take effective measures in disarmament, and even in the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. In preventing wars and safeguarding peace, the task is arduous and the road ahead is long; but favorable factors are increasing. This is the trend of the times and the prospects for peace are bright.

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